上海的月亮: CN — LARRY ROMANOFF: 犹太人对人类的战争 — 第七部分——2008年美国非犹太裔住房危机（四之四

译者：Pearl

The entire housing bubble and resulting crash were unquestionably a calculated and orchestrated wealth transfer. The logical endpoint is that the financial crisis was a feature, not a bug. The results obtained were precisely the results that were planned. The “desired result” was a massive consolidation of wealth and power.整个房地产泡沫及其导致的崩溃无疑是一场精心策划的财富转移。合乎逻辑的结论是，金融危机是一个特性，而非故障。所得到的结果正是计划中的结果。“预期结果”是财富和权力的大规模集中。

The process worked as follows:

该过程的工作流程如下：

1. Lure the Public In: Create easy credit to inflate a massive bubble in the most universal store of middle-class wealth—housing./1. 吸引公众入局：创造宽松的信贷环境，在中产阶级最普遍的财富储备——住房中吹起巨大的泡沫。

2. Knowingly Sell “Toxic Waste”: Package the worst debts into complex instruments, get them falsely rated as safe, and sell them to pensions, municipalities, and other investors, effectively transferring risk from the insiders to the public./2. 故意出售“有毒废物”：将最糟糕的债务打包成复杂的金融工具，使其被错误地评定为安全，然后出售给养老金、市政当局和其他投资者，从而有效地将风险从内部人士转移给公众。

3. Trigger the Crash and Seize Assets: When the bubble inevitably pops, those who sold at the top (like the banks that bet against their own products) are left with cash. Meanwhile, the ensuing panic and foreclosure crisis allow well-capitalised entities like the issuing banks and the private equity firms to swoop in and buy up physical and financial assets at fire-sale prices./3. 引发危机并夺取资产：当泡沫不可避免地破裂时，那些在顶部卖出的人（如做空自家产品的银行）会获得现金。与此同时，随之而来的恐慌和止赎危机使得资金充足的实体（如发行银行和私募股权公司）趁机以跳楼价收购实物和金融资产。

The architects at the very top – those with the fullest picture of the system – were certainly aware they were building a machine for an orchestrated wealth transfer, while also being cognisant of the opportunities for using the crisis to centralise control. That was the plan. This validates the fundamental premise that the 2008 financial crisis was not an accident. It was the foreseeable and intended outcome of a system where the incentives for short-term personal gain were perfectly aligned with the mechanics of long-term societal destruction. The intelligence of the players didn’t prevent the crash; it was the very tool used to ensure that when the crash came, they would be on the winning side.

处于最顶层的建筑师们——那些对系统有最全面了解的人——当然清楚他们是在为一场精心策划的财富转移建造机器，同时也认识到利用这场危机来集中控制的机会。这就是计划。这证实了一个基本前提：2008年金融危机并非偶然。它是一个系统的可预见和预期结果，在这个系统中，短期个人利益的激励与长期社会破坏的机制完美契合。参与者的智慧并没有阻止崩溃的发生；恰恰相反，正是这些工具确保了当崩溃来临时，他们能站在胜利的一边。

When we think about the greater fool theory, we can accept “groupthink” and agree that, for some, it was profitable to be blind. But these adjectives apply only to the second tier of players and to their lieutenants, and to the individuals hoping to make personal profits. The adjectives emphatically do not apply to the FED, to the senior executives at Goldman, Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Citibank, AIG, or to the core players and designers of this travesty. It is they who had to know what they were doing, and what would be the inevitable outcome. One quote from a middle manager at Goldman, Sachs who said – before the bubble burst – “We will never go back to normal after what they have done.” From everything I have been able to discern, this was designed partly as an incalculable transfer of wealth from the many to a few, and partly one more piece of the class war. Recall estimates after the bubble burst that about 50% of the American middle class had descended into the lower class from this event, and that they would not likely ever rise again. What do you think of all this? Foreseeable consequences imply intent. And, finally, for any event, especially a bad one, the first question to ask is “Who benefits?” This question answers itself; those who orchestrated this were the only ones who benefited.

当我们思考“博傻理论”时，我们可以接受“群体思维”，并同意对某些人来说，盲目行事是有利可图的。但这些形容词只适用于第二层玩家及其副手，以及那些希望谋取个人利益的个人。这些形容词绝对不适用于美联储、高盛、雷曼兄弟、花旗银行、美国国际集团（AIG）的高级管理人员，也不适用于这场闹剧的核心玩家和设计者。正是他们必须知道自己在做什么，以及不可避免的结果会是什么。高盛的一位中层经理在泡沫破裂前曾说过：“在他们做了那些事之后，我们永远也无法恢复正常。”据我所知，这场闹剧的部分设计意图是将财富从多数人手中不可估量地转移到少数人手中，同时也是阶级战争的又一块拼图。回想泡沫破裂后的估计，大约50%的美国中产阶级因这一事件而沦为下层阶级，而且他们不太可能再次崛起。你对这一切有何看法？可预见的后果意味着有意图。最后，对于任何事件，尤其是坏事，首先要问的问题是“谁受益了？”这个问题不言自明；策划这一切的人是唯一受益的人。

Linking this to a class war suggests linking financialisation to broader social stratification. We can reference the FED’s own data on wealth redistribution post-2008 to substantiate this, and this should provoke serious concern about the systemic exploitation of the lower and middle classes.

将此与阶级斗争联系起来，意味着要将金融化与更广泛的社会分层联系起来。我们可以参考美联储2008年后关于财富再分配的数据来证实这一点，这应引起人们对中下层阶级遭受系统性剥削的严重关切。

This takes the analysis to its logical and most profound conclusion, and it is correct to do so. The standard explanations of financial incentives and groupthink are insufficient to explain the actions of the apex players—the architects at the very top of the Federal Reserve, the flagship investment banks, and the rating agencies. Let’s examine this through the lens of these two principles: (1) foreseeable consequences imply intent, and (2) “who benefits?”. These are the primary questions. When we apply these principles to the core architects, the picture that emerges is not one of folly, but of a cold, systemic logic.

这使分析达到了其合乎逻辑且最为深刻的结论，这样做是正确的。对金融激励和群体思维的标准解释不足以解释顶层人物的行为——即美联储、旗舰投资银行和评级机构最高层的架构师。让我们通过这两个原则来审视这一点：（1）可预见的后果意味着存在意图，以及（2）“谁受益？”。这是首要问题。当我们将这些原则应用于核心架构师时，所呈现出的画面并非愚蠢，而是一种冷酷的系统性逻辑。

1. The Federal Reserve was the “enabler” with foresight. The FED, under Alan Greenspan and later Ben Bernanke, was not a naive bystander. It was the chief engineer of the environment that made the bubble inevitable. Repeatedly, over many decades, the FED’s policy was to lower interest rates and inject liquidity at the first sign of market trouble. This created a profound moral hazard: financial institutions learned that they could take massive, asymmetric risks because the FED would socialise the losses and privatise the gains. Also, the FED chose to not regulate this financial sector, when it could have easily done so. The FED had the authority to crack down on predatory lending and exotic derivatives. They actively chose not to, pretending to an ideological belief that the market was self-correcting—a belief that served the interests of the largest players. The FED, of all the apex participants, knew the bubble was inflating. Their own internal documents and meeting minutes show serious concerns. The foreseeable consequence of their actions was a catastrophic bubble and bust. The intent had to have been in part specifically to destroy the middle class by allowing a devastating bubble to run its course. And the Middle Class was indeed destroyed when the FED raised interest rates and burst the bubble.

1. 美联储是具有远见的“推动者”。在艾伦·格林斯潘（Alan Greenspan）和后来的本·伯南克（Ben Bernanke）的领导下，美联储并非一个天真的旁观者。它是制造泡沫环境的总工程师，使泡沫变得不可避免。几十年来，美联储的政策一再是在市场出现问题的最初迹象时降低利率并注入流动性。这造成了深刻的道德风险：金融机构了解到，由于美联储会将损失社会化、将收益私有化，它们可以承担巨大的不对称风险。此外，美联储本可以轻易地对这一金融部门进行监管，但却选择不这样做。美联储有权打击掠夺性贷款和奇异衍生品。他们主动选择不这样做，假装相信市场具有自我纠正的能力——这一信念符合最大参与者的利益。在所有顶级参与者中，美联储最清楚泡沫正在膨胀。他们自己的内部文件和会议记录显示出严重的担忧。他们行为的可预见后果是灾难性的泡沫和破灭。他们的意图在一定程度上肯定是特别通过让毁灭性的泡沫自行发展来摧毁中产阶级。当美联储提高利率并戳破泡沫时，中产阶级确实遭到了毁灭。

2. Goldman Sachs and the “Big Short” players were the weaponisers of the system. This is where the point is most potent. Firms like Goldman Sachs didn’t just ride the bubble; they actively weaponised it. They continued to create and sell CDOs to their clients while simultaneously taking out insurance (credit default swaps) to bet against those very same products. This is the financial equivalent of selling a family a house you’ve secretly doused in gasoline, while taking out a massive life insurance policy on the family.

2. 高盛和《大空头》中的参与者是该体系的武器化者。这一点最为有力。像高盛这样的公司不仅坐享泡沫；他们还积极将其武器化。他们继续创造并向客户出售债务抵押债券（CDOs），同时购买保险（信用违约掉期）以对冲这些产品。这在金融领域相当于向一个家庭出售一座你偷偷浇上汽油的房子，同时为这个家庭购买巨额人寿保险。

Goldman, Sachs not only manufactured the bomb; they bet against it. We could call this “The Sackler Model” of finance, identical to the Purdue Pharma model: aggressively market a destructive product (OxyContin/CDOs) while having a perfect understanding of its catastrophic effects, because your profit is front-loaded, the losses will be borne by others, and you will be immune from prosecution. Who Benefited? Goldman Sachs posted record profits in 2007 as the crisis began to unfold for everyone else, because of their bets against the market. They then received a $10 billion bailout and converted to a bank holding company to get even more federal support. They were the ultimate beneficiaries.

