上海的月亮: CN — LARRY ROMANOFF: 犹太人对人类的战争 — 第四部分——2008年美国非犹太裔住房危机（1/4) — The Jews’ War On Humanity –Part 4 – The 2008 US Gentile Housing Crisis (1 of 4)

Translator: Pearl

翻译者 Pearl

It can be hard to figure out who actually owns a building. Homes being treated like major sources of capital, instead of places for people to live. Source

很难弄清楚一栋建筑的实际所有者。房屋被当作主要的资金来源，而不是人们居住的地方。消息来源

This essay is about housing, and the Khazar Jews’ plan to eliminate home ownership for all but the (primarily) Jewish financier and industrial classes. Yes, I know. It sounds like just another conspiracy theory, but reserve your judgment until the end.

本文探讨的是住房问题，以及哈扎尔犹太人计划消除除（主要是）犹太金融家和工业阶层之外所有人的房屋所有权。是的，我知道。这听起来像是另一个阴谋论，但请在看完之后再做判断。

British banker Montagu Collet Norman (1871 – 1950), 1st Baron Norman, Governor of the Bank of England. Source

英国银行家蒙塔古·科莱·诺曼（1871-1950），第一任诺曼男爵，曾任英格兰银行行长。来源

I would remind readers here again about the statement by Montagu Norman, who was the Governor of the Rothschild-owned Bank of England, to the United States Bankers’ Association in 1924, often referred to as “The Bankers’ Manifesto”:

在此，我想再次提醒读者注意蒙塔古·诺曼（Montagu Norman）的声明，他曾是罗斯柴尔德家族拥有的英格兰银行行长，于1924年向美国银行家协会发表了这一声明，该声明常被称为“银行家宣言”：

“Capital must protect itself in every possible way, both by combination and legislation. Debts must be collected, mortgages foreclosed as rapidly as possible. When, through the process of law, the common people lose their homes, they will become more docile and more easily governed through the strong arm of government applied by a central power of wealth under leading financiers. These truths are well known among our principal men who are now engaged in forming an imperialism to govern the world. By dividing the voter through the political party system, we can get them to expend their energies in fighting for questions of no importance. It is thus by discreet action we can secure for ourselves that which has been so well planned and so successfully accomplished.” [1]

“资本必须通过联合和立法等一切可能的方式保护自己。必须尽快收回债务、取消抵押品赎回权。当普通民众通过法律程序失去家园时，他们将变得更加顺从，更容易被处于领导地位的金融家所控制的中央财富权力通过政府的强硬手段所统治。这些事实在我们那些正在构建帝国主义以统治世界的主要人物中是众所周知的。通过政党制度分化选民，我们可以让他们把精力投入到争取无关紧要的问题上。因此，通过谨慎的行动，我们可以确保自己精心策划并成功实现的目标。” [1]

There is no way to misunderstand the man’s words. The quote contains several distinct ideas, all of which are truly ominous for people in almost every country.

这个人的话不可能被误解。这段引述包含几个截然不同的观点，对于几乎每个国家的人来说，它们都透露出不祥的预兆。

(1) Debt enslavement — （1）债务奴役

(2) people losing their homes — （2）失去家园的人们

(3) government of central power by bankers — （3）由银行家掌控中央权力的政府

(4) bankers forming an imperialism to govern the world — （4）银行家们形成一种帝国主义来统治世界

(5) “democracy” a sham to divide and conquer the population; people waste their time on “questions of no importance” — （5）“民主”是分裂和征服民众的幌子；人们把时间浪费在“无关紧要的问题”上。

(6) “we can secure for ourselves that which has been so well planned”. If this isn’t a “conspiracy”, then what would be? —(6)“我们可以确保自己得到那些已经计划得如此周全的东西”。如果这不是“阴谋”，那又是什么呢？

“We shall have world government, whether or not we like it. The only question is whether world government will be achieved by conquest or consent.” James Paul Warburg (1896-1969) was the son of Paul Moritz Warburg, nephew of Felix Warburg and of Jacob Schiff, both of Kuhn, Loeb & Company which financed the Russian Revolution through James’ brother Max, banker to the government of Germany. Source

“不管我们是否愿意，世界政府终将出现。唯一的问题在于，世界政府是通过征服还是共识来实现。”詹姆斯·保罗·沃伯格（1896-1969）是保罗·莫里茨·沃伯格之子，费利克斯·沃伯格和雅各布·希夫的侄子，两人均来自库恩、洛布公司，该公司通过詹姆斯的兄弟马克斯（德国政府的银行家）为俄国革命提供资金。来源

I would remind you of James Paul Warburg, Jewish Banker, who in 1950 testimony to the U.S. Senate, said, “We shall have world government, whether or not we like it. The only question is whether world government will be achieved by conquest or consent.” [2] I would remind you also of David Rockefeller, Chairman of the Chase Manhattan Bank, who stated in 1991 during a Bilderberg Meeting, “We are grateful to The Washington Post, The New York Times, Time Magazine, and other great publications… for their commitment to global governance. The supranational sovereignty of an intellectual elite and world bankers is surely preferable to the national auto-determination practiced in past centuries.” [3] Rockefeller explicitly endorsed a “supranational sovereignty” led by bankers and elites, dismissing national sovereignty as outdated. This is directly connected to the Jews’ War on Humanity, because we will first be subjugated and colonised, one representation of this condition is us being homeless renters. This is not a joke.

我想提醒大家的是，犹太银行家詹姆斯·保罗·沃伯格（James Paul Warburg）在1950年向美国参议院作证时曾说：“不管我们是否愿意，世界政府终将出现。唯一的问题是，世界政府是通过征服还是通过同意来实现。” [2] 我还想提醒大家的是，大通曼哈顿银行董事长戴维·洛克菲勒（David Rockefeller）在1991年的一次彼尔德伯格会议上曾表示：“我们感谢《华盛顿邮报》、《纽约时报》、《时代》杂志和其他伟大的出版物……对全球治理的承诺。知识精英和世界银行家们的超国家主权，肯定比过去几个世纪实行的国家自决更可取。” [3] 洛克菲勒明确支持由银行家和精英领导的“超国家主权”，认为国家主权已经过时。这与犹太人对人类的战争直接相关，因为我们将首先被征服和殖民，这种情况的一个表现就是我们成为无家可归的租房者。这不是开玩笑。

To fully appreciate the extreme ferocity of this intent and the power and influence that lie behind it, we need to take a closer look at the 2008 housing crisis and financial meltdown. This is a complex topic with much detail necessary, so I have divided it into 4 parts.

为了充分理解这一意图的极端凶猛以及其背后的力量和影响力，我们需要更深入地研究2008年的住房危机和金融危机。这是一个复杂的话题，需要详细阐述，因此我将它分为四个部分。

The “housing problem” is a social boil that has been festering for many decades, and it emerged in full force (yet again) in 2007-2008 in the so-called “financial meltdown”. The 2008 financial crisis resulted in tens of millions of families in the US and some other nations losing their homes. This was generally referred to in the mass media as a “housing bubble”, insinuating that the problem somehow “just happened”.

“住房问题”是几十年来不断发酵的社会问题，在2007-2008年所谓的“金融危机”中（再次）全面爆发。2008年的金融危机导致美国和其他一些国家的数千万家庭失去了住房。大众媒体通常将此称为“房地产泡沫”，暗指这个问题不知何故“就这样发生了”。

But it didn’t just happen. It resulted from the confluence of processes consciously and deliberately executed by established capital, primarily the US FED, firms like Goldman Sachs, many banks, and some other participants, and of legislation and policies effected by the US government. We needn’t pretend to consider this a conspiracy between the major players. It is sufficient that they were all on the same page at the same time, each acting in their own interest, but with their actions complementing each other and magnifying the result. We can think of it as a sharp confluence of interests rather than a secret conspiracy. Nevertheless, when we examine the details, it is inescapable that the “housing bubble” was deliberately created and executed by a select group of actors with a willing and supporting cast, and that the end result was clearly foreseen at the inception of this process.

但这并非偶然发生。它是既定资本（主要是美联储、高盛等公司、众多银行以及其他一些参与者）有意识、有目的地执行的一系列流程，以及美国政府制定的立法和政策共同作用的结果。我们不必假装认为这是主要参与者之间的阴谋。只要他们同时达成共识，各自为自己的利益行事，但他们的行动相互补充并放大了结果，这就足够了。我们可以将其视为利益的急剧交汇，而非秘密阴谋。然而，当我们审视细节时，不可避免地会发现，“房地产泡沫”是由一群精心挑选的行动者故意创造和执行的，他们背后有一群心甘情愿的支持者，而且在这一过程开始时，最终结果就已经被清楚地预见到了。

And that leads us to the inconvenient truth that foreseeable consequences imply deliberate intent. I can foresee the consequences of striking a window with a hammer; it does me no good to claim I didn’t mean to break the glass. Foreseeable consequences imply deliberate intent.

这让我们面对一个令人不安的事实：可预见的后果意味着存在故意行为。我能预见用锤子敲打窗户的后果；声称我不是故意打破玻璃对我没有任何好处。可预见的后果意味着存在故意行为。

It is necessary to emphasise that, while the bubble was being inflated, all the participants had to be aware of that fact, and also aware of the inevitable result. First, the US FED opened the credit taps wide, providing virtually unlimited credit for home purchases. Next, mortgage interest rates were reduced to an all-time a low, not only making home purchases possible for many otherwise unenfranchised families but also encouraging widespread speculation. At one point in Canada, the mortgage interest rate at the major banks was 0%. If that isn’t a warning sign of something, then what would be? How can a bank lend money at 0% interest and remain solvent? As another indication, particularly in the US, the normal conditions required to qualify for obtaining a mortgage, were totally deleted. As the bubble inflated, mortgage applications contained no requirement for a minimum income, nor even for the applicant to have a job. House mortgages were available with no down payment, the banks willingly lending the entire appraised value of a dwelling. Further, the normal legal fees and real estate commissions were simply added to the mortgage amount. All the normal requirements for obtaining a home mortgage were suspended, along with all the cautious lending practices of banks.

