上海的月亮: CN –LARRY ROMANOFF: 跳跳蛙不是儿童游戏

跳跳蛙不是儿童游戏 — Leapfrog Is Not a Game for Children

译者：珍珠

Detail of Children from Children’s Games by Pieter Bruegel the Elder.

老彼得·勃鲁盖尔《儿童游戏中的儿童》细节图。

Some readers may remember the playground game at elementary school that we called “leapfrog”, where we would successively hop over each other. I don’t know if this game still exists, but the term has now been adopted by academics and others to describe some kinds of social changes. “Leapfrogging” is now defined as a strategic approach to development or innovation where one entirely bypasses the existing and established stages of technology (or infrastructure), and instead adopts a more advanced and radically different system. The purpose is not to catch up to society in an area where one is behind, but to skip entirely a generation of technology or an organisational model, and move to a new model that renders the current system irrelevant. Typically, by the time the incumbents realize the new system is superior, the leapfrogger is already far ahead and is now defining the new standard.

有些读者可能还记得小学时我们称之为“跳背”的操场游戏，我们在游戏中会一个接一个地跳过对方。我不知道这个游戏是否还存在，但这个术语现在已被学者和其他人用来描述某些类型的社会变革。“跨越式发展”现在被定义为一种发展或创新的战略方法，即完全绕过现有和已确立的技术（或基础设施）阶段，转而采用更先进且截然不同的系统。其目的不是在一个落后的领域赶上社会，而是跳过一代技术或一种组织模式，转向一种使当前系统变得无关紧要的新模式。通常，当现有企业意识到新系统更优越时，跨越式发展者已经遥遥领先，正在定义新的标准。

Leapfrogging does not aim to improve on an existing standard or model; it renders it obsolete by adopting a fundamentally different approach. One example would be skipping landlines and moving directly to mobile phones. Leapfrogging typically exploits what we could term a “Latecomer Advantage”, where one benefits from not being locked into legacy systems and infrastructure, or huge sunk costs. Leapfrogging is rarely accidental, although the conditions or circumstances that permitted it, are often fortuitous. It is usually a deliberate strategy that requires vision and foresight, political will, significant investment in R&D, and the building of new supporting ecosystems.

跨越式发展并非旨在改进现有的标准或模式；而是通过采用一种根本不同的方法，使现有标准或模式变得过时。一个例子就是跳过固定电话，直接转向移动电话。跨越式发展通常利用我们所谓的“后发优势”，即受益于未被传统系统和基础设施或巨额沉没成本所束缚。跨越式发展很少是偶然的，尽管促成其发生的条件或环境往往是偶然的。它通常是一种深思熟虑的战略，需要远见卓识、政治意愿、大量的研发投资以及构建新的支持性生态系统。

弱者的优势与强者的诅咒 — The Underdog’s Advantage and The Incumbent’s Curse

It may be easier for the “underdog” to imagine the future and leapfrog the present. The person who is already on the top, may be blinded by that success. There will be exceptions, of course, people who are naturally able to imagine the future, but these individuals are probably rare. The underdog may have a significant advantage in that when you have little to lose, you are free to imagine radical futures. China’s auto industry, for example, had no revered brands to protect, so it could bet everything on the EV revolution.

“弱者”可能更容易想象未来并超越现状。而那些已经处于顶端的人，可能会被自己的成功蒙蔽了双眼。当然，也有例外，有些人天生就能想象未来，但这样的人可能很少见。弱者可能有一个显著的优势，那就是当你没有什么可失去的时候，你可以自由地想象激进的未来。例如，中国的汽车行业没有值得尊敬的品牌需要保护，因此它可以孤注一掷地押注于电动汽车革命。

And simultaneously, there exists the incumbent’s curse. Success creates a legacy system of technology, revenue, and mindset. It creates cognitive lock-in. For a company like Ford to suddenly embrace EV technology on a massive scale, would mean cannibalising their own existing, highly profitable gasoline-powered models. For most incumbents, their success not only blinds them to the next paradigm; it also binds them to the existing one. The existing “establishment”, whether that be corporate products or government policies, is incentivised to protect the present, not to invent the future.