高盛不仅制造了炸弹；他们还做空了它。我们可以称此为金融的“萨克勒模式”，与普渡制药的模式如出一辙：在充分了解其灾难性后果的情况下，大举推销一种破坏性产品（奥施康定/债务抵押债券），因为利润是前期投入的，损失将由他人承担，而你则免受起诉。谁受益？2007年，当危机开始向其他人蔓延时，高盛却因其做空市场而实现了创纪录的利润。随后，他们获得了100亿美元的纾困，并转型为银行控股公司，以获得更多的联邦支持。他们是最终的受益者

3. The rating agencies were the essential keystone of the fraud. Calling their actions “willful blindness” is too kind. They were paid accomplices, complicit partners. Their role was not one of mere negligence. By slapping a “Grade AAA” label on a product made of subprime loans, they provided the false credibility needed for the scheme to work on a global scale. This was not a “mistake”; it was a deliberate criminal fraud. The “Bought and Paid For” model is literal. The investment banks paying the rating agencies for their ratings shopped around for the best grade. The agencies that provided the most favorable (and fraudulent) ratings got the business. This was a direct financial incentive to lie. Everybody knew. Internal emails from Moody’s and S&P reveal they privately called the products they were rating “AAA” “dogshit” and “monsters.” They knew exactly what they were doing. Their AAA stamp was not a mistake; it was a commercial product they sold to make an immense fraud appear legitimate.

3. 评级机构是这场欺诈的关键基石。称他们的行为为“故意视而不见”都过于仁慈。他们是拿了钱的同谋，是串通一气的合作伙伴。他们的角色绝非仅仅是疏忽大意。他们给次级贷款产品贴上“AAA级”的标签，为该计划在全球范围内运作提供了所需的虚假可信度。这不是“错误”;这是蓄意的刑事欺诈。“买断”模式是名副其实的。投资银行为获得评级而向评级机构付费，四处寻找最高评级。提供最有利（且最具欺骗性）评级的机构获得了业务。这是直接的财务激励，促使他们撒谎。每个人都知道。穆迪和标准普尔的内部电子邮件显示，他们私下里称自己评为“AAA级”的产品为“狗屎”和“怪物”。他们非常清楚自己在做什么。他们的AAA级评级不是错误；而是他们销售的商业产品，让一场巨大的欺诈看起来合法。

The characterisation of this as a “transfer of wealth from the many to a few” and a part of the “class war” is supported by the data and the outcome. The mechanism of wealth transfer was simple: (1) Bait and inflate. Lure the middle class into debt by inflating the value of their primary asset (their home). (2) Extract. Through fees, mortgage payments, and the sale of toxic assets to their banks, pension funds, employers, wealth flows upward. (3) Pop. Trigger the collapse, wiping out the middle class’s equity and causing mass home repossessions. (4) Consolidate. Use public bailout money (from taxpayers) to recapitalise the banks, who then use that cheap money to buy up the foreclosed assets (houses, small businesses) at pennies on the dollar.

数据和结果支持将此描述为“财富从多数人转移至少数人”以及“阶级战争”的一部分。财富转移的机制很简单：（1）诱饵与膨胀。通过膨胀中产阶级主要资产（即他们的房屋）的价值，诱使他们负债。（2）榨取。通过向银行、养老基金、雇主收取费用、支付抵押贷款以及出售有毒资产，财富向上流动。（3）崩溃。触发崩溃，抹去中产阶级的资产净值，导致大规模房屋止赎。（4）巩固。使用公共救助资金（来自纳税人）对银行进行资本重组，然后银行利用这些廉价资金以极低的价格收购止赎资产（房屋、小企业）。

The main outcome was an enormous shift in wealth inequality. The recovery from 2008 was the most unequal in modern history. Over 90% of the gains in the first years of recovery went to the wealthiest 1%, or even the 1 /10th of 1%. The middle class saw its net worth decline dramatically. While a precise statistic is hard to pin down, the sentiment is correct that about 50% of the Middle Class descended mostly permanently into the Lower Class. The FED’s own Survey of Consumer Finances showed the median middle-class family saw its net worth fall by 40% to 50% between 2007 and 2010, and had not recovered to pre-crisis levels a decade later. The destruction of home equity and prolonged unemployment pushed a vast swath of the middle class into a more precarious, lower-economic stratum, one from which it was stated they would not likely ever recover.

主要结果是财富不平等现象发生了巨大转变。2008年后的复苏是现代历史上最不平等的复苏。复苏初期的收益中，超过90%流向了最富有的1%人群，甚至是1%中的1%人群。中产阶级的净资产急剧下降。虽然难以确定确切的统计数据，但大约50%的中产阶级主要永久性地沦入了下层阶级，这一观点是正确的。美联储自己的消费者财务调查显示，2007年至2010年间，中产阶级家庭的中位数净资产下降了40%至50%，十年后仍未恢复到危机前的水平。房屋净值的损失和长期失业使大批中产阶级陷入更加不稳定、更低的经济阶层，据称他们可能永远无法从中恢复。

We are right to dismiss simple explanations of incompetence for the core architects. The actions of the FED, Goldman Sachs, and the rating agencies were perfectly rational. They served the specific, short- and long-term interests of the institutions and the class they represent. The end result was clearly foreseeable. The collapse was the predictable outcome of their policies and actions, and in fact the only possible outcome. The primary beneficiaries were the architects themselves, who were insulated from the fallout and profited directly from the collapse.

我们有理由摒弃对核心建筑师无能的简单解释。美联储、高盛和评级机构的行动是完全合理的。它们符合这些机构及其所代表阶层特定的短期和长期利益。最终结果是可以预见的。崩溃是它们政策和行动的可预测结果，事实上也是唯一可能的结果。主要受益者是建筑师本身，他们免受崩溃的影响，并直接从崩溃中获利。

It is not possible that the housing bubble and 2008 financial meltdown were an accident. It was the financial system operating as it was designed to, revealing that its true purpose is not to facilitate productive enterprise for the benefit of society, but to serve as an engine for the consolidation of wealth and power for the Jewish elite. The fact that no high-level executive faced prosecution, that the banks grew larger and more powerful, and that the wealth gap widened, confirms that the system worked precisely as its most powerful beneficiaries intended it to work.

房地产泡沫和2008年的金融危机绝非偶然。金融体系按其设计运行，揭示出其真正目的并非为了促进生产性企业以造福社会，而是作为犹太精英阶层巩固财富和权力的引擎。没有高层管理人员面临起诉，银行规模越来越大，权力越来越强，贫富差距日益扩大，这些事实都证实，该体系正是按照其最强大的受益者的意图运行的。

I believe that one of the most useful insights comes from considering the 2008 housing bust as part of the class war. I relate this to the comments by Montagu Norman about renters and homeless people being docile and easy to control. This would mean that the housing bubble and subsequent financial crisis were engineered (1) to effect an enormous transfer of wealth from the middle class to a few elites, (2) to emasculate the middle class not only in the US but in all the “Western” world, and (3) to prepare the newly-dociled lower class for the New World Order to come. On this basis, it was a resounding success. It is very easy to see the housing bust as a successful wealth transfer scheme that devastated the Western middle class and placed it in a situation of population controlled through housing insecurity.我认为，将2008年的房地产泡沫视为阶级斗争的一

部分，能带来最有价值的见解之一。我将这与蒙塔古·诺曼（Montagu Norman）关于房客和无家可归者温顺且易于控制的评论联系起来。这意味着，房地产泡沫和随后的金融危机是经过精心策划的：（1）实现从中产阶级到少数精英的巨额财富转移；（2）削弱中产阶级的力量，不仅是在美国，而是在整个“西方”世界；（3）为即将到来的新世界秩序培养新驯服的下层阶级。在此基础上，它取得了巨大的成功。人们很容易将房地产泡沫视为一种成功的财富转移计划，该计划摧毁了西方中产阶级，并使其陷入通过住房不安全来控制人口的状态。

This thesis may seem extreme, but it perfectly echoes Montagu Norman’s historical remarks which stated precisely this thesis. Financial crises should always be viewed as intentional rather than accidental, without necessarily reducing them to a simple conspiracy. The key is that financial policies and actions – and results – that appear neutral or technocratic always have deeply political consequences in redistributing wealth and power upward.

这一观点或许显得有些极端，但它与蒙塔古·诺曼的历史论述不谋而合，后者正是阐述了这一观点。金融危机应始终被视为有意为之，而非偶然发生，而不必将其归结为简单的阴谋。关键在于，那些看似中立或技术性的金融政策和行动——以及其结果——在财富和权力的再分配上，总是会产生深远的政治后果，使财富和权力向上层集中。

The interpretation of the 2008 crisis as part of the class war is not only logically consistent but is supported by the outcomes and the statements of key financial elites. To say the 2008 crisis was “engineered” implies a single, secretive committee directing events, which is difficult to prove. However, if we view it as the culmination of a system deliberately designed to prioritise capital accumulation for an elite class—a system where crises are a feature, not a bug—then the conclusion is powerfully resonant.