有必要强调的是，在泡沫膨胀的过程中，所有参与者都必须意识到这一事实，并且也意识到不可避免的结果。首先，美国联邦储备系统（FED）大开信贷闸门，为购房提供了几乎无限的信贷。其次，抵押贷款利率降至历史最低水平，这不仅使许多原本无购房能力的家庭能够购房，还鼓励了广泛的投机行为。在加拿大，主要银行的抵押贷款利率一度降至0%。如果这还不算是一个警告信号，那什么算呢？一家银行怎么可能以0%的利率放贷，同时还能保持偿付能力？另一个迹象是，尤其是在美国，获得抵押贷款所需的正常条件被完全取消。随着泡沫的膨胀，抵押贷款申请中不再要求最低收入，甚至不要求申请人有工作。购房者可以获得无首付的房屋抵押贷款，银行愿意贷出房屋的全部评估价值。此外，正常的法律费用和房地产佣金只是简单地加到了抵押贷款金额上。所有获得住房抵押贷款的正常要求以及银行谨慎的放贷做法都被暂停了。

At the end, the mortgage market was flooded with what were termed “LIAR” loans and “NINJA” loans. The LIAR mortgages were loans made with no documentation: borrowers could state their income or assets without verification. The NINJA Loans meant “No Income, No Job, no Assets.” The situation became so ludicrous that, at the end, homeless unemployed drifters – with zero assets – were obtaining mortgages on $500,000 homes. Given that every participant in the financial industry had to be fully aware of these conditions, we can hardly claim the housing bubble was an unexpected accident.

有必要强调的是，在泡沫膨胀的过程中，所有参与者都必须意识到这一事实，并且也意识到不可避免的结果。首先，美国联邦储备系统（FED）大开信贷闸门，为购房提供了几乎无限的信贷。其次，抵押贷款利率降至历史最低水平，这不仅使许多原本无购房能力的家庭能够购房，还鼓励了广泛的投机行为。在加拿大，主要银行的抵押贷款利率一度降至0%。如果这还不算是一个警告信号，那什么算呢？一家银行怎么可能以0%的利率放贷，同时还能保持偿付能力？另一个迹象是，尤其是在美国，获得抵押贷款所需的正常条件被完全取消。随着泡沫的膨胀，抵押贷款申请中不再要求最低收入，甚至不要求申请人有工作。购房者可以获得无首付的房屋抵押贷款，银行愿意贷出房屋的全部评估价值。此外，正常的法律费用和房地产佣金只是简单地加到了抵押贷款金额上。所有获得住房抵押贷款的正常要求以及银行谨慎的放贷做法都被暂停了。

To summarise: (1) Credit was easily available to anyone, with virtually no limitations; (2) you could purchase a home at an extraordinarily low interest rate – sometimes zero; (3) you could purchase a home of almost any size or selling price; (4) you needn’t have had sufficient income to qualify for the mortgage payments, and in fact needn’t have had any income at all; (5) you didn’t need to be employed, nor to even have a fixed address; (6) you needn’t have had a down payment; you could borrow not only 100% of the selling price of a house, but also additional funds to cover the legal fees and real estate commissions, all included in the mortgage loan. Countless qualified (and unqualified) purchasers bought a house with the intention of flipping it within weeks at a higher price. This was the situation that actually existed at the time. It shouldn’t require much mental effort to conclude that something was very wrong with this picture.

总结如下：（1）任何人都能轻易获得信贷，几乎没有任何限制；（2）你可以以极低的利率——有时甚至是零利率——购买房屋；（3）你可以购买几乎任何面积或售价的房屋；（4）你无需有足够的收入来符合抵押贷款的还款要求，事实上，你甚至可以完全没有收入；（5）你无需有工作，甚至无需有固定住址；（6）你无需支付首付款；你不仅可以借到房屋售价全额的贷款，还可以借到额外的资金来支付法律费用和房地产佣金，所有这些费用都包含在抵押贷款中。无数符合（或不符合）条件的购房者购买房屋，意图在几周内以更高的价格转手。这就是当时实际存在的情况。不难看出，这种情况存在很大问题。

Source: 来源：

There were many “customer-friendly” advertisements stating, for example, “It doesn’t matter if you can’t pay the loan every month, you only need to pay interest for the first 24 months, and the principal of the loan can be paid after two years!” [4]

有许多“对客户友好”的广告宣称，例如，“如果你不能每月还款也没关系，你只需在前24个月支付利息，两年后即可偿还贷款本金！”[4]

To additionally entice speculative purchases, advertisements promoting “zero down payment” and initially low “teaser” interest rates became common. Billboards everywhere yelled out “Why rent when you can own?”, drawing more buyers into the market and fueling demand. The teaser interest rates meant that mortgage loans were offered at unreasonably low interest rates (sometimes zero) that would “re-set” to much higher levels after perhaps two years. The combination of low interest rates and easy credit led to an increase in speculative buying. Investors purchased homes with the expectation of selling them for a quick profit, contributing to the rapid rise in home prices. Given the frenzied speculation in the housing market, the borrowers essentially relied on “the greater fool theory” which assures us that we will be able to flip this property to yet a greater fool in the near future. Caution was therefore eventually thrown to the wind.

为了进一步刺激投机性购房，宣传“零首付”和最初低“诱饵”利率的广告变得司空见惯。各地的广告牌上大声疾呼“能拥有时为何要租房？”，吸引更多买家进入市场，并推高需求。诱饵利率意味着抵押贷款的利率低得离谱（有时甚至为零），但可能在两年后“重置”为更高的水平。低利率和宽松信贷的结合导致了投机性购房的增加。投资者购买房屋，期望通过转手快速获利，从而推动了房价的快速上涨。鉴于房地产市场的疯狂投机，借款人基本上依赖于“博傻理论”，即我们能够在不久的将来将房产转手给更傻的人。因此，谨慎最终被抛到了九霄云外。

Now think, what would be the natural, inevitable result of this combined set of circumstances? The first is that housing became financialised as an investment commodity, totally detached from the social good of dwellings for people. The second, and most obvious, would be a literal tsunami of home buyers. With free money and no restrictions, and with house prices promising to rise rapidly, why not purchase a house? The third result, stemming from the first two, was a dramatic increase in selling prices. This didn’t occur overnight; the bubble was being inflated since about the year 2000, and by 2008, or even 2006, the median selling price of homes in the US had doubled, and tripled from 1997 prices when the scheming first began for this fraud.

现在想想，这一系列情况交织在一起，会自然而然地产生什么不可避免的结果呢？首先，住房作为投资商品被金融化，完全脱离了住房作为人们社会福利的本质。其次，也是最明显的一点，就是购房者如海啸般涌现。有了免费资金且没有限制，再加上房价有望迅速上涨，为什么不买房呢？由前两点引发的第三个结果是房价的急剧上涨。这并非一蹴而就；泡沫自2000年左右开始膨胀，到2008年，甚至2006年，美国房屋的中位售价已经翻倍，而当这场骗局首次策划时，房价仅为1997年的三倍。

The bubble was obvious to everyone, but greed prevailed. Goldman, Sachs executives slept with dreams of riches far beyond the limitations of mere avarice, while the intermediary financial institutions had the same disease to a lesser extent. The local banks appear to have been totally overcome with equal portions of greed and recklessness, to the point where their lending practices became insanely unrestricted. And the eventual real losers, the individuals who purchased the homes, saw an innocent (and easy) opportunity for profit by purchasing a real estate asset that was rapidly appreciating. Everyone saw only the upside; no one seemed to consider that most hills have a downside.

泡沫对每个人来说都是显而易见的，但贪婪占了上风。高盛（Goldman Sachs）的高管们做着远超贪婪极限的财富梦，而中介金融机构则或多或少地患上了同样的病症。当地银行似乎完全被贪婪和鲁莽所征服，以至于他们的贷款行为变得毫无限制。而最终的真正输家——那些购买房屋的个人，则看到了一个无辜（且容易）的获利机会，即购买正在快速增值的房地产资产。每个人都只看到了好处；似乎没有人考虑到大多数山丘都有其不利的一面。

But this wasn’t the whole story. Goldman, Sachs created something new that was critical to the scheme, and in hindsight appears to have been their main purpose, and also unquestionably the cause of the financial meltdown. Through intermediaries like Countrywide, Washington Mutual, and Wells Fargo, Goldman, Lehman Brothers, and others, purchased these “subprime” mortgage loans from the original lending banks, mixed the good mortgages together with the subprime debt (the trash), Then sliced, diced, and repackaged them as AAA-quality bundled securities called CDOs, and sold them off to innocent pension funds, national social security funds, and other investors. With these bundles being marketed aggressively throughout the world, the demand for mortgages increased almost exponentially, serving to increasingly corrupt lending practices while further inflating the US housing market.

但这并不是全部。高盛（Goldman, Sachs）创造了一种对该计划至关重要的新事物，事后看来，这似乎也是他们的主要目的，而且毫无疑问是导致金融崩溃的原因。通过Countrywide、华盛顿互惠银行（Washington Mutual）和富国银行（Wells Fargo）等中介机构，高盛、雷曼兄弟（Lehman Brothers）等公司从原始贷款银行购买了这些“次级”抵押贷款，将优质抵押贷款与次级债务（垃圾）混合在一起，然后将其分割、组合并重新包装成名为债务抵押债券（CDOs）的AAA级捆绑证券，并将其出售给无辜的养老基金、国家社会保障基金和其他投资者。随着这些捆绑证券在全球范围内的大力推广，抵押贷款的需求几乎呈指数级增长，这不仅加剧了贷款行为的腐败，还进一步推高了美国房地产市场。

In case it isn’t obvious, I should state that a very significant percentage of the mortgages issued by the various banks were clearly substandard in terms of quality, with potentially millions of borrowers having no hope of making the required mortgage payments. And in fact, by the end of the bubble inflation, nearly all mortgages would have met this description. Yet it is crucial to note that as Goldman, Sachs and others heavily promoted these bundled securities, they assured purchasers the securities were “Grade AAA”. To assist in the fraud, the major stock and securities-rating firms, Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch, cooperated to rate these “securitised investment packages” as Grade AAA. It should have been obvious to investors that AAA could not be possible under these circumstances, but few knew the details of the mortgage securitisation until after the bubble burst.

以防有不明之处，我需指出，各银行发放的抵押贷款中，有很大一部分在质量上明显不合格，可能有数百万借款人没有希望按要求偿还抵押贷款。事实上，到泡沫膨胀结束时，几乎所有抵押贷款都符合这一描述。然而，必须指出的是，当高盛（Goldman Sachs）等公司大力推销这些捆绑证券时，他们向购买者保证这些证券是“AAA级”。为了协助欺诈，主要的股票和证券评级公司——标准普尔（Standard & Poor’s）、穆迪（Moody’s）和惠誉（Fitch）合作，将这些“证券化投资组合”评为AAA级。投资者本应清楚，在这种情况下，AAA级是不可能的，但在泡沫破裂之前，很少有人了解抵押贷款证券化的细节。

By 2006, the market reached its limit. As borrowing costs reset higher and household budgets were squeezed, people began to default on their mortgages. This led to a surge in foreclosures, which flooded the market with homes and caused prices to fall sharply. Documented reports were that house prices quickly plunged by 30% to 50% in many US states. [5] [6] To compound the effect, the FED raised interest rates in 2006, claiming an attempt to slow the growth of the housing market, but surreptitiously this was a deliberate act to burst the bubble and to effectively force the desired collapse in house prices. And, as house prices collapsed, the Jewish vulture funds and billionaires swooped into the market to buy up all those foreclosed homes at very low prices. More later.