同时，还存在着“在位者诅咒”。成功会创造出一个由技术、收入和思维模式构成的遗留体系。它会造成认知锁定。对于像福特这样的公司来说，突然大规模采用电动汽车技术，意味着要牺牲自己现有的、利润丰厚的汽油动力车型。对于大多数在位者而言，他们的成功不仅让他们对下一个范式视而不见，还让他们固守现有的范式。现有的“既定秩序”，无论是企业产品还是政府政策，都被激励着保护现状，而不是创造未来。

The Leapfrog Way is to identify an inevitable technological or societal shift, and then instead of competing directly on the old playing field, to build the new playing field entirely. This requires foresight, patience, and a willingness to bypass established, low-margin markets. The goal is to define the future, not to win a battle in the present. There are many such obvious examples: EVs vs. gasoline-powered cars, Mobile QR payments vs. credit card networks

.“蛙跳法”是指识别出不可避免的技术或社会变革，然后不再在旧有的竞技场上直接竞争，而是完全构建新的竞技场。这需要远见、耐心和绕过成熟、低利润率市场的意愿。其目标是定义未来，而非在当下赢得一场战斗。这样的明显例子不胜枚举：电动汽车与燃油汽车，移动二维码支付与信用卡网络。

历史相关性 — Historical Relevance

Shanghai 1936 上海1936

This topic is relevant to us from an historical perspective because the lessons inherent in this process supply us with an understanding of some modern history and current events that can be obtained in no other way. Leapfrogging is a universal phenomenon. It is a viable strategy that has been employed globally, where nations bypass outdated or inefficient systems by adopting newer technologies. Nevertheless, it seems that the best, and certainly the most profound, examples of leapfrogging emanate from China, so I will concentrate my comments on these.

从历史角度来看，这一话题与我们息息相关，因为这一过程中蕴含的教训让我们能够以其他方式无法获得的方式理解一些现代历史和时事。跨越式发展是一种普遍现象。它是一种在全球范围内被采用的可行策略，即国家通过采用新技术来绕过过时或低效的系统。然而，跨越式发展的最佳、当然也是最深刻的例子似乎来自中国，因此我将重点讨论这些例子。

In reading the following examples, it will be worthwhile to keep several thoughts in mind. One is to consider the societal environment in which these leapfrog events occurred. Another is to ask the obvious question of “why didn’t the incumbents perform this leapfrog themselves, instead of permitting ‘outsiders’ to upset their applecart?” A third, and extremely important, thought, would be to examine the respective roles of corporations and government in this context; from this, you will derive a critical understanding of something important about Western countries.

在阅读以下示例时，有必要记住几个要点。一是要考虑这些跨越式事件发生的社会环境。二是要问一个显而易见的问题：“为什么现有企业不自己实现这种跨越，而是允许‘外来者’打乱他们的阵脚？”第三，也是极其重要的一点，是要审视企业和政府在此背景下的各自角色；从中，你将获得对西方国家某些重要方面的关键理解。

固定电话、移动电话和计算机 — Landlines, Mobile Phones, and Computers

This one is a bit complicated because several related “leapfrogs” occurred simultaneously. When I first moved to Shanghai many years ago, one of my first realisations was that nobody had a land line. They still existed in corporate and government offices, but I knew of no individuals who had one. China had a long road to develop the nation after a century of Western destruction and two world wars, with most of the focus on drawing the population out of poverty. One result was that the national telecom infrastructure was being built just as mobile technology became affordable, so the Chinese just decided to bypass the wired landline system altogether. There was little point in installing expensive copper lines to the homes of a billion people when you could build more efficient cellular towers. And mobile phones became not only ubiquitous, but very inexpensive; at the time, a perfectly serviceable mobile phone could cost as little as $25. This was actually a major transformative event because China didn’t just adopt mobile technology; it vaulted over entire stages of technological development that Western countries had to evolve over decades.

这件事有点复杂，因为几个相关的“跨越式发展”同时发生了。多年前我刚搬到上海时，我首先意识到的是，没有人有固定电话。企业和政府办公室里还有固定电话，但据我所知，个人用户没有。在经历了一个世纪的西方破坏和两次世界大战后，中国的发展道路漫长，大部分重点都是让人民摆脱贫困。其结果之一是，国家电信基础设施的建设恰逢移动技术变得经济实惠，因此中国人干脆决定绕过有线固定电话系统。既然可以建造更高效的蜂窝基站，就没有必要为十亿人的家庭安装昂贵的铜线。移动电话不仅变得无处不在，而且价格非常低廉；当时，一部完全可以使用的移动电话售价可能低至25美元。这实际上是一个重大的变革性事件，因为中国不仅采用了移动技术，还跨越了西方国家几十年来必须经历的整个技术发展阶段。

At the same time, the personal computer revolution was occurring, with rapid development from desktop to laptop. Given the still relatively impoverished state of Chinese society, the high cost of personal computers meant that for a vast portion of the population, their first and only computer was a smartphone. This created a society that was native to mobile, not desktop. Thus, the Chinese, to a very large extent, bypassed the desktop computer and went directly to smartphones and laptops. All of this cumulatively was a transformational event that laid the foundation for yet more leapfrogs soon to come. I would add here that, just as no one in China had a landline, few offices had desktop computers. The direct transition to laptops was virtually automatic. There are still shops in China that sell desktop computers, but they are in the minority, and are focused on AI and specialised applications.