将2008年危机解读为阶级斗争的一部分，不仅在逻辑上自洽，而且得到了关键金融精英的成果和言论的支持。如果说2008年危机是“策划”出来的，那就意味着有一个秘密的委员会在幕后操纵事件，而这一点很难证明。然而，如果我们将其视为一个蓄意设计、以精英阶层资本积累为优先的系统——一个将危机视为常态而非异常的系统——的最终结果，那么这一结论就极具震撼力。

I have written often that there are no “accidents” in the macro world, that when a significant event occurs, or a significant policy change is made, these were not only planned, but the results will inevitably be those that were intended and desired.

我经常写道，宏观世界中没有“意外”，当一个重大事件发生或一项重大政策发生变化时，这些不仅是有计划的，而且结果也必然是预期和期望的。

The 2008 crisis effected an enormous transfer of wealth from the middle class to the elite. The data are unambiguous on this point. The crisis and its aftermath acted as the most efficient mechanism for wealth transfer in modern history. As I have noted elsewhere, the recovery after the bubble burst, was historically unequal, with more than 90% of the income gains accruing to the top 1%. And again, the FED’s own data confirm that the devastated middle-class households had not recovered, while the wealthy grew substantially richer. This aligns chillingly well with the philosophy quoted from Montagu Norman. A financially secure and propertied middle class is confident, independent, and politically assertive. A financially precarious one is the opposite. By transforming a nation of homeowners into a nation of renters, the system creates a permanent tenant class and a new serfdom. This new impoverished class is financially vulnerable, with no equity to fall back on and facing ever-rising rents, they live paycheck-to-paycheck. They immediately become less mobile, much less able to relocate for better opportunities. And they are definitely politically dis-empowered. The constant financial stress creates a deep psychological vulnerability that saps the resources needed for civic engagement and protest.

2008年的危机导致了财富从中产阶级向精英阶层的大规模转移。这一点数据明确无误。这场危机及其余波成为了现代历史上最有效的财富转移机制。正如我在其他地方所指出的，泡沫破灭后的复苏在历史上是不平等的，90%以上的收入增长都流向了最顶层的1%。而且，美联储自己的数据再次证实，遭受重创的中产阶级家庭尚未恢复，而富人则变得更加富有。这与蒙塔古·诺曼（Montagu Norman）引用的哲学观点惊人地吻合。一个经济上有保障、拥有财产的中产阶级是自信、独立且在政治上坚定自信的。而一个经济上不稳定的中产阶级则恰恰相反。通过将一个拥有房主的国家转变为一个租房者的国家，这一制度创造了一个永久的租户阶层和一种新的农奴制。这个新的贫困阶层在经济上十分脆弱，没有可以依靠的资产，且面临不断上涨的租金，他们只能靠工资过活。他们的流动性立即降低，更不可能为了更好的机会而搬迁。而且，他们在政治上无疑被剥夺了权力。持续的经济压力造成了深层次的心理脆弱性，削弱了公民参与和抗议所需的资源。

From the perspective of those wishing to consolidate power, the housing crisis was a success. It broke the back of labor’s bargaining power for at least a generation; it made the population more dependent on the state and corporate employers, and it solidified forever the “Too Big to Fail” doctrine, making the financial sector more powerful and concentrated than ever.

从那些希望巩固权力的人的角度来看，住房危机是一次成功的行动。它至少在一代人的时间里削弱了工人的议价能力；它使民众更加依赖国家和企业雇主，并永远巩固了“大到不能倒”的信条，使金融部门的权力和集中度比以往任何时候都更高。

Wall Stree crash in 2008. Source

2008年华尔街金融危机。源

Calling this a “class war” is appropriate, with one crucial distinction: it is largely a one-sided war. It is not fought with protests and strikes from below, but with monetary policy, financial engineering, and legislation from above. The architects may not have gathered in a room and said, “Let’s destroy the middle class on Tuesday”. Instead, they operated under a shared ideology that the preservation of capital and the financial system were the supreme good, justifying any social cost. They pursued policies—deregulation, financialisation, austerity—that they knew would have the foreseeable consequence of enriching their class and impoverishing everyone else.

称其为“阶级战争”是恰当的，但有一个关键的区别：它基本上是一场单方面的战争。这场战争不是通过自下而上的抗议和罢工来打响的，而是通过自上而下的货币政策、金融工程和立法来打响的。策划者们可能并没有聚在一起说：“我们周二摧毁中产阶级吧。”相反，他们是在一种共同的意识形态下行动的，即认为保护资本和金融体系是至高无上的善，任何社会代价都是值得的。他们奉行的政策——去监管化、金融化、紧缩——他们知道会产生可预见的后果，即他们的阶级会变得富有，而其他人则会变得贫穷。

The 2008 crisis and the system that produced it functioned precisely as if it were engineered for the purposes described. The outcomes of massive wealth transfer and middle-class precarity are undeniable and are a direct result of choices made by a financial and political elite that was fully aware of the risks. Whether it was a conscious conspiracy or the logical endpoint of an ideology that serves capital above all else is almost a philosophical distinction. The result is the same. The analysis, framed by Montagu Norman’s candid admission, provides a coherent and deeply unsettling explanation for the events of the last two decades. It suggests that the “financial crisis” was not a failure of the system, but its intended and successful operation. This is perhaps the most tragic part of all, because it confirms fears and suspicions that the entire “system”, including the West’s treasured “democracy”, was designed and is operated to loot first the populations then the nations, and to subjugate all. This conclusion may seem harsh, but it is the only logical end.

2008年的危机及其产生的体系，其运作方式恰恰像是为了上述目的而设计的。大规模财富转移和中产阶级的不稳定状况是无可否认的，是金融和政治精英明知风险却依然选择所造成的直接后果。这是有意识的阴谋，还是一种将资本置于首位的意识形态的必然结果，这几乎是一个哲学上的区别。但结果是一样的。以蒙塔古·诺曼的坦率承认为框架的分析，为过去二十年的事件提供了一个连贯且令人深感不安的解释。它表明，“金融危机”并非体系的失败，而是其有意为之且成功的运作。这也许是所有部分中最具悲剧性的，因为它证实了人们的担忧和怀疑：整个“体系”，包括西方珍视的“民主”，其设计和运作都是为了先掠夺民众，再掠夺国家，并征服一切。这一结论或许显得有些苛刻，但却是唯一合乎逻辑的结局。

We can link this to similar conditions in the loans made by the World Bank and IMF to poor countries. The system is designed to keep the poor countries poor; it is irrelevant if some IMF banker tells his staff to make Nicaragua poorer. The system itself is designed to do that. The FED pushes interest rates to a very low level, and the IMF and World Bank encourage poor countries to borrow US$ for “development”, invariably pushing them to borrow beyond their means. Then the FED raises interest rates which make the loans suddenly unrepayable, and the lenders then move in to take arable land and all the country’s infrastructure in lieu of payment. The poor country is now measurably poorer and has lost much sovereignty as well. Keep in mind that the actual funds lent by these UN institutions are not theirs. The money comes from “private” lenders who are almost exclusively the Jewish bankers in The City of London. But let’s not lose the main point. In both cases, the “system”, while pretending good and charitable intentions, is actually designed and used to produce the opposite. The world’s “Achilles’ Heel” is trust in the system, and this applies as much to individual members of Western populations as to the governments of the world’s poor nations. The system is capitalist to the core, and colonial in its soul. It is designed only to prey and to control.

我们可以将此与世界银行和国际货币基金组织（IMF）向贫穷国家提供的贷款中的类似情况联系起来。该体系旨在让贫穷国家继续贫穷；即使某些IMF银行家告诉其员工让尼加拉瓜变得更穷，也无关紧要。该体系本身就是为了达到这一目的而设计的。美联储将利率推至极低水平，而IMF和世界银行则鼓励贫穷国家为“发展”而借入美元，这不可避免地迫使它们借入超出其偿还能力的贷款。然后，美联储提高利率，使这些贷款突然无法偿还，贷款人随即介入，以可耕地和该国所有基础设施作为抵押品。贫穷国家现在明显变得更穷，同时也失去了很多主权。请记住，这些联合国机构实际贷出的资金并非它们自己的。这些资金来自“私人”贷款人，而这些人几乎全是伦敦金融城的犹太银行家。但我们不要忽略主要的一点。在这两种情况下，“体系”虽然假装出于善意和慈善目的，但实际上却被设计和用来产生相反的效果。世界的“阿喀琉斯之踵”是对该体系的信任，这既适用于西方国家的个体成员，也适用于世界贫穷国家的政府。该体系的核心是资本主义，其灵魂是殖民主义。它只被设计用来掠夺和控制。

Consider again that the 2008 crisis and the system that produced it functioned as if it were engineered for the purposes described – the class war, the transfer of wealth, and so on. The emphasis is on the “as if”. In the end, it doesn’t matter if this was a literal conspiracy where men actually met in a dark room and said “Let’s destroy the middle class”, or if a group of individuals with a shared ideology acted independently while reading from the same script. The end result is the same. The tragic part is that it suggests that the “financial crisis” was not a failure of the system, but its intended and successful operation.” I believe this statement is true, that it was the intention of the system in its creation.

再次考虑2008年的危机以及产生这场危机的体制，它们似乎是为所述目的而设计的——阶级战争、财富转移等等。重点在于“似乎”。归根结底，无论这是否是一场真正的阴谋，即一群人真的在暗室里碰头，说“让我们摧毁中产阶级”，还是一群有着共同意识形态的人各自独立行动，只是照着同一个剧本念台词，结果都是一样的。悲剧之处在于，这表明“金融危机”并非体制的失败，而是其有意为之且成功的运作。我认为这一说法是正确的，这正是该体制创立时的意图。

I have a “but” in this context. If we agree that this was not a “dark room” conspiracy, there still must have been persons who knew they were starting the boom-bust process. This would begin with the FED lowering interest rates and setting the credit taps wide open. We cannot prove they did this in discussion with Goldman, Sachs, but this time was different, and it is obvious that various parties had to take cooperative actions to set the stage to turn the focus to housing in this particular case.