到2006年，市场已达到极限。随着借贷成本重新调高，家庭预算受到挤压，人们开始拖欠抵押贷款。这导致止赎案例激增，市场上充斥着大量房屋，房价急剧下跌。有记录的报告显示，美国许多州的房价迅速下跌了30%至50%。[5][6]雪上加霜的是，美联储在2006年提高了利率，声称是为了减缓住房市场的增长，但暗地里，这是蓄意戳破泡沫、实际上迫使房价如愿崩溃的举动。而且，随着房价暴跌，犹太秃鹫基金和亿万富翁们涌入市场，以极低的价格收购所有止赎房屋。更多内容见后文。

You can see from the chart below, drawn from the St. Louis FED, what happened to US home sales. Note the dramatic increase from 2000 to 2005/2006, and the plunge to 2010. Note also the repetitive rises and plunges from 1970 onward. None of these were accidents either.

从圣路易斯联邦储备银行提供的下图可以看出美国房屋销售的情况。注意2000年至2005/2006年的急剧增长，以及2010年的暴跌。还要注意自1970年以来反复出现的上涨和暴跌。这些也都不是偶然的。

Source:来源：

Commensurate with this, the banks and financial institutions faced significant losses on those same mortgage-backed securities, and that led to a widespread credit freeze. This credit freeze, and the subsequent realisation that trillions of dollars’ worth of mortgage securities were of seriously questionable value, led to our “2008 financial crisis”.

与此相称的是，银行和金融机构在这些相同的抵押贷款支持证券上蒙受了巨大损失，这导致了广泛的信贷冻结。这种信贷冻结，以及随后人们意识到价值数万亿美元的抵押贷款证券的价值存在严重问题，引发了我们的“2008年金融危机”。

Everything I have written above, is generally well-known. But with these details fresh in our minds, we are no closer to being enlightened. We still have no understanding of WHY this disaster occurred, nor in fact HOW it occurred. We need to dig a little deeper, to trace this event from its inception, and to relate it properly to the agenda of the dispossession of the world’s Gentile housing, and to the broader category of the War on Humanity.

我上面所写的一切，基本上都是众所周知的。但尽管这些细节仍历历在目，我们却仍未得到启示。我们仍然不明白这场灾难为什么发生，事实上也不知道它是如何发生的。我们需要更深入地挖掘，从事件的一开始就进行追踪，并将其与剥夺世界外邦人住房的议程以及更广泛的“反人类战争”联系起来。

This event of the housing bubble, crash, and crisis, was not an accident. When we examine the entire circumstances and connect all the dots, it becomes very clear that the “crisis” was an orchestrated event meant to produce precisely the results that obtained from it. When we examine the details and put all the pieces into proper place, there is no way to avoid the conclusion that the entire 2008 housing event was a planned criminal fraud executed by a small group of players. This is where we will go first.

房地产泡沫、破灭和危机这一事件并非偶然。当我们审视整个情况并将所有线索联系起来时，就会非常清楚地看到，“危机”是一场精心策划的事件，旨在产生从中获得的确切结果。当我们审视细节并将所有碎片拼凑在一起时，我们不可避免地得出结论：2008年的整个房地产事件是由一小撮人策划执行的犯罪欺诈行为。我们将首先从这个角度入手。

2008年危机爆发的真正原因是什么？ — What Really Happened to Create 2008?

From all the available evidence, this debacle originated somewhere in the bowels of Goldman, Sachs, probably around 1995, when one of their officers or officials conceived the idea of securitising high-interest-rate and high-risk mortgages, and selling them off in tranches that would later be termed “Collateralised Debt Obligations“, or CDOs. Despite the fact that this enormous fraud had many deeply-involved active participants, it needn’t be seen as a conspiracy in any real sense. The impetus for the hatched plan likely originated during a casual discussion over lunch between a Goldman employee and someone from perhaps the Treasury Department. Given the attractiveness of the scheme and its potential for vast profits, and the fact that all the potential actors at this level were reading from the same playbook, the scheme likely took on a life of its own after that discussion. There were many pieces to put into place to create the environment and set the stage for this housing bubble-to-come, but much of this could have been accomplished through casual discussions among the necessary key players. Treasury could have spoken to the FED, the lobbyists from AIPAC to members of Congress, others to the intermediary banks, and some to the local banks as well.

根据所有现有证据，这场灾难起源于高盛（Goldman, Sachs）的某个内部部门，很可能是在1995年左右，当时该部门的一名高管或官员萌生了将高利率、高风险抵押贷款证券化，并分批出售（后来被称为“债务抵押债券”或CDO）的想法。尽管这场巨大的欺诈涉及许多深度参与的活跃参与者，但并不应将其视为真正意义上的阴谋。这一计划的推动力很可能源于高盛的一名员工与财政部某位人员之间的一次午餐闲谈。鉴于该计划的吸引力及其带来巨额利润的潜力，以及这一层面所有潜在参与者都在照本宣科的事实，该计划很可能在这次讨论后便自行发展起来。要为即将到来的房地产泡沫创造环境和搭建舞台，需要许多环节的配合，但其中大部分本可以通过必要的关键参与者之间的随意讨论来实现。财政部本可以与美联储、美国以色列公共事务委员会（AIPAC）的游说者、国会议员、其他中介银行以及一些地方银行进行沟通。

搭建舞台，第一步——金融化的诅咒 — Setting the Stage, Step 1 – The curse of Financialisation

It may not be well understood, but also is not a secret, that the Khazar Jews financialise almost everything. For example, this is the root of the push for privatisation, basically converting public goods into private profit streams. This applies to railroads, airports, prisons, electrical, water and gas utilities, toll highways, and much else. For more background on the severe dangers of this ideology, you may care to read “A Further Look at Privatisation” [7] and “World Map of Privatisation“. [8]

或许人们对此不太了解，但这也并非什么秘密：哈扎尔犹太人几乎将所有事物都金融化了。例如，这正是推动私有化的根源，基本上是将公共产品转化为私人利润流。这适用于铁路、机场、监狱、电力、供水和燃气公用事业、收费高速公路以及其他许多领域。如需更多关于这一意识形态严重危害的背景信息，您不妨阅读《私有化的进一步探讨》[7]和《私有化世界地图》[8]

It is the cause of the increasingly short-term vision exemplified by American and most Western multi-national companies, where “long-term” is the next financial quarter. This, in turn, has led to stock buybacks, call centers relocating to India, the offshoring of American manufacturing, huge unemployment, and much more. Simply put, due to financialisation, companies no longer exist to manufacture and provide products, but to avoid taxes and pay high dividends to stockholders. As Steve Ballmer of Microsoft so eloquently said, “Our purpose is not to make good software. Our purpose is to make money.”

这是导致美国和大多数西方跨国公司日益短视的原因，在这些公司中，“长期”意味着下一个财政季度。这进而导致了股票回购、呼叫中心迁往印度、美国制造业离岸外包、大量失业等问题。简而言之，由于金融化，公司的存在不再是为了制造和提供产品，而是为了避税并向股东支付高额股息。正如微软的史蒂夫·鲍尔默所言，“我们的目的不是制作好软件。我们的目的是赚钱。”

Source:来源：

住房金融化 — The Financialisation of Housing

Returning to housing, the core issue here is that the 2008 crisis really stemmed from a deliberately-programmed fundamental shift in what housing is: from an essential social good to a financial asset. This shift was not an accident, but the consequence of decisions and systems that evolved in planned measure over time. This process that we call “financialisation,” is a complex transformation driven by very specific mechanisms and by very specific actors (all Jewish), with profound implications for economies and societies.

回到住房问题，这里的核心问题是，2008年的危机实际上源于住房性质的一次蓄意规划的根本性转变：从一种基本的社会福利转变为一种金融资产。这一转变并非偶然，而是长期以来有计划、有步骤地演变而来的决策和制度的结果。我们称之为“金融化”的这一过程，是由非常具体的机制和非常具体的参与者（均为犹太人）推动的复杂转变，对经济和社会产生了深远影响。

There were several key mechanisms that prioritised the investment value of a house over its use as a home. A classic sign is what we term the “price-rent disconnect”, when housing prices rise far beyond what can be supported by their rental income. When the cost of buying a home is not justified by the potential rent, it indicates that prices are being driven by speculation on future resale value, not by the fundamental value of providing shelter. This speculation creates a dangerous cycle, a kind of self-reinforcing feedback loop. As prices rise, housing becomes a more attractive “investment”, drawing more capital into the market. This influx of money further drives up prices, which in turn attracts even more investment, rapidly inflating a price bubble. This is where the role of easy credit and leverage come into play. This process is deliberately fueled by easy credit, where buyers are encouraged to take on large amounts of debt, betting that future price increases will justify the loans. This of course amplifies both the boom and the eventual bust. This shift to the financialisation of American housing wasn’t an accident; it was propelled by the actions and incentives of several key groups. And, it is important to point out, this wasn’t the first time.

有几种关键机制使得房屋的投资价值优先于其作为住宅的使用价值。一个典型的迹象就是我们所说的“房价与租金脱节”，即房价涨幅远超其租金收入所能支撑的水平。当购房成本无法通过潜在租金来合理化时，就表明价格是由对未来转售价值的投机所驱动，而非由提供住所的基本价值所决定。这种投机行为创造了一个危险的循环，即一种自我强化的反馈回路。随着价格的上涨，住房成为更具吸引力的“投资品”，吸引了更多资金进入市场。资金的涌入进一步推高了价格，这反过来又吸引了更多的投资，迅速催生价格泡沫。这就是宽松信贷和杠杆作用发挥作用的地方。宽松信贷故意助长了这一过程，鼓励购房者承担大量债务，押注于未来价格上涨将使贷款变得合理。这当然放大了繁荣和最终的泡沫破裂。美国住房金融化的转变并非偶然；它是由几个关键群体的行为和激励所推动的。而且，重要的是要指出，这并非首次发生。

The consequences of the financialisation of housing are very serious. Speculative “investment” in housing, as opposed to normal purchases, seriously distorts other sectors of a nation’s economy, depriving “real” sectors of needed capital. The attraction is vast immediate profits, even though the activity contributes nothing to a nation’s economy and in real life distorts it badly. Also, housing financialisation worsens the gap between the rich and the poor. It creates a situation where those who already own property assets see their wealth grow effortlessly, while younger generations and lower-income families find it nearly impossible to get on the property ladder. This is one of the main factors that has destroyed the prospect of social mobility in the US and many Western countries. Those who can never accumulate a down payment – and pay off – a home, are almost certainly condemned to remain in the lower class. And of course, a financialised housing market is fragile. When a real estate bubble finally bursts, it will most often trigger a full-blown financial crisis with lasting damage to the entire economy, leaving behind a mess that takes years or decades to clean up. Think of Japan in the 1990s or the US after 2008.