与此同时，个人电脑革命正在发生，从台式机到笔记本电脑都取得了快速发展。鉴于中国社会仍然相对贫穷，个人电脑的高昂成本意味着，对于很大一部分人口来说，他们的第一台也是唯一一台电脑就是智能手机。这创造了一个以移动设备而非台式机为原生设备的社会。因此，在很大程度上，中国人绕过了台式电脑，直接转向了智能手机和笔记本电脑。所有这些累积起来，成为了一个转型事件，为即将到来的更多飞跃奠定了基础。我在此要补充的是，就像中国没有人使用固定电话一样，很少有办公室配备台式电脑。直接过渡到笔记本电脑几乎是自然而然的。中国仍有商店销售台式电脑，但为数不多，且主要专注于人工智能和特殊应用。

I want to add here an important historical note, relating to dismissive Western theories about “Chinese innovation”. China’s lag in the computer and mobile phone technologies was, more than anything else, an unfortunate accident of fate that occurred during a blip in time. After Mao evicted all the foreigners and China shook off the effects of 150 years of foreign interference and plundering to begin the transition to an industrialised economy, this was precisely when the world of electronics and communication exploded. It was during that brief period of a couple of decades that computers, the Internet, mobile phones and so much more, were conceived and patented by the West. Virtually the entire process passed China by, because during that brief period the nation was entirely enveloped in the fundamentals of its economic and social revolution, and in no position to participate. China’s lack of patents and IP in the field of electronics and semiconductors today is due neither to Western superiority nor Chinese lack of innovation, but to Western aggression. The accumulation of American and European patents was in no way due to Western supremacy in innovation but to the absence of the Chinese.

我想在此补充一个重要的历史注释，这与西方对“中国创新”的轻蔑理论有关。中国在计算机和手机技术方面的落后，归根结底是命运的不幸安排，发生在一段短暂的时间里。在毛泽东驱逐所有外国人，中国摆脱了150年外国干涉和掠夺的影响，开始向工业化经济转型之后，电子和通信领域恰好迎来了爆发。正是在那短短几十年的时间里，计算机、互联网、手机等众多技术被西方构思并申请了专利。几乎整个过程都与中国无关，因为在那段短暂的时间里，中国完全沉浸在经济和社会革命的基础工作中，无暇参与。如今，中国在电子和半导体领域缺乏专利和知识产权，既不是因为西方技术优越，也不是因为中国缺乏创新，而是因为西方的侵略。美国和欧洲专利的积累绝非因为西方在创新方面占据优势，而是因为中国的缺席。

支付购买款项 — Paying for Purchases

This is a crucial part of leapfrog history, and one of China’s most profound and successful leapfrogging achievements. China’s payment revolution represents a triple leapfrog – bypassing cheques, debit/credit cards, and increasingly marginalising cash. China vaulted over three distinct stages of financial evolution that characterized Western economies. This wasn’t just a technological upgrade; it was a complete systemic overhaul that created a new financial paradigm.

这是跨越式历史的关键部分，也是中国最深刻、最成功的跨越式成就之一。中国的支付革命代表了三重跨越——绕过支票、借记卡/信用卡，并日益边缘化现金。中国跨越了西方经济体所特有的三个不同阶段的金融发展。这不仅仅是技术升级；这是一次全面的系统性改革，创造了一种新的金融范式。

The Western paper-based system of cheques and money orders was bypassed entirely. The very concept of writing a cheque is alien to most young Chinese. In the West, while debit and credit cards tied to a centralised banking infrastructure became the standard, they were also bypassed (leapfrogged) in China. While the West is making a slow and hesitant move to digital wallets, mobile QR-code-based payments were adopted by the Chinese as the primary system, a new decentralized network outside the traditional card rails.

西方的纸质支票和汇票系统在中国完全被绕过。对于大多数中国年轻人来说，写支票的概念本身就十分陌生。在西方，与集中式银行基础设施绑定的借记卡和信用卡已成为标准支付方式，但在中国，这些支付方式也被绕过（即被跨越）。当西方国家缓慢而犹豫地转向数字钱包时，中国人却将基于移动二维码的支付方式作为主要系统，这是传统银行卡轨道之外的一种新型去中心化网络。

The important point is that China had no deeply entrenched, ubiquitous card payment culture. While cards existed, the infrastructure was not pervasive, and the banks had no leverage for resistance. This meant there was little consumer or merchant inertia to overcome, that the population was ready for a new standard. China’s skip of the desktop era meant hundreds of millions of people came online for the first time via smartphones. These devices became their primary, and often only, window to the digital world, making them the perfect vehicle for financial services. WeChat in particular wasn’t just a payment app; it was an everything-app, encompassing social media, messaging, gaming, news, and e-commerce. Embedding payments into this daily-use platform created frictionless adoption. Payment became just another feature of daily social and commercial life, not a separate activity.