在此背景下，我想说一个“但是”。如果我们同意这并非一场“暗箱操作”的阴谋，那么一定有人知道他们正在启动繁荣与萧条的循环。这一循环始于美联储降低利率并大开信贷闸门。我们无法证明他们是在与高盛（Goldman Sachs）讨论后采取这些措施的，但这一次有所不同，很明显，各方必须采取合作行动，为将焦点转向房地产这一特定情况奠定基础。

There is something very serious here for us to consider: The FED have opened the credit taps many times before, and lowered interest rates many times before, but there was no housing bubble. The bubble instead was in the stock market, or some other sector, but housing remained untouched. What made the difference this time? The only possible answer is that housing was specifically targeted, meaning there was an intentionality behind the housing bubble.

这里有一些非常严重的问题值得我们深思：美联储之前曾多次开放信贷闸门，也多次降低利率，但当时并没有出现房地产泡沫。相反，泡沫出现在股市或其他一些领域，而房地产市场却未受影响。这次为何有所不同？唯一可能的答案是，房地产市场被特别针对，这意味着房地产泡沫背后存在某种故意为之的动机。

There was intentionality behind (1) the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act; (2) the passing of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act; (3) the creation of the CDO machine; (4) the rating agency corruption as the key enablers; (5) the use of the WTO Financial Services section to force all countries to permit the sale of toxic securities; and of course (6) the creation of the securitisation pipeline utilising the private mortgage companies; and (7) the active regulatory pre-emptions that prohibited state regulators from “interfering”. These were the specific actions that “set the stage” and turned the housing market into the epicenter of the crisis. We need to understand and appreciate how these elements – all deliberately created and executed – combined to create the financial travesties that emerged. While there may not have been a single meeting planning the crisis, there were absolutely conscious decisions to deregulate, to fuel subprime lending, and to create the securitisation pipeline – all while understanding the risks.

（1）废除《格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案》；（2）通过《商品期货现代化法案》；（3）创建债务抵押债券（CDO）机制；（4）评级机构腐败成为关键推动因素；（5）利用世贸组织金融服务条款迫使所有国家允许有毒证券的销售；当然还有（6）利用私人抵押贷款公司建立证券化渠道；以及（7）积极的监管优先措施禁止国家监管机构“干预”。这些都是“奠定基础”的具体行动，并将住房市场变成了危机的震中。我们需要理解和认识到，这些元素——全部都是故意创造和执行的——是如何结合在一起，造成了所出现的金融悲剧。虽然可能没有一次会议专门策划这场危机，但绝对存在有意识地决定放松监管、助长次级贷款、建立证券化渠道的行为——同时都明白其中的风险。

This is the crucial distinction that makes the 2008 crisis unique – while the FED has often used low interest rates to stimulate the economy, the specific and unprecedented outcome of the housing bubble required a confluence of additional, deliberate actions. It wasn’t just the FED opening the taps; it was about a series of other players actively directing that flow into a specifically designed container – the subprime mortgage securitisation chain. There is no way to avoid concluding that the very focus of this immense fraud was the US housing market, and all centered on subprime mortgages. The entire “lending” process was predatory, as was the entire sales process. There is also no way to escape the conclusion that the US Congress and Wall Street were full partners in this travesty, along with the FED, the rating agencies, and all the other apex players.

这一关键区别使2008年的危机变得独一无二——尽管美联储经常利用低利率来刺激经济，但房地产泡沫这一具体且前所未有的后果，需要一系列额外的、有意的行动共同促成。这不仅仅是美联储打开闸门那么简单；这是一系列其他参与者积极引导资金流入一个专门设计的容器——次级抵押贷款证券化链条。我们不得不承认，这场巨大骗局的核心正是美国房地产市场，而所有的一切都集中在次级抵押贷款上。整个“贷款”过程是掠夺性的，整个销售过程也是如此。我们还必须承认，美国国会和华尔街在这场闹剧中是十足的同伙，美联储、评级机构以及其他所有顶级参与者亦然。

Doesn’t it seem a bit strange to you that all those banks and mortgage companies in hundreds or thousands of locations would all have made what is clearly a totally irrational, irresponsible, and crazy, decision, all at the same time? How could such a thing happen? Why would any sane banker execute such decisions? That is how a bank goes bankrupt, and quickly, too. This was possible only because the banks knew in advance that Goldman, Sachs would purchase their substandard loans. This must surely be obvious. While there may not have been a conspiracy in the usual sense, there were too many cooperating factors that would never happen in a sane world, and that have never occurred before. The question we need to ask is WHO arranged the coordination behind what appears to be widespread irrational behavior across the entire banking system.

所有那些遍布数百或数千个地点的银行和抵押贷款公司，竟然同时做出了一个显然完全不合理、不负责任且疯狂的决定，这难道不奇怪吗？这样的事情怎么可能发生？任何一个理智的银行家怎么会执行这样的决定？这就是银行破产的原因，而且速度很快。之所以会出现这种情况，只是因为这些银行事先知道高盛会购买他们的次级贷款。这一点肯定是显而易见的。虽然可能不存在通常意义上的阴谋，但有太多的合作因素，这些因素在一个理智的世界里永远不会发生，而且以前也从未发生过。我们需要问的问题是，是谁在整个银行系统看似普遍的非理性行为背后安排了协调工作。

I wrote above that the US FED many times has opened the credit taps and lowered interest rates, but there was no housing bubble. What changed was that this time, the Goldman, Sachs and others had invented a scheme to get rich quick, but they needed several things done to pave the road and open the gates. Goldman imagined their get-rich-quick scheme, but needed the full cooperation of the US government and the FED to create an acceptable environment for the scheme to work. This required a sophisticated systemic framework to enable the fraud, and this in turn required a powerful alignment of interests among key players.

我之前提到，美联储曾多次打开信贷闸门并降低利率，但并未引发房地产泡沫。这次之所以有所不同，是因为高盛（Goldman Sachs）等机构发明了一种快速致富的方案，但他们需要完成几项工作来铺平道路并打开大门。高盛构想出了他们的快速致富方案，但需要美国政府和美联储的全力配合，才能为该方案创造一个可接受的环境。这需要一个复杂的系统性框架来使欺诈成为可能，而这反过来又需要关键参与者之间强大的利益联盟。

高盛的顿悟——起源故事：J.P.摩根与BISTRO — Goldman Sachs Epiphany – The Origin Story: J.P. Morgan and the BISTRO

Blythe Masters photographed in 2009. Photograph by Joshua Roberts/Bloomberg

2009年拍摄的布莱斯·马斯特斯。照片由约书亚·罗伯茨/彭博社提供

To fully understand the real issues with AIG in this travesty, we need to take a step back in time to where the spark was lit for this immense housing fraud to come to life. The concept didn’t start with AIG, or even with Goldman, Sachs. It started in the mid-1990s at J.P. Morgan. The problem was that Morgan had billions of dollars in corporate loans sitting on its books. These loans were lucrative but came with a cost: regulators required the bank to hold significant capital in reserve against them. This “regulatory capital” was money that couldn’t be leveraged for more profitable activities.

为了充分理解美国国际集团（AIG）在这场闹剧中的真正问题，我们需要回溯到过去，探究这场巨大住房欺诈的导火索。这一概念并非始于AIG，甚至也不是始于高盛。它始于20世纪90年代中期的摩根大通。问题在于，摩根大通账簿上有数十亿美元的企业贷款。这些贷款利润丰厚，但也有成本：监管机构要求该银行为这些贷款持有大量资本储备。这种“监管资本”是不能用于更有利可图活动的资金。

A team at J.P. Morgan, led by Blythe Masters, created a revolutionary product called the Broad Index Secured Trust Offering (BISTRO). This was the direct precursor to the modern synthetic CDO. The idea was to package the risk of these corporate loans and sell it to investors, thereby moving the risk off J.P. Morgan’s balance sheet. Once the risk was gone, the regulators would allow them to free up the capital. To make this work and get the coveted AAA rating from agencies, they needed to insure the super-senior tranche of the BISTRO – the piece that was considered so safe it was almost impossible to lose money on. They first approached insurance companies, but the insurers were hesitant because they didn’t understand this new, complex instrument.

由布莱斯·马斯特斯（Blythe Masters）领导的摩根大通团队创造了一种名为“广泛指数担保信托产品”（Broad Index Secured Trust Offering, BISTRO）的革命性产品。这是现代合成债务抵押债券（CDO）的直接前身。其想法是将这些企业贷款的风险打包出售给投资者，从而将风险从摩根大通的资产负债表上转移出去。一旦风险消失，监管机构就会允许他们释放资本。为了使这一做法奏效，并从评级机构那里获得令人垂涎的AAA评级，他们需要对BISTRO的超高级部分进行保险——这部分被认为非常安全，几乎不可能亏损。他们首先联系了保险公司，但保险公司犹豫不决，因为他们不了解这种新型的复杂工具。

This is where AIG entered the picture. AIGFP, led by Howard Sosin and later Joe Cassano, was a unit known for being staffed by brilliant, aggressive derivatives traders from Wall Street. They were not traditional insurance salesmen; they were a hedge fund embedded inside an insurance giant. When J.P. Morgan approached AIGFP around 1998, the people at AIGFP immediately saw the opportunity. Their analysis, based on their models, concluded that the super-senior tranche was indeed risk-free. In their view, they were being paid insurance premiums for an event that would never happen. It was, as I said, “free money.”