住房金融化的后果非常严重。与正常购买行为不同，住房投机“投资”严重扭曲了一国经济的其他部门，剥夺了“实体”部门所需的资本。其吸引力在于巨大的即期利润，尽管这种活动对一国经济毫无贡献，而且在现实生活中严重扭曲了经济。此外，住房金融化加剧了贫富差距。它造成了一种局面：那些已经拥有房产的人财富轻松增长，而年轻一代和低收入家庭则几乎不可能踏上购房之路。这是破坏美国和许多西方国家社会流动前景的主要因素之一。那些永远无法积累首付并还清房贷的人，几乎注定只能留在下层阶级。当然，金融化的住房市场是脆弱的。当房地产泡沫最终破裂时，往往会引发一场全面的金融危机，对整个经济造成持久损害，留下需要数年甚至数十年才能清理的烂摊子。想想20世纪90年代的日本或2008年后的美国吧。

One inevitable result is the abrupt plunge into the lower class by former members of the middle class, and another is the inevitable transfer of wealth from the middle and lower classes to the 1/10th of 1% who engineer these booms and busts. But it is very important to understand the process: the hundreds of billions and even trillions of dollars in losses from a collapsed housing market, are not really ‘lost”; they become profits for the billionaire class who purchase these depreciated assets at pennies on the dollar. The main result of the collapse of any bubble, but here especially a housing bubble, is a transfer of wealth of almost unimaginable proportion from the lower and middle classes to the elite financial class. As I mentioned earlier, as house prices collapsed, the Jewish vulture funds and billionaires swooped into the market to buy up all those foreclosed homes at very low prices. Thus, the equity and value of all those homes (and families) were transferred from tens of millions of Americans into the hands of a few dozen Jews and their hedge funds.

一个不可避免的结果是，昔日的中产阶级成员突然跌入下层阶级，另一个结果是财富不可避免地从中下层阶级转移到策划这些繁荣与萧条的1%中的1/10的人手中。但理解这一过程非常重要：房地产市场崩溃导致的数千亿美元甚至数万亿美元的损失，并非真正“损失”；它们变成了亿万富翁阶层以极低的价格购买这些贬值资产所获得的利润。任何泡沫（尤其是房地产泡沫）崩溃的主要结果，是几乎难以想象的巨额财富从下层阶级和中产阶级转移到精英金融阶层。正如我之前提到的，随着房价暴跌，犹太秃鹫基金和亿万富翁们涌入市场，以极低的价格收购所有被取消赎回权的房屋。因此，所有这些房屋（和家庭）的权益和价值，从数千万美国人手中转移到了几十个犹太人及其对冲基金手中。

I would note here that China’s approach to this issue is astute. Chinese policymakers and analysts have explicitly identified “real estate financialisation” as a major risk. Official discourse consistently warns that it is as addictive and dangerous as a narcotic to the economy and emphasises that the fundamental positioning of a house is for living, not for speculation. This represents a conscious effort to resist the global trend of financialisation and re-anchor housing policy to its social function. Still, all of this is just background to help us understand the social and financial travesties that were created. We are still lacking the necessary enlightenment.

在此，我要指出，中国对此问题的处理方式十分精明。中国政策制定者和分析人士已明确将“房地产金融化”视为一大风险。官方言论一再警告，房地产对经济而言，其成瘾性和危险性堪比毒品，并强调住房的根本定位是用于居住，而非投机。这代表着中国有意识地抵制全球金融化趋势，并重新将住房政策定位为其社会功能。然而，所有这些只是背景信息，旨在帮助我们理解由此产生的社会和金融悲剧。我们仍然缺乏必要的启示。

搭建舞台，第二步——监管变革 — Setting the Stage, Step 2 – Regulatory Changes

Roosevelt signs the Glass-Steagall Act on June 16, 1933 to fix banking issues that had led to the Great Depression. Source

1933年6月16日，罗斯福签署了《格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案》，以解决导致大萧条的银行业问题。来源

There were two critical objectives necessary to be accomplished for this fraud to come to life. First, since Goldman’s scheme was clearly prohibited by law at the time it was hatched, Congress would have to be enlisted as a Shabbos Goy agent (servant of the Jews) at some point. Secondly, since the scheme would depend in very large part on stealth and secrecy as to the content (and quality) of the securities to be marketed, this required special legislative protection as well, involving Congress yet again.

要使这起欺诈案得以实施，必须实现两个关键目标。首先，由于高盛的计划在策划之初就明显受到法律的禁止，因此必须在某个时候让国会充当安息日男孩（犹太人的仆人）的角色。其次，由于该计划在很大程度上依赖于对所销售证券内容（和质量）的隐蔽性和保密性，因此也需要特殊的立法保护，这同样需要国会的参与。

For the first point, the Glass-Steagall Act was a law that had long separated commercial banking (taking deposits, making loans) from investment banking (underwriting securities, making speculative bets). That meant that Goldman, Sachs could not proceed with this housing securities fraud with the Glass-Steagall Act still in force. The movers and shakers of this scheme used their “bought and paid for” influence over Congress and the White House, utilising the extortionate abilities of AIPAC and similar pressure groups, and President Bill Clinton signed the repeal into law in November 1999. [9] [10] This repeal not only permitted Goldman, Sachs and friends to plunder the Gentile world unmolested, but it allowed the creation of megabanks like Citigroup that could originate mortgages, package them into securities, and then bet against them, creating catastrophic conflicts of interest.

关于第一点，《格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案》是一项长期将商业银行（吸收存款、发放贷款）与投资银行（承销证券、进行投机性押注）分开的法律。这意味着，在《格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案》仍然生效的情况下，高盛无法进行此次住房证券欺诈。这一计划的幕后推手利用他们对国会和白宫的“收买”影响力，利用美国以色列公共事务委员会（AIPAC）等压力团体的敲诈能力，而比尔·克林顿总统于1999年11月签署了废除该法案的法案。[9][10]此次废除不仅允许高盛及其盟友肆无忌惮地掠夺非犹太世界，还促成了花旗集团等巨型银行的诞生，这些银行能够发起抵押贷款，将其打包成证券，然后进行反向押注，从而引发灾难性的利益冲突。

The second point required laws that were “friendly” to the kind of securitisation that Goldman had in mind. To this point in time, the securitisation of assets, and the various complex insurance policies used to bet on, or bet against, those same securities, were tightly supervised by law. There was no possibility of Goldman, Sachs or Citibank executing this fraud in the dark. This situation clearly had to change and, courtesy again to AIPAC and Bill Clinton, it did change. In 2000, the Commodity Futures Modernization Act (which Clinton again signed into law) explicitly prevented the regulation of Credit Default Swaps (CDS), the insurance policies on CDOs. This allowed the securitised mortgage market to grow in the shadows, completely unregulated. [11] [12] And not only unregulated, but with the ability to completely hide the fraudulent nature of the scheme behind an impenetrable veil of secrecy. There was actually additional protection created to ensure the ability of these Jewish financiers to work in the dark: federal regulators actively preempted state-level attempts to interfere with or disrupt the execution of this fraud by warning them off in advance. The message from the top was clear: do not interfere.

第二点要求法律对高盛所设想的证券化“友好”。在此之前，资产证券化以及用于押注于这些证券或与之对赌的各种复杂保险政策都受到法律的严格监管。高盛、萨克斯银行或花旗银行不可能在暗中实施这种欺诈行为。这种情况显然必须改变，而得益于美国以色列公共事务委员会（AIPAC）和比尔·克林顿的努力，情况确实发生了变化。2000年，《商品期货现代化法案》（克林顿再次签署成为法律）明确禁止对信用违约掉期（CDS，即债务抵押债券的保险政策）进行监管。这使得证券化抵押贷款市场得以在暗中发展，完全不受监管。[11][12]而且，不仅不受监管，还能通过密不透风的保密面纱完全掩盖该计划的欺诈性质。实际上，还为确保这些犹太金融家能够在暗中运作提供了额外的保护：联邦监管机构积极抢先于州级机构采取行动，通过事先警告他们不要干预或破坏这种欺诈行为的实施，从而阻止了州级机构的干预。来自高层的讯息很明确：不要干预。

This would be a good place for you to ask yourself WHY Goldman, Sachs and the other initial participants wanted the Class-Steagall act repealed. You might also want to ask yourself WHY the US Congress would, suddenly and without apparent need or provocation, enact legislation prohibiting the supervision of, or investigation into, precisely such schemes as the bankers envisaged. Keep in mind that it is primarily such schemes that demand supervision and investigation. You might also care to ask yourself WHY federal regulators would want to warn the state-level regulators against investigation or interference in the bubble-to-be.

这将是一个好机会，你可以问问自己，为什么高盛和其他最初的参与者希望废除《格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案》。你或许还想问问自己，为什么美国国会会突然且在无明显需要或挑衅的情况下，颁布立法禁止对银行家们设想的这类计划进行监督或调查。请记住，正是这类计划才需要监督和调查。你或许还想问问自己，为什么联邦监管机构会警告州级监管机构不要调查或干预即将形成的泡沫。

搭建舞台，第三步——应对全球欺诈 — Setting the Stage, Step 3 – Taking The Fraud Worldwide

Bill Clinton repealed the Glass-Steagall Act on November 12, 1999. Source

比尔·克林顿于1999年11月12日废除了《格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案》。来源

Something else very important happened that was apparently missed by the media, but that was excruciatingly important to the mortgage fraud. You will recall the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act which permitted these vultures to loot the American people and the US government of trillions of dollars (to say nothing of the unimaginable social cost). But ambition and greed are unlimited, or at least they were unlimited in this case. Our banker friends actually wanted to loot the entire world, not just the US, but they had a problem in that most countries had their own version of the Glass-Steagall Act, preventing our parasites from exercising their plan outside the US. To re-state, all other countries had laws prohibiting the confluence of commercial and investment banking and also prohibiting the issuance of precisely the toxic and fraudulent securities these bankers wanted to issue. What to do?

另一件非常重要的事情发生了，但媒体显然忽略了，而这件事对抵押贷款欺诈来说却至关重要。大家应该还记得《格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案》的废除，该法案曾允许这些秃鹫掠夺美国人民和美国政府数万亿美元的财富（更不用说难以想象的社会成本了）。但野心和贪婪是无限的，至少在这个案例中是如此。我们的银行家朋友们实际上想掠夺整个世界，而不仅仅是美国，但他们遇到了一个问题，那就是大多数国家都有自己的《格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案》版本，阻止我们的寄生虫在美国以外的地方实施他们的计划。重申一下，所有其他国家都有法律禁止商业银行和投资银行的融合，也禁止发行这些银行家想要发行的有毒和欺诈性证券。怎么办？

At the same time that Henry Paulson became Goldman’s CEO, he apparently conspired (evidenced by a now-public memo) with Lawrence Summers, [13] who was then US Treasury Secretary, and also with a handful of other financial vultures, to remove banking and securities regulation worldwide – just as he had done in the US. While he was Treasury Secretary, Summers was instrumental in blocking all attempts by the US government and society to restrict or even supervise the creation and distribution of this new category of financial assets. He succeeded, but this was insufficient for the worldwide plan. To achieve their goal, Henry Paulson and Lawrence Summers conspired in a scheme to eliminate controls on banks in every country in the world.

在亨利·保尔森（Henry Paulson）成为高盛首席执行官的同时，他显然与时任美国财政部长劳伦斯·萨默斯（Lawrence Summers）[13]以及其他几位金融投机者合谋（一份现已公开的备忘录证明了这一点），在全球范围内废除银行和证券监管——正如他在美国所做的那样。萨默斯在担任财政部长期间，曾竭力阻挠美国政府和社会限制甚至监管这类新型金融资产创造和分配的所有尝试。他成功了，但这对于全球计划来说还不够。为了实现他们的目标，亨利·保尔森和劳伦斯·萨默斯合谋策划，在全球范围内消除对银行的管制。

To accomplish this, they used the WTO as a platform in what may have been the most egregious campaign of bullying and extortion in world history. In simple terms, the WTO was designed for trade in goods. But Summers and the other bankers concocted an amendment that would force all nations to specifically include banking “services”, and more specifically the trade in derivatives and other toxic financial instruments. Summers and the bankers did a re-draft of the Financial Services Agreement portion of the WTO, with new rules that would force all nations to open their borders to these same banks and their imaginative new financial products. [14] Readers should note that all of the articles and documents critical of this WTO “liberalisation” of financial “services” appear to have been deleted from the Internet. At one time, there were many of these. They may still exist, but the search engines refuse to supply them. The only articles remaining are documents from the WTO or BIS, which present only a sanitised, fairytale narrative. This clearly is a sensitive topic that powerful people want suppressed. Some may still be available on the Wayback Machine at archive.org, although the US is suing to have many documents deleted.

为了实现这一目标，他们利用世界贸易组织（WTO）作为平台，发起了可能是世界历史上最恶劣的霸凌和敲诈勒索行动。简而言之，WTO是为商品贸易而设计的。但萨默斯和其他银行家炮制了一项修正案，迫使所有国家明确将银行业“服务”纳入其中，更具体地说，就是衍生品和其他有毒金融工具的交易。萨默斯和银行家们重新起草了WTO的《金融服务协议》部分，制定了新规则，迫使所有国家向这些银行及其富有想象力的新金融产品开放边境。[14]读者应注意，所有批评WTO对金融“服务”进行“自由化”的文章和文件似乎都已从互联网上删除。曾经，这样的文章和文件有很多。它们可能仍然存在，但搜索引擎拒绝提供。仅存的文章是来自WTO或国际清算银行（BIS）的文件，这些文件只呈现了一个经过净化的、童话般的叙述。这显然是一个敏感话题，有权势的人希望压制它。尽管美国正在起诉要求删除许多文件，但其中一些可能仍然可以在archive.org的时光机（Wayback Machine）上找到。

But no nation was sufficiently crazy to willingly enact or accept such changes. Hence, the bullying and extortion. All nations, one by one, were presented with a “Hobson’s choice”; two alternatives equally disastrous and unappealing. Any country refusing to accept the new rules was threatened with economic hell – financial “sanctions”, a total trade embargo, total dislocation from the world’s financial system, confiscation of their US assets, and more. Eventually, almost every nation in the world was bullied into agreement by these Jewish bankers employing typical American “diplomacy”. And thus, the people who arranged the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in the US, accomplished the same result worldwide. And now the fraud-based calamity that faced the US people and the US economy, could be inflicted mercilessly on the rest of the world.

但没有哪个国家会疯狂到自愿实施或接受这样的变革。于是，便出现了霸凌和敲诈。所有国家都逐一面临“霍布森选择”——两种同样灾难性且令人不快的选择。任何拒绝接受新规则的国家都会受到经济地狱的威胁——金融“制裁”、全面贸易禁运、彻底脱离世界金融体系、没收其在美国的资产等等。最终，这些犹太银行家运用典型的美国“外交手段”，迫使世界上几乎每个国家都屈服并达成一致。因此，在美国安排废除《格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案》的人，在全球范围内取得了同样的结果。现在，美国人民和美国经济所面临的基于欺诈的灾难，可能会无情地波及世界其他地区。

启示录的骑士 — The Horsemen of the Apocalypse

The record indicates there were 5 banks involved initially in this worldwide scheme, but it is important to realise that “banks” do not bully and extort; it is the “bankers” who do that, real people with names. These are the banks and bankers, and their names:

记录显示，最初有5家银行参与了这一全球阴谋，但重要的是要意识到，霸凌和敲诈勒索的不是“银行”，而是“银行家”，是有名字的真实人物。这些银行和银行家及其名字如下：

Sources: Paulson – Goldman, Sachs; Corzine – Goldman, Sachs; Kamanski – Merrill Lynch – ; Coulter – Bank of America; Reed – Citibank; Shipley – Chase Manhattan

消息来源：保尔森 – 高盛；科尔津 – 高盛；卡曼斯基 – 美林；库尔特 – 美国银行；里德 – 花旗银行；希普利 – 大通曼哈顿银行

搭建舞台，第四步——“旋转门” — Setting the Stage, Step 4 – The “Revolving Door”

You have no doubt read about the constant two-way traffic in the US between the regulators and the regulated. The head of the FDA approves for public sale a questionable but highly-profitable new drug (Think of the Sackler family and their Oxycontin), and six months later is hired by that same pharmaceutical firm at a high salary for a position with no particular duties. It works in reverse, too: A pharmaceutical company wants to distribute a questionable but highly-profitable new drug, but cannot obtain government approval. Suddenly the company’s CEO is appointed as head of the FDA who then magically approve the new drug for sale. Six months later, the man quietly returns to his former position at the pharmaceutical company. There are literally dozens of such examples, each with a purpose that would be obvious even to a child.

你肯定读到过美国监管机构与被监管机构之间持续不断的双向交流。美国食品药品监督管理局（FDA）局长批准一种有争议但利润丰厚的新药上市销售（想想萨克勒家族及其生产的奥施康定），六个月后，该局长被同一家制药公司高薪聘用，担任一个没有具体职责的职位。反之亦然：一家制药公司希望分销一种有争议但利润丰厚的新药，却无法获得政府批准。突然间，该公司的首席执行官被任命为FDA局长，然后神奇地批准了新药的上市销售。六个月后，该人悄悄回到了制药公司原来的职位。这样的例子不胜枚举，其目的即使对一个孩子来说也是显而易见的。

Sources: Summers; Rubin; Geithner; Bernanke

消息来源：萨默斯；鲁宾；盖特纳；伯南克

I raise the Revolving Door here, because the 2008 housing boom and bust could not have happened without it, and this leads us back to Henry Paulson, the CEO of Goldman, Sachs. Paulson joined Goldman in 1974, became a partner in 1982 and a managing partner in 1988. He co-headed the firm’s investment banking division from 1990 to 1994, when he was named president and chief operating officer. He became Chairman and CEO of Goldman Sachs in 1999, which is almost certainly when the housing mortgage fraud scheme was nearing fruition and being promoted among the select group of bankers. Paulson was promoted to those positions around the time the Glass-Steagall act was repealed, and when the “Act to Protect Criminal Bankers From Scrutiny” was passed.

我在这里要提到“旋转门”，因为2008年的房地产繁荣与萧条离不开它，而这又把我们带回了高盛（Goldman Sachs）的首席执行官亨利·保尔森（Henry Paulson）。保尔森于1974年加入高盛，1982年成为合伙人，1988年成为管理合伙人。1990年至1994年，他担任公司投资银行部门的联席主管，之后被任命为总裁兼首席运营官。1999年，他成为高盛的董事长兼首席执行官，几乎可以肯定，此时住房抵押贷款欺诈计划已接近尾声，并在一群精选的银行家中得到推广。保尔森在《格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案》（Glass-Steagall Act）被废除以及《保护犯罪银行家免受审查法案》（Act to Protect Criminal Bankers From Scrutiny）通过前后被晋升至这些职位。

In May of 2006, when the housing crisis was nearing its peak and the impending explosion was becoming obvious, US then-President George W. Bush chose Paulson as Treasury Secretary, a nomination surprisingly and unconscionably confirmed unanimously by the Senate. Then, in 2008, when the bubble finally burst, Paulson was placed specifically in charge of the US government’s attempts to prevent a full-blown, world-wide credit crisis “resulting from widespread losses on faulty or subprime mortgage loans made by financial institutions”. That is actually an astonishingly euphemistic statement that magically disperses all the blame. Henry Paulson was the Chairman and CEO of Goldman, Sachs in 1999 when the mortgage fraud was implemented there, and remained at the helm through all of its execution, until it was obvious the entire house of cards would soon collapse. At precisely that moment, George Bush opened the revolving door and made Henry Paulson the US Treasury Secretary, where he would now be in a position to protect the bankers from the consequences of their criminality. This is like hiring the bank robber as CEO to now come in and save the bank from insolvency. But without returning the money he stole.