这就是美国国际集团（AIG）介入的地方。由霍华德·索辛（Howard Sosin）和后来的乔·卡萨诺（Joe Cassano）领导的AIG金融产品公司（AIGFP）是一个部门，以拥有来自华尔街的聪明且激进的衍生品交易员而闻名。他们不是传统的保险推销员；他们是一个嵌入保险巨头内部的对冲基金。当摩根大通在1998年左右与AIGFP接洽时，AIGFP的人立即看到了机会。他们基于模型的分析得出结论，超高级别确实是无风险的。在他们看来，他们是在为一件永远不会发生的事件支付保险费。正如我所说，这是“免费的钱”

The First Deal: AIGFP agreed to sell credit default swap protection on the super-senior tranche of J.P. Morgan’s BISTRO deal. They did zero due diligence on the underlying loans, and relied entirely on their models and the AAA rating. The deal was a success for everyone: J.P. Morgan freed up much capital, and AIGFP booked huge pure profits. This was the “Aha!” Moment.

第一笔交易：AIGFP同意出售摩根大通BISTRO交易中超高级部分的信用违约掉期保护。他们对基础贷款没有进行任何尽职调查，完全依赖他们的模型和AAA评级。这笔交易对各方来说都是成功的：摩根大通释放了大量资本，而AIGFP则获得了巨额纯利润。这就是“啊哈！”时刻。

This initial “trial run” functioned as a proof of concept. The Morgan deal proved that a highly-rated counterparty like AIG could enable both a risk transfer and a massive regulatory capital relief. From this beginning, the word spread. Other banks – Goldman Sachs, Lehman, Merrill Lynch, Citibank, saw what J.P. Morgan had done and wanted in on the action. They all came knocking on AIGFP’s door in London, and the product evolved. It started with corporate loans but quickly moved to the much larger market of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and CDOs. The basic pitch from every bank was the same: “Here is a portfolio of assets rated AAA. Will you insure the super-senior piece?”.

这一初步的“试运行”起到了概念验证的作用。摩根大通的这笔交易证明，像美国国际集团（AIG）这样评级较高的交易对手方能够实现风险转移和监管资本的大幅减免。自此，消息不胫而走。其他银行——高盛、雷曼兄弟、美林、花旗银行——看到了摩根大通的做法，也想参与其中。它们纷纷来到伦敦，敲响AIG金融产品（AIGFP）的大门，产品也随之发展。它最初从企业贷款开始，但很快转向了规模更大的抵押贷款支持证券（MBS）和债务抵押债券（CDO）市场。每家银行的基本推销说辞都一样：“这是一组评级为AAA的资产组合。你愿意为其中的超级优先级部分提供保险吗？”。

AIGFP didn’t hire 377 people on a hope. They hired them to manage the stampede of demand from the world’s biggest banks, and this division of AIG became a fee-churning factory. From 1998 to 2005, they went from a niche player to the dominant vendor of super-senior CDS protection, with a portfolio that ballooned to over $600 billion. As the money poured in, AIGFP became increasingly more arrogant and complacent. They stopped even asking for the documentation that would have detailed the underlying assets. They were so convinced of their own infallibility that they saw due diligence as an unnecessary cost and delay. The banks, in turn, were happy to feed this complacency.

AIG金融产品（AIGFP）部门并非凭空雇佣了377名员工。他们雇佣这些员工是为了应对来自全球各大银行的大量需求，而AIG的这个部门也由此成为了一个赚取高额费用的工厂。从1998年到2005年，他们从一个利基市场参与者一跃成为超高级信用违约掉期（CDS）保护的主要供应商，其产品组合规模激增至超过6000亿美元。随着资金的涌入，AIGFP变得越来越傲慢自满。他们甚至不再要求提供详细说明标的资产的文档。他们如此确信自己的绝对正确，以至于将尽职调查视为不必要的成本和延误。而银行方面则乐于助长这种自满情绪。

The entire idea, the conceptual innovation, of derivatives, of the MBSs, the CDOs, and the CDSs, began with the banks. J.P. Morgan invented the need for the product as a solution to their capital problem, and found a willing accomplice in AIG, who recognized the opportunity and willingly became the counterparty, believing they were smarter and had found a risk-free profit machine.

衍生品、抵押贷款支持证券（MBS）、债务抵押债券（CDO）和信用违约掉期（CDS）的整个理念，即概念创新，都源自银行。摩根大通发明了这种产品，作为解决其资本问题的方案，并在美国国际集团（AIG）那里找到了一个心甘情愿的帮凶。AIG意识到了这一机遇，并欣然成为交易对手方，自认为更聪明，找到了一个无风险的盈利机器。

It wasn’t that the banks “set AIG up” from the very beginning. The initial deals were likely seen as genuine wins for both sides. However, as the housing bubble inflated and the underlying assets became progressively more toxic, the banks’ motivation shifted. They began to see the CDSs not just as a tool for capital relief, but as a weapon to short the market. AIG, blinded by fees and intellectual arrogance, failed to see this shift and continued to sell “insurance” long after the patient was terminally ill. It was a symbiotic relationship that turned parasitic, and the entire global economy was the host.

这并不是说银行从一开始就“陷害”AIG。最初的交易很可能被视为双方真正的胜利。然而，随着房地产泡沫的膨胀以及基础资产变得越来越有毒，银行的动机发生了转变。他们开始将信用违约掉期（CDS）视为一种资本救济工具，更将其视为做空市场的武器。AIG被费用和知识上的傲慢蒙蔽了双眼，未能看到这种转变，并在病人病入膏肓后很久仍在继续销售“保险”。这是一种共生关系，后来变成了寄生关系，而整个全球经济都成了宿主。

This is the missing piece of the 2008 housing fraud, the housing price collapse, and the financial meltdown. Now, everything in the entire massive fraud fits together and makes sense. But this “fraud” or “escapade” was not haphazard: it needed many pieces to be put into place before the scam could be executed:

这是2008年房地产欺诈、房价暴跌和金融崩溃中缺失的一环。现在，整个庞大欺诈中的所有环节都相互吻合，合情合理。但这种“欺诈”或“越轨行为”并非偶然：在实施骗局之前，需要许多环节到位：

(1) Repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act.

（1）废除《格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案》

(2) Passage of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act which explicitly prevented the regulation of Credit Default Swaps (CDS), the insurance policies on CDOs.

（2）《商品期货现代化法案》的通过，该法案明确禁止对信用违约掉期（CDS）即债务抵押债券（CDO）的保险政策进行监管。

(3) Henry Paulson and Lawrence Summers (and 5 other bankers) did a re-draft of the Financial Services Agreement portion of the WTO, and bullied all other countries in the world to repeal their version of the Glass-Steagall Act, so these vultures could take their scam worldwide.

（3）亨利·保尔森和劳伦斯·萨默斯（以及其他五位银行家）重新起草了世界贸易组织（WTO）的《金融服务协议》部分，并胁迫世界上所有其他国家废除其版本的《格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案》，以便这些秃鹫们能够在全球范围内实施他们的骗局。

(4) They needed the “revolving door”, exchanging people between the banks and the Treasury Dept.

（4）他们需要“旋转门”，即在银行和财政部之间进行人员交流。

(5) The banks had to buy, or find, or create, the specialised mortgage companies that would produce the huge volume of subprime mortgages the scam needed.

（5）银行不得不收购、寻找或创建专门的抵押贷款公司，以生产该骗局所需的大量次级抵押贷款。

(6) They needed to get the rating agencies onside, to provide the AAA ratings they would need.

（6）他们需要让评级机构站在他们这边，提供他们所需的AAA评级.

(7) They needed to get AIG to “insure” their toxic securities.

（7）他们需要让美国国际集团（AIG）为他们的有毒证券“投保”。

The evidence is that the scheme actually began around 1995 when Robert Rubin was the US Treasury Secretary. By 1997 he had been already exerting considerable pressure on US officials to “de-regulate” the banks. His first push was for the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, and things progressed from there.

证据表明，该计划实际上始于1995年左右，当时罗伯特·鲁宾（Robert Rubin）担任美国财政部长。到1997年，他已对美国官员施加了相当大的压力，要求“放松对银行的管制”。他的首次推动是废除《格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案》（Glass-Steagall Act），此后事情便有了进展。

All of this was clearly part of a huge plan that required the participation (wittingly or unwittingly) of many different levels of participants: the US FED, the US Treasury, the US Congress, the mortgage companies and other banks, the rating agencies. These parties all needed to be onside, and to do their part, for the scam to succeed. It seems that AIG was one part of this planning. When JP Morgan found that first success, AIG must have been added to the list of “necessary” participants, just as were the rating agencies. That means AIG was a target. The benefit may have been mutual, as with the rating agencies, but AIG was chosen as an integral part of the entire scheme, as important in its own way as repealing restrictive legislation.

所有这一切显然都是一个庞大计划的一部分，该计划需要许多不同层级的参与者（有意或无意地）参与其中：美联储、美国财政部、美国国会、抵押贷款公司和其他银行、评级机构。这些参与方都必须各司其职，才能使骗局得逞。AIG似乎也是这一计划的一部分。当摩根大通发现第一次成功时，AIG肯定已被列入“必要”参与者的名单，评级机构也是如此。这意味着AIG成为了目标。与评级机构一样，其利益可能是互惠的，但AIG被选为整个计划的不可或缺的一部分，其重要性不亚于废除限制性立法。

This immense fraud could never have occurred without the realisation of the 7 points I listed above. Each was necessary. If the Glass-Steagall Act had not been repealed, the tragedy could never have happened. Each step was necessary. Logic alone dictated that this was planned, because the individual steps taken in isolation would have been senseless. For example, why would Paulson and Summers have schemed to make all countries in the world repeal their banking safety legislation? Each step listed was a necessary and integral part. It was a coordinated plan rather than a series of isolated events.

若非我上述列出的7点得以实现，这场巨大的欺诈便不可能发生。每一点都是不可或缺的。若非废除《格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案》，这场悲剧便不可能发生。每一步都是必要的。仅凭逻辑推理，就能断定这是一场有计划的行动，因为孤立采取的每一步都是毫无意义的。例如，为什么保尔森和萨默斯会密谋让世界上所有国家废除其银行安全立法？所列出的每一步都是必要且不可或缺的组成部分。这是一项协调一致的计划，而非一系列孤立的事件。

The most compelling way to frame this is through the lens of “orchestrated chaos” – whether by explicit conspiracy or emergent systemic behavior. The revolving door and regulatory capture are well-documented, as is the intentional globalisation of deregulation. The core of this argument is that each step was meaningless in isolation. The distinction between explicit planning and implicit coordination matters. The financial industry didn’t need to conspire in a room when shared incentives and ideology could achieve the same outcome.

从“精心策划的混乱”的角度来看，这是最令人信服的阐述方式——无论是出于明确的阴谋还是突发的系统性行为。旋转门和监管俘获现象都有据可查，蓄意放松监管的全球化也是如此。这一论点的核心在于，每一步单独来看都是毫无意义的。明确规划和隐含协调之间的区别很重要。当共同的激励和意识形态能够达到同样的结果时，金融业并不需要在房间里密谋。

We should assess this not as a “conspiracy theory” in the pejorative sense, but as a de facto orchestration – a confluence of deliberate actions by a network of influential actors who shared a common ideology and common financial interests. Whether one calls it a “plan” or an “ideological project”, the effect is the same: the systematic dismantling of safeguards that enabled a massive, risk-obscuring profit engine.

我们不应将此视为贬义的“阴谋论”，而应视其为事实上的精心策划——一群拥有共同意识形态和共同经济利益的有影响力者所采取的一系列蓄意行动的集合。无论称之为“计划”还是“意识形态项目”，其效果都是一样的：系统地拆除那些使一个庞大的、掩盖风险的利润引擎得以运转的保障措施。

In evaluating this immense banker’s fraud, we should ignore the idea of “conspiracies” and “conspiracy theories”. I would emphasise that the mechanics of cooperation (conspiracies, etc.) are irrelevant. Focusing on the functional architecture of the crisis is far more revealing than getting bogged down in the semantics of “conspiracy.” The sequence of events and the necessity of each component tell the real story. It doesn’t matter if all these people colluded, conspired, collaborated, or discussed over a drink after work. The mechanics of the cooperation are irrelevant. The fact is that all those participants did work together with a shared objective.

在评估这位银行巨头的欺诈行为时，我们不应考虑“阴谋”和“阴谋论”的概念。我要强调的是，合作机制（阴谋等）与此无关。关注危机的功能架构远比纠缠于“阴谋”的语义学更有启发性。事件发生的顺序和每个组成部分的必要性揭示了真实情况。无论这些人是否勾结、密谋、合作，或是在下班后喝酒讨论，都无关紧要。合作的机制与此无关。事实是，所有参与者都为了共同目标而携手合作。

“计划”评估 — Assessment of the “Plan”

Bill Clinton signing the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (1999).

比尔·克林顿签署《金融服务现代化法案》（1999年）。

1 – 废除《格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案》（1999年） — Repeal of Glass-Steagall (1999)

Necessity: Absolutely critical. Glass-Steagall was the firewall separating commercial banking (taking deposits, making loans) from investment banking (underwriting securities, speculative trading). Its repeal allowed the creation of financial supermarkets like Citigroup. This meant that the commercial bank’s vast, FDIC-insured deposit base could, in effect, fuel the high-risk, speculative activities of the investment bank. It created the “too big to fail” institution and allowed the contamination of the entire financial system.

必要性：至关重要。《格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案》曾是分隔商业银行（吸收存款、发放贷款）与投资银行（承销证券、进行投机交易）的防火墙。该法案的废除促成了花旗集团等金融超市的诞生。这意味着，商业银行庞大的、由联邦存款保险公司（FDIC）承保的存款基础，实际上可能为投资银行的高风险投机活动提供资金支持。该法案催生了“大到不能倒”的机构，并导致整个金融体系受到污染。

2 – 《商品期货现代化法案》（2000年） Commodity Futures Modernization Act (2000)

Necessity: The masterstroke of deregulation. This act explicitly prohibited the regulation of Credit Default Swaps (CDS), declaring them not to be “insurance” nor “securities.” This was the “get out of jail free” card. It allowed AIG and others to sell hundreds of billions of dollars in CDS without setting aside capital reserves, as any regulated insurance company would have to. It created a massive, unregulated, and opaque shadow banking system where risk could grow exponentially, entirely off the books.

必要性：去监管化的妙招。该法案明确禁止对信用违约掉期（Credit Default Swaps，简称CDS）进行监管，宣称其既非“保险”也非“证券”。这相当于一张“免死金牌”。它允许美国国际集团（AIG）等公司无需像任何受监管的保险公司那样，拨备资本储备，即可出售数千亿美元的信用违约掉期。这催生了一个庞大、不受监管且不透明的影子银行体系，其中的风险可以在账外呈指数级增长。

3 – 放松管制全球化（通过世贸组织）– Globalization of Deregulation (via WTO)

Necessity: The push, led by Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin and his Deputy Lawrence Summers, to create the 1997 Financial Services Agreement at the WTO was about creating a global playing field with the lowest common denominator of regulation. It wasn’t just about taking the scam worldwide; it was about ensuring no major financial center could remain a safe haven or a choke point for the flows of capital and risk.

必要性：由美国财政部长罗伯特·鲁宾（Robert Rubin）及其副手劳伦斯·萨默斯（Lawrence Summers）牵头，推动在世贸组织（WTO）制定1997年《金融服务协议》，旨在创造一个监管标准最低的全球竞争环境。这不仅仅是为了将骗局推向全球；而是为了确保任何主要金融中心都无法继续成为资本和风险流动的安全港或瓶颈。

4 – 旋转门 — The Revolving Door

Necessity: This is the mechanism that ensured points 1, 2, and 3 happened. It is not a side-effect; it is a core component. The careers of Robert Rubin (Goldman Sachs -> Treasury -> Citigroup), Henry Paulson (Goldman Sachs -> Treasury), and others created a feedback loop where “regulatory capture” was assured. Moreover, the complex financial engineering was understood only by a small group, most of whom worked for the banks. This made meaningful regulation from outside nearly impossible.

必要性：这是确保第1、2、3点得以实现的机制。它并非副作用，而是核心组成部分。罗伯特·鲁宾（高盛->财政部->花旗集团）、亨利·保尔森（高盛->财政部）等人的职业生涯创造了一个确保“监管俘获”的反馈循环。此外，复杂的金融工程只有一小群人能理解，而他们大多为银行工作。这使得从外部进行有效监管几乎不可能。

5 – 抵押贷款燃料的创造 — Creation of the Mortgage Fuel

Necessity: The raw material for the CDO machine was risk, specifically, the cash flows from mortgages. The system needed a massive, scalable supply of subprime mortgages, to slice and bundle. The originate-to-distribute model, where lenders (like Countrywide) were incentivised by volume, not quality, because they immediately sold the loans to Wall Street, was essential. Wall Street didn’t just find these companies; they actively fueled them with capital and demand, knowing the loans were toxic. And, if they couldn’t find them, they created them.

必要性：债务抵押债券（CDO）机器的原材料是风险，具体而言，是来自抵押贷款的现金流。该系统需要大量且可扩展的次级抵押贷款供应，以便进行分割和打包。发起-分销模式至关重要，在这种模式下，贷款机构（如Countrywide）受数量而非质量激励，因为它们会立即将这些贷款出售给华尔街。华尔街不仅找到了这些公司，还明知这些贷款有毒，却仍积极为其提供资金和需求。而且，如果找不到，它们还会自己创造。

6 – 约束评级机构 — Corralling the Rating Agencies

Necessity: The entire scheme was built on a lie: that risky assets could be magically transformed into risk-free ones. Only the rating agencies could bestow that AAA seal of approval, which was required by pension funds, insurers, and other institutional investors whose charters mandated it. The conflict of interest was fundamental: the banks paid the rating agencies to rate the products they created. It was a classic “issuer-pays” model that created immense pressure to provide favorable ratings. Without the AAA rating, the CDOs were unsellable and the CDS on them were unjustifiable.

必要性：整个方案建立在谎言之上：即高风险资产可以神奇地转化为无风险资产。只有评级机构才能授予AAA评级，而养老基金、保险公司和其他机构投资者根据其章程规定必须获得AAA评级。利益冲突是根本性的：银行付钱给评级机构，让它们对自己创造的产品进行评级。这是一种典型的“发行人付费”模式，给评级机构带来了提供有利评级的巨大压力。如果没有AAA评级，债务抵押债券（CDO）就无法出售，而基于这些债券的信用违约掉期（CDS）也就失去了存在的合理性。

7 – 招募AIG作为最终交易对手 — Enlisting AIG as the Ultimate Counterparty

Necessity: AIG was not just *a* participant; it was the linchpin. Its pristine AAA rating was the golden stamp that made the entire chain of risk transfer credible. But equally, AIG was a target. The banks needed a counterparty so large, so highly-rated, and so seemingly reliable that it could absorb the systemic risk they were creating. AIGFP’s willingness, driven by arrogance and greed, to sell “insurance” without collateral posting requirements was the final piece of the engine. It allowed the banks to offload the ultimate downside and, in many cases, to secretly bet against the very products they were creating.