2006年5月，当住房危机接近顶峰、危机即将爆发时，时任美国总统乔治·W·布什选择保尔森出任财政部长，这一提名出人意料且不合情理地得到了参议院的一致确认。然后，在2008年，当泡沫最终破裂时，保尔森被专门指派负责美国政府防止“因金融机构发放的次级或不良抵押贷款普遍亏损”而引发全面、全球性信贷危机的努力。这实际上是一种令人震惊的委婉说法，神奇地分散了所有责任。1999年，当高盛实施抵押贷款欺诈时，亨利·保尔森担任该公司的董事长兼首席执行官，并在整个欺诈过程中一直掌舵，直到整个纸牌屋即将坍塌时才卸任。就在那一刻，乔治·布什打开了旋转门，让亨利·保尔森出任美国财政部长，这样他就可以保护银行家免受其犯罪行为的后果。这就像聘请银行劫匪担任首席执行官，现在他可以进来拯救银行免于破产。但前提是不归还他偷走的那些钱。

U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben Bernanke, Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission Christopher Cox, and director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency James Lockhart III, testify during a hearing before the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee September 23, 2008 on Capitol Hill in Washington, DC. Source

2008年9月23日，美国财政部长亨利·保尔森、联邦储备委员会主席本·伯南克、证券交易委员会主席克里斯托弗·考克斯以及联邦住房金融局局长詹姆斯·洛克哈特三世在华盛顿特区国会山参议院银行、住房和城市事务委员会举行的听证会上作证。来源

In this new position, Paulson was given enormous, almost unlimited power over the financial scene, despite his almost unlimited conflicts of interest. One of Paulson’s first acts: “He quickly pushed through the federal takeover of the quasi-government mortgage-loan agencies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.” In other words, Paulson engineered the US government takeover of the two massive mortgage agencies that he more or less personally bankrupted while at Goldman, Sachs. Then Paulson worked closely with FED Chairman Ben “helicopter” Bernanke to create a “credit facility”, i.e. quantitative easing (QE), i.e. the sudden issuing of trillions of dollars of free money to all the criminal banks involved in the fraud to enable them to escape with all their profits intact. Paulson and Bernanke especially convinced Congress to quickly pass an act to bail out the insurance company American International Group (AIG). At one point, Paulson was actually on his knees in Congress, begging them to approve the funds for the bailout.[15]

在这个新职位上，尽管保尔森的利益冲突几乎无边无际，但他被赋予了金融领域几乎无限的权力。保尔森上任后的首批行动之一是：“他迅速推动联邦政府接管准政府抵押贷款机构房利美（Fannie Mae）和房地美（Freddie Mac）。”换言之，保尔森策划了美国政府接管这两家大型抵押贷款机构，而他在高盛（Goldman Sachs）任职期间，或多或少亲手让这两家机构破产。随后，保尔森与美联储主席本·“直升机”·伯南克密切合作，创建了一种“信贷工具”，即量化宽松（QE），即突然向所有参与欺诈的犯罪银行发放数万亿美元的免费资金，使它们能够带着全部利润安然脱身。保尔森和伯南克尤其说服国会迅速通过一项法案，以纾困保险公司美国国际集团（AIG）。有一度，保尔森甚至在国会跪下，恳求他们批准纾困资金。 [15]

It should warm your heart to know that Paulson was also instrumental in the creation of the “HOPE NOW Alliance”, which was proclaimed as an effort by the same bankers “to assist struggling homeowners during the crisis”. Sadly, it bore no fruit and tens of millions of Americans lost their homes with no banker or government assistance anywhere to be seen. But it played well in the media as an effort to put a human face on the same bankers who caused all those tens of millions to lose their homes in the first place. [16] After having saved all his Jewish banking and insurance friends from bankruptcy, and after expressing appropriate sympathies for all the Gentiles who lost their homes, Paulson was replaced as Treasury Secretary by Timothy Geitner, who carried Paulson’s “financier resurrection programs” to their conclusion.

得知保尔森（Paulson）在创建“HOPE NOW联盟”中也发挥了重要作用，你定会感到心暖。该联盟被宣称是这些银行家们“在危机期间帮助陷入困境的房主”的一项努力。遗憾的是，该联盟并未取得任何成果，数千万美国人失去了家园，却看不到任何银行家或政府的援助。但它在媒体上表现良好，因为这是为了让那些最初导致数千万人失去家园的银行家们展现出人性的一面。[16]在帮助所有犹太银行家和保险业朋友免于破产之后，在对所有失去家园的非犹太人表示适当的同情之后，保尔森被蒂莫西·盖特纳（Timothy Geitner）接替为财政部长，而盖特纳则将保尔森的“金融家复兴计划”推向了终点。

更多背景信息 — Yet More Background

Stephen Friedman, left, was co-chairman of Goldman, Sachs in 1991 with Robert E. Rubin.Credit Gary Spector. Source

1991年，斯蒂芬·弗里德曼（左）与罗伯特·E·鲁宾共同担任高盛联席董事长。图片来源：Gary Spector

We could profitably step back a bit further in time, to determine the onset of the planning for this immense worldwide fraud. Robert Rubin was the US Treasury Secretary from 1995 to 1999, and by 1997 he had been already exerting considerable pressure on US officials to “de-regulate” the banks. His first push was to dismantle the barrier between commercial and investment banks, which required the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act. As one observer noted, this “was like replacing bank vaults with roulette wheels”. Rubin was also part of the Revolving Door, having been a Vice-Chairman of Goldman, Sachs along with Stephen Friedman, and Chairman of the firm’s management committee. [17] According to the Goldman, Sachs website, “Robert Rubin has led both the US Treasury and Goldman Sachs, which gives him a rare perspective on interactions between the financial and political systems.” [18] In this article, Rubin claims “The biggest risks to the US economy are political, not financial”. On this, he is 50% right because it is nearly entirely the Jews’ political influence and parasitical control of the US political system that leads to all these debacles – of which the 2008 meltdown was only one of many. But he was 50% wrong in that, because of the Jews’ control of the US political system, they create most of their disasters through the financial system.

我们不妨在时间上稍微回溯一下，以确定这场全球性巨大骗局的策划始于何时。罗伯特·鲁宾于1995年至1999年担任美国财政部长，到1997年，他已对美国官员施加相当大的压力，要求他们“放松对银行的监管”。他的首个举措是拆除商业银行与投资银行之间的壁垒，这需要废除《格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案》。正如一位观察家所言，这“就像是用轮盘赌取代银行金库”。鲁宾也是“旋转门”的一员，他曾与斯蒂芬·弗里德曼一起担任高盛的副董事长，并担任该公司管理委员会主席。[17]根据高盛网站的说法，“罗伯特·鲁宾曾领导美国财政部和高盛，这使他得以从罕见的视角看待金融体系与政治体系之间的相互作用。”[18]在这篇文章中，鲁宾声称“美国经济面临的最大风险是政治风险，而非金融风险”。在这点上，他有一半是对的，因为正是犹太人的政治影响力和对美国政治体系的寄生控制导致了所有这些灾难——其中2008年的危机只是众多灾难之一。但在这点上，他也有一半是错的，因为正是犹太人对美国政治体系的控制，他们才通过金融体系制造了大部分灾难。

But let’s not lose the main point, which is that the scheme which was being hatched by the bankers to loot the entire world, began around 1995 and required years of pressure on the US Congress to finally create the necessary legal environment for the execution of their massive fraud. And it should be noted that within weeks of leaving his position as Treasury Secretary, Rubin was named the Chairman of Citigroup. This is notable for reasons in addition to the Revolving Door, since it was expressly Rubin’s efforts to “de-regulate” the banks, that permitted the creation of the monstrosity later known as Citigroup.

但我们不要忽略重点，那就是银行家们密谋掠夺整个世界的计划始于1995年左右，并需要多年对美国国会的施压，才能最终为其实施大规模欺诈创造必要的法律环境。值得注意的是，鲁宾在卸任财政部长一职仅几周后，就被任命为花旗集团董事长。这一点之所以值得注意，除了“旋转门”效应外，还因为正是鲁宾明确推动对银行的“去监管化”，才促成了后来被称为花旗集团的庞然大物的诞生。

搭建舞台，第五步——专业抵押贷款公司 — Setting The Stage, Step 5 – The specialised Mortgage Companies

I stated above that “banks” were the originators of the subprime loans, but that was not entirely accurate. Our friends at Goldman, Sachs et al had conceived the idea of obtaining toxic mortgages in the trillions of dollars, bundling and re-packaging them, stamping them with AAA ratings, and selling them off to unsuspecting buyers all over the world. But there was one bottleneck in this “supply chain”; the investment banks (Goldman, et al) could not depend on the normal inhabitants of the US commercial banking system to cooperate in this fraud. Normal and sane bankers would resist providing mortgages to unemployed drifters, meaning that Henry Paulson’s dreams of unlimited avarice would go unrequited.

我在上文提到，“银行”是次级贷款的发起者，但这并不完全准确。我们高盛等公司的朋友曾设想，获取数万亿美元的有毒抵押贷款，将其捆绑和重新包装，贴上AAA评级的标签，然后卖给世界各地毫无戒心的买家。但这条“供应链”中存在一个瓶颈；投资银行（高盛等）无法指望美国商业银行系统的正常居民会在这场欺诈中合作。正常且理智的银行家会拒绝向失业的流浪者提供抵押贷款，这意味着亨利·保尔森无限贪婪的梦想将无法实现。

The solution was that the investment banks who were behind this fraudulent scheme took matters into their own hands and bought up several dozens of the seedy mortgage companies that lived in the nether world of low-quality high-risk borrowers. For example, Merrill Lynch acquired First Franklin Financial Company, a major subprime lender, and others did something similar. These were not passive investments; they were a strategic move to directly secure and control a steady supply of the high-yield raw material they needed for their CDOs. In cases where they couldn’t find a substandard, subprime mortgage company to purchase, the investment banks created, or financed the creation of, “specialised mortgage companies” to do the dirty work for them. The process functioned much like a manufacturing supply chain.

解决方案是，这些欺诈计划的幕后投资银行亲自出手，收购了几十家位于低质高风险借款人阴暗角落的肮脏抵押贷款公司。例如，美林收购了第一富兰克林金融公司（一家主要的次级贷款机构），而其他银行也采取了类似的举措。这些并非被动投资；而是直接获取和控制他们所需的稳定的高收益原材料供应以制作债务抵押债券（CDOs）的战略举措。在无法找到不合格的次级抵押贷款公司进行收购的情况下，投资银行会创建或资助创建“专业抵押贷款公司”来为他们做这些脏活累活。这一过程的功能很像制造业供应链。

The record indicates that most of those “specialised” lenders went bankrupt after the bubble burst, and it seems clear that this was the plan, that these mortgage companies were specifically created (or purchased) as “one-trick ponies”, solely to vacuum up every substandard borrower in the US, issue them a mortgage, and supply Goldman and Lehman with the high-yield assets they wanted. Many (perhaps all) of the subprime specialists like New Century Financial and American Home Mortgage Investment Corporation went bankrupt when the bubble burst, confirming the conclusion about these companies being temporary one-purpose tools. This was the actual structure of the subprime mortgage machine. The specialised mortgage companies were the crucial, and disposable, engine designed to generate the specific “product” that investment banks wanted.

记录显示，大多数此类“专业”贷款机构在泡沫破裂后都宣告破产，而且似乎很明显，这正是它们的计划：这些抵押贷款公司被专门创建（或收购）为“一招鲜”的机构，目的只是为了吸纳美国所有不合格的借款人，为他们发放抵押贷款，并向高盛和雷曼提供它们想要的高收益资产。许多（也许是所有）次贷专业机构，如新世纪金融公司和美国住房抵押贷款投资公司，在泡沫破裂时都宣告破产，这证实了这些公司只是临时性的、一次性使用的工具。这就是次贷机器的实际结构。专业抵押贷款公司是至关重要的、可随意处置的引擎，旨在生产投资银行想要的特定“产品”。

搭建舞台，第六步——投资银行“武器制造” — Setting The Stage, Step 6 – “Weapons Manufacturing” by Investment Banks

It is vitally important to appreciate that the huge contrived demand created by the bankers was not for “housing” or “homes”, but for high-yield mortgages.

至关重要的是，要认识到银行家们人为创造的巨大需求并非针对“住房”或“住宅”，而是针对高收益抵押贷款。

This is where the focus of the scheme could now actively turn to housing. The financial engineers on Wall Street had created in their imaginations a very lucrative and high-yielding securitisation machine, and the housing stock of the United States would now be used as the raw material to feed it.[19]

现在，该计划的重点可以积极转向住房领域。华尔街的金融工程师们曾凭借想象创造出一台利润丰厚、收益颇高的证券化机器，而美国的住房存量现在将被用作这台机器的原材料。[19]

It is very important for readers to understand this next point: The “demand” in the 2008 bubble was not for “housing”, but for “mortgage investments”, specifically high-yielding (and high risk) mortgages. The creation of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) would create an insatiable demand for high-yield mortgages. But the only way to obtain mortgages in sufficient numbers was to encourage hugely increased activity in house purchases. The problem was that traditional, safe, 30-year fixed mortgages weren’t sufficiently profitable, and thus unattractive, for what Goldman, Sachs and their friends had in mind. You cannot generate and execute a worldwide financial fraud by offering investors 3% or 5% on their money. You need the temptation of exceptionally high returns and, in the housing market, this could come only from subprime loans. The high yields were available only with high risk – the LIAR loans and the NINJA loans. And now we move into the fraud with a vengeance.

读者必须理解以下这一点：2008年泡沫中的“需求”并非针对“住房”，而是针对“抵押贷款投资”，尤其是高收益（且高风险）的抵押贷款。抵押贷款支持证券（MBS）和债务抵押债券（CDO）的诞生，将催生对高收益抵押贷款的巨大需求。然而，要获得足够数量的抵押贷款，唯一的办法就是鼓励大幅增加购房活动。问题在于，对于高盛及其友人而言，传统的、安全的30年期固定利率抵押贷款利润不足，因此缺乏吸引力。你无法通过为投资者提供3%或5%的回报来制造并执行一场全球性的金融欺诈。你需要的是异常高回报的诱惑，而在房地产市场，这种诱惑只能来自次级贷款。高收益往往伴随着高风险——即所谓的“说谎者”贷款和“无收入无资产”贷款。现在，我们进入到了极其恶劣的欺诈阶段。

To meet this demand for high-yield mortgages, lenders were incentivised to create a new high-yield product – the subprime mortgage – meaning low quality loans made at high interest rates to those with poor or no credit. This was the root cause of normal banks dumping all their lending restrictions and throwing caution to the winds. It was from this contrived “demand” for high-yield mortgages that mortgage companies began promoting zero down payment and initially low teaser interest rates, intended to draw more buyers – and especially substandard buyers – into the market, thus fueling an almost completely artificial demand for “housing” while providing the high-yield (and very high risk) mortgages. These subprime LIAR and NINJA mortgages were specifically designed according to specifications dictated by Goldman, Sachs.

为了满足对高收益抵押贷款的需求，贷款机构受到激励，推出了一种新的高收益产品——次级抵押贷款，即以高利率向信用不良或无信用者发放的低质量贷款。这是导致正规银行摒弃所有贷款限制、不顾一切地冒险的根源。正是基于这种人为制造的对高收益抵押贷款的“需求”，抵押贷款公司开始推广零首付和较低的初始优惠利率，旨在吸引更多买家——尤其是资质不达标的买家——进入市场，从而在提供高收益（且风险极高）抵押贷款的同时，催生了一种几乎完全人为的“住房”需求。这些次级“低收入者”和“无收入者”抵押贷款是专门根据高盛（Goldman, Sachs）制定的规格设计的。

When the real world is functioning normally, a bank lends its money to a borrower and maintains that loan on its books. It is therefore of considerable interest to the bank that the borrower have the capacity to repay the loan. No bank officer, even one mentally challenged or high on drugs, would issue a mortgage of $500,000 on a house worth $450,000, to an unemployed drifter with no income and no fixed address. But they did. And the reason they did, was that these mortgages were never designed to be retained by the bank. They were issued only for sale to Goldman, Sachs, Bear Sterns, Lehman Brothers, and other financial wizards (parasitic vultures, actually) to be securitised and sold. Thus, the lending banks didn’t care if the borrower could afford the payments because they would have sold off the loan to Wall Street within weeks. You can appreciate that this represented a fundamental shift from traditional lending.[20]

当现实世界正常运行时，银行会将其资金贷给借款人，并在账簿上记录这笔贷款。因此，银行非常关心借款人是否有能力偿还贷款。没有任何银行职员，即便是精神有障碍或吸毒成瘾的职员，会向一个没有收入、没有固定住址的失业流浪者发放价值45万美元的房子，价值50万美元的抵押贷款。但他们确实这么做了。而他们之所以这么做，是因为这些抵押贷款从来不是为了被银行保留而设计的。它们只是为了出售给高盛、贝尔斯登、雷曼兄弟和其他金融巨头（实际上是寄生秃鹫）进行证券化并出售而发放的。因此，贷款银行并不关心借款人是否有能力支付贷款，因为它们会在几周内将贷款卖给华尔街。你可以理解，这代表了与传统贷款的根本转变。 [20]

The mortgages did not go from the local banks or mortgage companies directly to Goldman and others similar. There were financial intermediaries like Countrywide, Washington Mutual, and Wells Fargo. It was these intermediaries, acting on explicit instructions from the wizards of Wall Street, who dealt with the local banks. It was they who would communicate in strict and direct terms the kind of mortgage, the size, and the yield required. If the local bank produced the specific high-yield, high-risk mortgages the intermediaries demanded, they were guaranteed purchase by the intermediary and thus these outstandingly risky loans carried no risk for the bank doing the lending. It was only this guarantee of immediate purchase by Wall Street that prompted the local banks to ignore their normal lending practices.

这些抵押贷款并非直接从当地银行或抵押贷款公司流向高盛等类似机构。中间存在Countrywide、华盛顿互惠银行和富国银行等金融中介机构。正是这些中介机构，在华尔街金融大鳄的明确指示下，与当地银行进行交易。正是他们以严格且直接的方式，沟通所需的抵押贷款类型、规模和收益率。如果当地银行生产出中介机构所要求的高收益、高风险抵押贷款，中介机构就会保证购买，因此这些风险极高的贷款对发放贷款的银行而言没有任何风险。正是华尔街这种立即购买的保证，促使当地银行忽视了其正常的贷款做法。

As if we weren’t already sufficiently deeply embedded in a fraud, there were two powerful supporting frauds in terms of “quality assurance”, and this involved the corruption of the rating agencies and insurance policies from AIG. For Goldman, Sachs and friends to perpetuate this fraud on a global scale, the severely toxic securitised mortgages had to be mislabeled as “safe”, and this first required the conscious, paid complicity of Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch. The profits offered to these agencies were enormous, provided they did what they were told to do. And they did. This was clearly and entirely a criminal fraud, involving willful ignorance and complicity by the rating agencies. Internal emails proved that rating agency analysts knew the models were flawed and referred internally to the securitised mortgage products as “dogshit.” [21] [22] But they rated them AAA anyway because they were knowingly and willingly an important part of the scheme, and were paid handsomely for their fraudulent mislabeling. The rating agencies provided the scientific-looking stamp of approval that made the entire fraud seem legitimate to pension funds and foreign investors. More about the complicity of AIG later.

仿佛我们还不够深陷于一场骗局之中，还有两场强大的“质量保证”支持性骗局，涉及美国国际集团（AIG）的评级机构和保险政策的腐败。为了使高盛及其友人在全球范围内延续这一骗局，那些剧毒的证券化抵押贷款必须被错误地标记为“安全”，而这首先需要穆迪、标准普尔和惠誉有意识地、有偿地串通一气。只要这些机构按照要求行事，它们就能获得巨额利润。而它们确实这样做了。这显然完全是一场犯罪欺诈，涉及评级机构的故意忽视和串通。内部电子邮件证明，评级机构的分析师知道这些模型存在缺陷，并在内部将证券化抵押贷款产品称为“狗屎”。[21][22]但它们仍然将其评为AAA级，因为它们明知故犯，心甘情愿地成为该计划的重要组成部分，并因其欺诈性的错误标记而获得丰厚报酬。评级机构提供了看似科学的认可印章，使整个骗局在养老基金和外国投资者看来似乎合法。稍后将详细介绍美国国际集团的串通行为。

It should be more than obvious by this time that a Jewish merchant bank hatched a scheme for an immense financial and social fraud, and enlisted many participants as active players. We cannot know exactly how this unfolded. At this distance in time, we will never know who said what to whom. We don’t know who exerted pressure on the US Congress to repeal the Glass-Steagall act, although we know pressure must have been exerted, since Congress would never have originated this abomination its own. And certainly, Bill Clinton was sufficiently compromised and pressured to sign it. We will never know precisely the circumstances that led the US Congress to pass the Commodity Futures Act that prohibited supervision, examination – and even knowledge – of dangerous financial schemes. This was by any measure one of the most recklessly stupid pieces of legislation ever passed by any government anywhere. It was an act that permitted a select few financiers to create financial instruments with a high likelihood of being not only financially disastrous, but also fraudulent and criminal, and specifically prohibiting any government oversight.

到目前为止，应该已经非常明显，一家犹太商业银行策划了一场巨大的金融和社会欺诈计划，并招募了许多参与者作为积极分子。我们无法确切知道事情是如何展开的。时隔多年，我们永远也无法知道谁对谁说了什么。我们不知道是谁向美国国会施压，要求废除《格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案》，尽管我们知道肯定有人施加了压力，因为国会绝不会主动提出这一令人憎恶的法案。当然，比尔·克林顿（Bill Clinton）也受到了足够的妥协和压力，不得不签署该法案。我们永远也无法确切知道，是什么情况促使美国国会通过了《商品期货法》，该法案禁止对危险的金融计划进行监督、审查，甚至禁止了解这些计划。无论如何，这都是有史以来任何政府通过的最鲁莽愚蠢的立法之一。该法案允许少数金融家创造金融工具，这些工具极有可能不仅在财务上造成灾难，而且具有欺诈性和犯罪性，并明确禁止任何政府监管。

Looking back on this immense treasonous criminal scheme, I would conclude that there was no single meeting in which it was created or expanded. Instead, there was most likely a series of conscious decisions by different individuals in different sectors, all reading from the same ideological script of deregulation, profit-maximisation, and obscene greed. There would have been some distinct coordination between the large merchant banks and the intermediaries and between the latter and the local banks, but these might well have been one-on-one conversations. When we have a distinct group of persons, all members of the same small tribe, all of whom are known to each other, and all of whom share the same ideology and “values”, it is easily possible for them to act in coordination without meeting the test of a “conspiracy”. Although, I would say that this distinction is largely academic since the result is the same.