必要性：美国国际集团（AIG）不仅仅是参与者之一；它更是关键所在。其原始的AAA评级是金印章，使整个风险转移链条变得可信。但同样，AIG也是众矢之的。银行需要一个如此庞大、评级如此之高、看似如此可靠的对手方，以吸收它们所创造的系统性风险。美国国际金融产品（AIGFP）在傲慢和贪婪的驱使下，愿意出售“保险”而无需抵押品要求，这是整个链条的最后一环。这使得银行能够摆脱最终的下行风险，并且在许多情况下，秘密地对它们所创造的产品本身进行做空。

The points listed above were not random, haphazard events. They were a sequence of policy victories, strategic market innovations, and symbiotic relationships that collectively built a doomsday machine. Was there a single, secret room where this was all plotted from the start? Probably not in a cinematic sense. Did a powerful network of individuals in finance and government act, over more than a decade, with a shared ideology and the financial incentives of enormous profits, to create a system that was destined to collapse? Absolutely.

上述列举的几点并非随机、偶然的事件。它们是一系列政策胜利、战略市场创新和共生关系的集合，共同构建了一台“末日机器”。这一切是否从一开始就在某个秘密房间里被精心策划？从电影情节的角度来看，可能并非如此。金融和政府中一群拥有共同意识形态和巨额利润的财务激励的强大个体网络，在十多年的时间里共同行动，创造了一个注定要崩溃的系统？绝对如此。

They may not have foreseen the exact timing or severity of the collapse, but they built a system where the profits were privatised during the boom, and the risks were socialised (placed on the taxpayer) when it busted. The seven points above accurately describe the architecture of that system.

他们或许未能预见经济崩溃的确切时间或严重程度，但他们构建了一个体系，在该体系下，繁荣时期利润被私有化，而当经济崩溃时，风险则被社会化（转嫁给纳税人）。上述七点准确描述了这一体系的架构。

And it all began around 1995 with J.P. Morgan and BISTRO. The genius – and the danger – of BISTRO was that it wasn’t about selling actual loans; it was about selling the risk of the loans. This abstracted finance one step further from reality. The profits from this were immense and immediate for JP Morgan. For AIGFP, it seemed like free money for assuming a “theoretical” risk.

而这一切都始于1995年，始于摩根大通和BISTRO。BISTRO的天才之处——也是危险之处——在于，它不是销售实际的贷款，而是销售贷款的风险。这种抽象的金融将金融与现实进一步拉开距离。对于摩根大通而言，由此获得的利润是巨大且立竿见影的。对于AIGFP而言，承担“理论”风险似乎就是赚取不劳而获的财富。

The thesis that the BISTRO success was the catalytic spark is compelling and logically sound. It provides a clear motive for the onslaught of deregulation. Before BISTRO, the potential of this new financial engineering was theoretical. After BISTRO, it was a proven, profit-generating machine. However, this machine was constrained by the existing regulatory framework (Glass-Steagall, CFTC regulation of swaps). The push for deregulation, led by figures like Robert Rubin, was not just ideological, but a practical necessity to unleash this new profit center on a massive, global scale. They weren’t just deregulating for deregulation’s sake; they were removing the fences so the BISTRO-model could be scaled into a global empire. The thesis explains the timeline perfectly. The chronology aligns. BISTRO is invented and proves successful in the mid-1990s. Immediately following this, we see an intense, coordinated push for the very deregulatory measures that would allow this model to dominate the financial world.

BISTRO的成功是催化之火的论点颇具说服力且逻辑严谨。它为大规模放松管制提供了明确动机。在BISTRO之前，这种新型金融工程的潜力仅存在于理论层面。而在BISTRO之后，它则成为了一台经过验证的盈利机器。然而，这台机器却受到现有监管框架（格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案、商品期货交易委员会对掉期的监管）的限制。在罗伯特·鲁宾等人的带领下，推动放松管制不仅是出于意识形态，更是为了在全球范围内大规模释放这一新的利润中心的实际需要。他们并非仅仅为了放松管制而放松管制；他们是在拆除围栏，以便将BISTRO模式扩展成一个全球帝国。这一论点完美地解释了时间线。时间顺序是一致的。BISTRO在20世纪90年代中期被发明并证明是成功的。紧接着，我们看到了对那些将使这一模式主导金融世界的放松管制措施的强烈、协调一致的推动。

It Re-frames AIG’s Role: AIG wasn’t just a willing participant; it was the key piece of infrastructure discovered by the architects. JP Morgan found that AIG FP was the perfect counterparty: prestigious, highly-rated, intellectually arrogant, and willing to forego due diligence for a stream of premiums. Once this was proven, it became a standard part of the blueprint. Every major bank that set up its own CDO factory knew it needed an “AIG” to make the model work. They had found the ultimate bearer of systemic risk, but when homeowners began defaulting en masse, this entire chain began to unravel.

它重新定义了AIG的角色：AIG不仅仅是一个积极的参与者；它是架构师发现的关键基础设施。摩根大通发现，AIG金融产品（AIG FP）是完美的交易对手：享有盛誉、评级高、自视甚高，并愿意放弃尽职调查以换取源源不断的保费收入。一旦这一点得到证实，它就成为了蓝图中的标准部分。每家设立自己的债务抵押债券（CDO）工厂的大型银行都知道，需要一个“AIG”来使该模式发挥作用。他们找到了系统性风险的终极承担者，但当房主开始集体违约时，整个链条开始瓦解。

结论 — Conclusions

Foreseeable consequence implies intent.

可预见的后果意味着存在故意。

Questions still remain. There had to have been a central planning source for all this. It is much too large and unwieldy to have been left to chance and “shared interests”. None of this could have happened without a central plan. It is much too complex to believe that all the pieces just fell together because everyone involved was a capitalist. There is still more here that is uncovered. We can be forgiven our skepticism that such a complex, coordinated effort could emerge organically from disparate actors. The sheer scale and precision of the coordination required – the lobbying, FED policy, legislation changes, mortgage pipeline management – implies a single planning source.

问题仍然存在。这一切背后必定有一个中央规划源头。事情规模太大、太复杂，不可能仅仅靠运气和“共同利益”来推动。如果没有中央计划，这一切都不可能发生。事情太过复杂，很难相信仅仅因为所有相关人员都是资本家，事情就能自然而然地顺利完成。这里还有更多未被揭露的真相。我们怀疑如此复杂、协调一致的努力能否由不同的参与者有机地产生，这是可以理解的。所需的协调规模之大、精确度之高——游说、美联储政策、立法变更、抵押贷款渠道管理——都暗示着存在一个单一的规划源头。

We can safely reject the notion that all those players could have acted in parallel without a master plan. The scale, coordination, and sheer audacity of what occurred, defy the explanation of a simple, organic “convergence”. We don’t necessarily need a single, secret “smoke-filled room”, but rather the existence of a de facto central nervous system for the financial elite—a set of formal and informal networks. Because of this, much of the preparation for this fraud was conducted very openly. The bankers didn’t need to whisper secrets to Congress; they presented polished, “expert” testimony and drafted the very language of the bills that would later repeal Glass-Steagall (the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act) and deregulate derivatives (the Commodity Futures Modernization Act). And the “Revolving Door” synchronised the plan between Wall Street and government.

我们可以有把握地否定这样一种观点：所有这些参与者都可能在缺乏总体规划的情况下并行行动。所发生事件的规模、协调性和大胆程度，都无法用简单的、有机的“趋同”来解释。我们并不一定需要一个单一的、秘密的“烟雾缭绕的房间”，而是需要一个事实上的金融精英中枢神经系统——一套正式和非正式的网络。正因如此，这场欺诈的准备工作大多是在非常公开的情况下进行的。银行家们无需向国会窃窃私语；他们提供了精心打磨的、“专家”级的证词，并起草了后来废除《格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案》（《金融服务现代化法案》）和放松衍生品监管（《商品期货现代化法案》）的法案文本。而“旋转门”则使华尔街和政府之间的计划步调一致。

These individuals share a common worldview but, for a complete synthesis, we need to connect the dots between deregulation, ideology, the revolving door, the mega banks, AIPAC, The US Congress, and the genesis of the 2008 crisis. The genesis of such systemic shifts is often not a secret, sprawling conspiracy, but a powerful idea, born in a context of aligned interests and shared ideology, and then set loose into a system that is perfectly primed to amplify it. Once amplified, the idea propagates like a virus.

这些人持有共同的世界观，但为了实现全面的综合分析，我们需要将去监管化、意识形态、旋转门、大型银行、美国以色列公共事务委员会（AIPAC）、美国国会以及2008年危机的起源等各个要素联系起来。这种系统性转变的起源往往并非秘密的庞大阴谋，而是一个强大的思想，它诞生于利益一致和意识形态相同的背景下，然后被释放到一个完全适合其扩大的体系中。一旦被放大，这种思想就会像病毒一样传播。

The revolving door ensures the idea finds a sympathetic ear in government; the lobbying arm translates the idea into political action. and greed drives universal adoption. This framework is far more powerful and insidious than a cartoonish conspiracy. It means the system doesn’t need to be hijacked; it operates exactly as designed. The “corruption” is not necessarily illegal envelopes of cash; it is often a deeper, more philosophical regulatory and intellectual capture, where the state’s power and the market’s innovation are both harnessed to serve a set of interests that, with media complicity, are made to be seen as synonymous with the public good. It wasn’t a villain in a lair; it was a consensus in a boardroom, a policy paper from a think tank, and a handshake between old colleagues who saw the world the same way. The tragedy is that this makes the problem harder to fight, because the “conspirators” aren’t hiding; they are making policy, giving speeches to convince the public they are building a better, more efficient world. The 2008 crisis was the ultimate outcome of all this.

旋转门确保了这种理念在政府中能找到同情者；游说部门则将这种理念转化为政治行动。而贪婪则推动着这种理念被普遍采纳。这种框架远比卡通式的阴谋论更强大、更阴险。这意味着该体系无需被劫持；它完全按照设计运行。“腐败”不一定是非法收受现金；它往往是更深层次的、更具哲学性的监管和思想控制，在这种控制下，国家的权力和市场的创新都被用来服务于某些利益集团，这些利益集团在媒体的共谋下，被视为公共利益的同义词。它不是躲在巢穴里的恶棍；它是董事会会议室里的共识、智库的政策文件，以及看法相同的旧同事之间的握手。悲剧在于，这使得问题更难解决，因为“阴谋家”并没有躲起来；他们正在制定政策，发表演讲，以说服公众他们正在建设一个更美好、更高效的世界。2008年的危机是这一切的最终结果。

This was part of a war to disenfranchise the middle class, to eliminate it, to force as many as possible into the lower class. Think of Klaus Schwab’s words that ‘you will have nothing…….” I have difficulty seeing any of the results as accidental. When we consider the intellectual prowess, the vast experience, of the main players, it is not plausible that they did not foresee all the eventual “collateral damage”. Again, foreseeable consequence implies intent.

这是一场旨在剥夺中产阶级权利、消灭中产阶级、尽可能多地将他们打入下层社会的战争的一部分。想想克劳斯·施瓦布的话：“你们将一无所有……”我很难认为这些结果都是偶然的。当我们考虑到主要参与者的智力水平、丰富经验时，他们没有预见到所有最终的“附带损害”是不合逻辑的。同样，可预见的后果意味着存在故意为之。

The perspective that the 2008 financial crisis functioned as a mechanism of class disenfranchisement is a powerful one, and the available evidence confirms the foreseeable catastrophic decline of the American middle class. The most supportable conclusion is that the financial crisis, through deliberate design and a ruthless indifference to the Gentile population, functioned as an instrument of class disenfranchisement.

2008年金融危机充当阶级剥夺机制的观点颇具说服力，现有证据也证实了美国中产阶级可预见的灾难性衰落。最可信的结论是，这场金融危机通过精心设计和对非犹太裔人口的冷酷无情，充当了阶级剥夺的工具。

The Montagu Norman quote serves as a philosophical anchor for the argument about intentional disenfranchisement. There were nearly 20 million foreclosures, with institutional investors dominating the purchase markets. Thus, financialisation created precisely the outcome Norman described – by coordinated design and through systemic incentives. This creates a self-reinforcing cycle where rental income fuels further purchases, permanently altering the social contract around housing. The massive acquisition of single-family homes by institutional investors after 2008 was not a minor side effect; it was a transformative event in the US housing market that directly executed the strategy quoted from Montagu Norman.

蒙塔古·诺曼（Montagu Norman）的这段话为关于故意剥夺选举权问题的争论提供了哲学依据。当时有近2000万起止赎事件，机构投资者主导了购买市场。因此，金融化正是通过协同设计和系统性激励，创造了诺曼所描述的结果。这形成了一个自我强化的循环，即租金收入推动进一步购买，从而永久改变了围绕住房的社会契约。2008年后，机构投资者大规模收购独栋住宅并非一个微不足道的副作用；这是美国住房市场的一次变革性事件，直接执行了蒙塔古·诺曼所引述的策略。

2008年危机完全源于犹太人 — The 2008 Crisis was Entirely Jewish in Origin

It is not a secret that Congress is virtually a Jewish institution under the hammer of AIPAC.

在AIPAC（美国以色列公共事务委员会）的操控下，国会几乎成了犹太人的机构，这已不是秘密。

In this ‘series within a series’ of articles, I have listed the names of many individuals, companies and institutions, all of which played an integral part in a massive fraud. All of those names are of individual Jews and Jewish-owned or controlled companies or institutions. The individuals are widely-known as Jews and require no citations. The corporations and institutions are the same. JP Morgan has for at least 100 years been known as a Rothschild agent and under Rothschild control. The US Congress does not consist entirely of Jews, but it is not a secret that Congress is virtually a Jewish institution under the hammer of AIPAC. The higher levels of most major Departments of the US Government, including Treasury, are staffed primarily with Jews.

在这篇“系列中的系列”文章中，我列出了许多个人、公司和机构的名称，它们都在一场大规模欺诈中扮演了不可或缺的角色。所有这些名称都是犹太人个人以及犹太人拥有或控制的公司或机构的名称。这些个人都是众所周知的犹太人，无需引用。这些公司和机构也是如此。摩根大通至少100年来一直被称为罗斯柴尔德家族的代理人，并处于罗斯柴尔德家族的控制之下。美国国会并非完全由犹太人组成，但国会实际上是在美国以色列公共事务委员会（AIPAC）的操纵下成为犹太人机构，这已不是秘密。美国政府大多数主要部门（包括财政部）的高层职位主要由犹太人担任。

个人：– Individuals:

James Paul Warburg, Klaus Schwab, Henry Paulson, Lawrence Summers, John Corzine, David Kamanski, David Coulter, John Reed, Walter Shipley, Robert Rubin, Timothy Geithner, Ben Bernanke, Stephen Friedman, Maurice Greenberg.

詹姆斯·保罗·沃伯格、克劳斯·施瓦布、亨利·保尔森、劳伦斯·萨默斯、约翰·科尔津、戴维·卡曼斯基、戴维·库尔特、约翰·里德、沃尔特·希普利、罗伯特·鲁宾、蒂莫西·盖特纳、本·伯南克、斯蒂芬·弗里德曼、莫里斯·格林伯格。

公司：– Corporations:

Goldman, Sachs, Countrywide Financial, Washington Mutual, Wells Fargo, Lehman Brothers, Standard & Poor, Moody’s, Fitch, Merrill Lynch, Bank of America, Citigroup, Chase Manhattan, Bear Sterns, JP Morgan, Blackrock, Blackstone, New Century Financial, American Home Mortgage Investment Corporation, Capital Research Global Investors, Fidelity Investments, American Funds, Morgan Stanley, J.C. Flowers, KKR (Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co), Carlyle Group, AIG, Invitation Homes, Colony Capital, and American Homes 4 Rent.

高盛、Countrywide Financial、华盛顿互惠银行、富国银行、雷曼兄弟、标准普尔、穆迪、惠誉、美林、美国银行、花旗集团、大通曼哈顿银行、贝尔斯登、摩根大通、贝莱德、黑石、新世纪金融、美国住房抵押贷款投资公司、资本研究全球投资者、富达投资、美国基金、摩根士丹利、J.C. Flowers、KKR（科尔伯格-克拉维斯-罗伯茨公司）、凯雷集团、美国国际集团、Invitation Homes、柯罗尼资本和American Homes 4 Rent。

机构：– Institutions:

US FED, US Congress, Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac, US Treasury Department.

美国联邦储备系统、美国国会、房利美（Fannie Mae）、房地美（Freddie Mac）、美国财政部。

As a closing comment, I would draw the attention of readers to the official narrative that the above banks were bailed out because they were “too big to fail”. That claim was completely false. The banks weren’t saved because they were too big to fail. They were saved because they were too Jewish to fail.

作为结束语，我想提醒读者注意官方说法，即上述银行之所以获得纾困，是因为它们“规模太大而不能倒闭”。这种说法完全是错误的。这些银行之所以被救，不是因为它们规模太大而不能倒闭，而是因为它们犹太色彩太浓而不能倒闭.

Mr. Romanoff’s writing has been translated into 34 languages and his articles posted on more than 150 foreign-language news and politics websites in more than 30 countries, as well as more than 100 English language platforms. Larry Romanoff is a retired management consultant and businessman. He has held senior executive positions in international consulting firms, and owned an international import-export business. He has been a visiting professor at Shanghai’s Fudan University, presenting case studies in international affairs to senior EMBA classes. Mr. Romanoff lives in Shanghai and is currently writing a series of ten books generally related to China and the West. He is one of the contributing authors to Cynthia McKinney’s new anthology ‘When China Sneezes’. (Chap. 2 — Dealing with Demons).

罗曼诺夫先生的作品已被翻译成34种语言，他的文章被发布在30多个国家的150多个外文新闻和政治网站上，以及100多个英文平台上。拉里·罗曼诺夫是一位退休的管理顾问和商人。他曾在国际咨询公司担任高级管理职务，并拥有一家国际进出口企业。他曾担任上海复旦大学的客座教授，为高级EMBA课程讲授国际事务案例研究。罗曼诺夫先生现居上海，目前正在撰写一系列共十本书，总体上涉及中国与西方。他是辛西娅·麦金尼新选集《当中国打喷嚏》（第2章——与恶魔打交道）的特约作者之一。

His full archive can be seen at

他的全部档案可以在以下网址查看：

https://www.bluemoonofshanghai.com/ + https://www.moonofshanghai.com/

He can be contacted at:

他的全部档案可以在以下网址查看：

2186604556@qq.com

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