回顾这一巨大的叛国犯罪计划，我得出的结论是，它并非在一次会议中形成或扩大的。相反，它极有可能是由不同行业中的不同个体做出的一系列有意识决定，所有人都遵循着相同的意识形态脚本：放松管制、利润最大化以及令人发指的贪婪。大型商业银行与中介机构之间，以及中介机构与当地银行之间，可能存在某种程度的明确协调，但这些很可能只是一对一的对话。当我们面对一个由同一小群体中的所有人组成的明显团体时，他们彼此认识，且都秉持相同的意识形态和“价值观”，他们很容易在无需满足“阴谋”标准的情况下协同行动。不过，我想说，这种区分在很大程度上是学术性的，因为结果是一样的。

Once again, it is vitally important to appreciate that the huge contrived demand created by the bankers was not for “housing” or “homes”, but for high-yield mortgages that could be bundled as CDOs and sold as high-quality investments to unsuspecting buyers.

再次强调，至关重要的是要认识到，银行家们人为制造的巨大需求并非针对“住房”或“住宅”，而是针对高收益抵押贷款，这些贷款可以被打包成债务抵押债券（CDO），并作为优质投资出售给毫无戒心的买家。

The financial system itself was at fault, but this must be personalised to individuals. It is not “the FED” that lowered interest rates to create the bubble and then raised them to burst it, but specific individuals at the FED, all under the watchful eye of Alan Greenspan. It was not “Goldman, Sachs” that created the bundled securities, but senior individuals within that organisation, most likely Henry Paulson who was Chairman and CEO. Identified individuals at banks and other institutions played a key role by providing ample credit for housing purchases, with extremely relaxed lending standards. The widespread securitisation of mortgages was performed by specific individuals at the very large merchant banks – real people with names. There is also a matter of US government policies and legislation; Certainly, Bill Clinton can claim major responsibility for the crisis, but so can most members of the US Congress. And of course, there were specific individuals with names at the rating agencies who actively and knowingly cooperated to fleece the public and investors alike.

金融体系本身存在缺陷，但必须具体到个人。不是“美联储”降低利率制造泡沫，然后又提高利率使其破灭，而是美联储中的具体个人，而这一切都是在艾伦·格林斯潘的监管之下。不是“高盛”创造了捆绑证券，而是该组织内部的高级个人，最有可能是时任董事长兼首席执行官的亨利·保尔森。银行和其他机构中的特定个人通过为购房提供充足的信贷，并放宽贷款标准，发挥了关键作用。抵押贷款的广泛证券化是由大型商业银行中的具体个人——有名字的真实个人——完成的。此外，美国政府的政策和立法也存在一定问题；当然，比尔·克林顿可以对这场危机承担主要责任，但美国国会的大多数成员同样难辞其咎。当然，评级机构中也有具体的有名字的个人，他们积极且故意地合作，欺骗公众和投资者。

Important Reading

The real estate bubble in the United States from 2001 to 2007 and the subprime mortgage crisis in 2008
2001年至2007年美国的房地产泡沫以及2008年的次贷危机

https://rmlt.com.cn/2016/0908/439423_5.shtml

Spiritual Godfather Colonel House and the Diplomatic Association (Part II)
精神教父豪斯上校与外交协会（第二部分）

https://finance.sina.com.cn/economist/shukanbolan/20070710/05393768587.shtml

Lessons From the 2008 Financial Crisis
2008年金融危机的教训

https://www.investopedia.com/news/10-years-later-lessons-financial-crisis/

Mr. Romanoff’s writing has been translated into 34 languages and his articles posted on more than 150 foreign-language news and politics websites in more than 30 countries, as well as more than 100 English language platforms. Larry Romanoff is a retired management consultant and businessman. He has held senior executive positions in international consulting firms, and owned an international import-export business. He has been a visiting professor at Shanghai’s Fudan University, presenting case studies in international affairs to senior EMBA classes. Mr. Romanoff lives in Shanghai and is currently writing a series of ten books generally related to China and the West. He is one of the contributing authors to Cynthia McKinney’s new anthology ‘When China Sneezes’. (Chap. 2 — Dealing with Demons).

罗曼诺夫先生的作品已被翻译成34种语言，他的文章被发布在30多个国家的150多个外文新闻和政治网站上，以及100多个英文平台上。拉里·罗曼诺夫是一位退休的管理顾问和商人。他曾在国际咨询公司担任高级管理职务，并拥有一家国际进出口企业。他曾担任上海复旦大学的客座教授，为高级EMBA课程讲授国际事务案例研究。罗曼诺夫先生现居上海，目前正在撰写一系列共十本书，总体上涉及中国与西方。他是辛西娅·麦金尼新选集《当中国打喷嚏》（第2章——与恶魔打交道）的特约作者之一。

His full archive can be seen at

他的全部档案可以在以下网址查看：

https://www.bluemoonofshanghai.com/ + https://www.moonofshanghai.com/

He can be contacted at:

他的全部档案可以在以下网址查看：

2186604556@qq.com

*
NOTES — PART 4
注释 – 第4部分

[1] Capital must protect itself in every possible way
https://yoice.net/en/montagu-norman-capital-must-protect-itself-in-every-possible-way/
[1] 资本必须竭尽所能保护自己
https://yoice.net/en/montagu-norman-capital-must-protect-itself-in-every-possible-way/
[2] The flow of money creates a path to a world group
https://www.163.com/dy/article/GTUS0Q4T0536UU0T.html
[2] 资金流动为走向世界集团开辟了道路
https://www.163.com/dy/article/GTUS0Q4T0536UU0T.html
[3] The flow of money creates a path to a world group
https://www.163.com/dy/article/GTUS0Q4T0536UU0T.html
[3] 资金流动为走向世界集团开辟了道路
https://www.163.com/dy/article/GTUS0Q4T0536UU0T.html
[4] With strong demand support, U.S. real estate will not fall hard
https://www.naipo.com/Portals/1/web_tw/Knowledge_Center/Editorial/IPNC_190313_1502.htm
[4] 在强劲需求的支撑下，美国房地产市场不会大幅下跌
https://www.naipo.com/Portals/1/web_tw/Knowledge_Center/Editorial/IPNC_190313_1502.htm
[5] US housing prices fell halfway
https://paper.cnstock.com/html/2008-06/17/content_61972356.htm
[5] 美国房价下跌过半
https://paper.cnstock.com/html/2008-06/17/content_61972356.htm
[6] The S&P 1 Home Price Index shows that housing prices in major cities in the US https://www.chinanews.com.cn/estate/kong/news/2008/07-30/1330095.shtml e falling at an accelerated pace
[6] 标准普尔1家房价指数显示，美国主要城市的房价正在加速下跌
[7] A Further Look at Privatisation
https://www.bluemoonofshanghai.com/politics/5647/
[7] 私有化的进一步探讨
https://www.bluemoonofshanghai.com/politics/5647/
[8] World Map of Privatisation
https://www.bluemoonofshanghai.com/politics/5634/
[8] 私有化世界地图
https://www.bluemoonofshanghai.com/politics/5634/
[9] Glass-Steagall Act of 1933: Definition, Effects, and Repeal
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/03/071603.asp
[9] 1933年《格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案》：定义、影响与废除
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/03/071603.asp
[10] Glass-Steagall Act Repealed, USA | 1999-11-12
https://historysphere.com/glass-steagall-repeal-1999/
[10] 美国废除《格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案》| 1999年11月12日
https://historysphere.com/glass-steagall-repeal-1999/
[11] How Deregulating Derivatives Led to Disaster, and Why Re-Regulating Them Can Prevent Another
https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1824&context=facpub
[11] 衍生品去监管化如何导致灾难，以及为何重新监管它们可以防止另一场灾难
https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1824&context=facpub
[12] Transforming big banks into bucket shops
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/318002314_Transforming_Big_Banks_into_Bucket_Shops_The_Impact_of_Gramm-Leach-Bliley_Act_The_Commodity_Futures_Modernization_Act
[12] 将大银行转变为投机商行
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/318002314_Transforming_Big_Banks_into_Bucket_Shops_The_Impact_of_Gramm-Leach-Bliley_Act_The_Commodity_Futures_Modernization_Act
[13] The Confidential Memo at the Heart of the Global Financial Crisis
https://www.vice.com/en/article/larry-summers-and-the-secret-end-game-memo/
[13] 全球金融危机核心的机密备忘录
https://www.vice.com/en/article/larry-summers-and-the-secret-end-game-memo/
[14] The GATS agreement on financial services – liberalisation
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/wp9755.pdf
[14] 《服务贸易总协定》关于金融服务的协议——自由化
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/wp9755.pdf
[15] “Business leaders in crisis” No. 4: U.S. Treasury Secretary Paulson
https://www.yicai.com/news/4642620.html
[15] “危机中的商业领袖”第四期：美国财政部长保尔森
https://www.yicai.com/news/4642620.html
[16] Henry Paulson
https://www.britannica.com/money/Henry-Paulson
[16] 亨利•保尔森
https://www.britannica.com/money/Henry-Paulson
[17] Rubin and Friedman Become Co-Heads
https://www.goldmansachs.com/our-firm/history/moments/1990-rubin-friedman
[17] 鲁宾与弗里德曼成为联席主管
https://www.goldmansachs.com/our-firm/history/moments/1990-rubin-friedman
[18] Robert Rubin: The biggest risks to the US economy are political, not financial
https://www.goldmansachs.com/insights/talks-at-gs/bob-rubin
[18] 罗伯特•鲁宾：美国经济面临的最大风险是政治风险，而非金融风险
https://www.goldmansachs.com/insights/talks-at-gs/bob-rubin
[19] The causes, disposal and enlightenment of the 2008 real estate crisis in the United States: the second part of the overseas real estate series
https://so.html5.qq.com/page/real/search_news?docid=70000021_7836548271850352&faker=1
[19] 2008年美国房地产危机的原因、处理及启示：海外房地产系列第二部分
https://so.html5.qq.com/page/real/search_news?docid=70000021_7836548271850352&faker=1
[20] Why does Bank of America dare to lend high-risk loans?
https://zqb.cyol.com/content/2008-01/20/content_2039336.htm
[20] 美国银行为什么敢放高利贷？
https://zqb.cyol.com/content/2008-01/20/content_2039336.htm
[21] Dogshit ratings
https://www.sott.net/article/501935-Rhyming-history-Inside-Job-2-0
[21] 狗屎评分
https://www.sott.net/article/501935-押韵历史-内幕工作-2.0
[22] Dogshit ratings
https://weissratings.com/en/crypto/coin/dogshit/trading-pairs
[22] Dogshit评级
https://weissratings.com/en/crypto/coin/dogshit/trading-pairs

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