关键在于，中国没有根深蒂固、无处不在的银行卡支付文化。虽然银行卡存在，但基础设施并不普及，银行也没有抵抗的筹码。这意味着消费者或商家几乎没有需要克服的惯性，人们已经准备好接受新标准。中国跳过了桌面时代，这意味着数亿人首次通过智能手机上网。这些设备成为他们进入数字世界的主要、甚至唯一的窗口，使其成为金融服务的完美载体。尤其是微信，它不仅仅是一个支付应用；它是一个无所不能的应用，涵盖了社交媒体、即时通讯、游戏、新闻和电子商务。将支付嵌入这个日常使用的平台，实现了无摩擦的采用。支付成为日常社交和商业生活的另一个特征，而不是一项单独的活动。

Moreover, instead of requiring merchants to install expensive card terminals, the system used simple, printable QR codes, making adoption cheap and instant for even the smallest street vendor, and the consumer’s smartphone functioned as the terminal. Unlike in the West, where payments flow through Visa/Mastercard, China created closed-loop ecosystems that settle transactions between users and merchants directly, often without ever touching the traditional interbank card networks.

此外，该系统没有要求商家安装昂贵的刷卡终端，而是使用简单的、可打印的二维码，即使是最小的街头小贩也能轻松快速地采用，而且消费者的智能手机就能充当终端。与西方通过维萨/万事达卡进行支付不同，中国创建了闭环生态系统，直接在用户和商家之间结算交易，通常无需触及传统的银行间卡网络。

The effects of this go far beyond convenience, fundamentally reshaping the economy and society. For one thing, hundreds of millions of people who were previously “unbanked” gained access to digital financial services directly through their phones, without needing a formal bank account. And cash was automatically dethroned. While cash is still legal tender, its use has plummeted. It’s now common to see signs in major cities saying “We accept mobile payments only.” This is more than nothing. For at least the past 10 or more years, I cannot recall carrying any cash; I can live all the events of my daily life and travel throughout China with only my passport and mobile phone.

其影响远不止于便利，而是从根本上重塑了经济和社会。首先，数亿之前“无银行账户”的人直接通过手机获得了数字金融服务，而无需正式的银行账户。现金就这样被自动淘汰。虽然现金仍是法定货币，但其使用量已大幅下降。现在，在大城市里经常能看到这样的标志：“我们只接受移动支付。”这绝非空穴来风。至少在过去10年甚至更长时间里，我不记得自己带过任何现金；我可以只凭护照和手机就应付日常生活中的所有活动，并在中国各地旅行。

It’s important to note that this wasn’t a government-mandated change, but one driven by private tech companies solving real-world problems, although the government did step in to regulate and standardise the system. The West is now playing catch-up, trying to replicate this system, but is hampered by the need to integrate with legacy banking infrastructure and card networks.

值得注意的是，这一变化并非政府强制要求，而是由私营科技公司为解决现实世界的问题而推动的，尽管政府确实介入对该系统进行监管和标准化。西方国家目前正在努力追赶，试图复制这一系统，但受到需要与传统的银行基础设施和银行卡网络整合的阻碍。

China’s bypassing of cheques, cards, and cash is arguably one of the clearest and most impactful examples of leapfrogging in economic history. It demonstrates that leapfrogging is most successful when there is a lack of entrenched legacy infrastructure, when new technology (smartphones) achieves rapid near-universal penetration; when the solution is dramatically superior (QR codes); and when it is embedded into everyday life through platforms people already use (WeChat). This payment revolution did more than just change how people pay; it redefined commerce, accelerated the digital economy, and provided a blueprint for how developing nations can build modern financial systems without being shackled by the West’s technological legacy. It is a perfect case study.

中国绕过支票、银行卡和现金的做法，可以说是经济史上最清晰、最具影响力的跨越式发展案例之一。它表明，当缺乏根深蒂固的传统基础设施时，当新技术（智能手机）迅速普及到近乎所有人时，当解决方案显著优越（二维码）时，当它通过人们已经使用的平台（微信）融入日常生活时，跨越式发展最为成功。这场支付革命不仅改变了人们的支付方式；它重新定义了商业，加速了数字经济，并为发展中国家如何在不受西方技术遗产束缚的情况下建立现代金融体系提供了蓝图。这是一个完美的案例研究。

The crucial part is that the West had a 50-year head start with credit cards. The entire Western consumer economy, from point-of-sale systems to consumer protection laws and credit scores, was built around credit cards and they were deeply entrenched. Even today, both merchants and consumers rely heavily on the card payment systems. In China, WeChat and Alipay offered a digital payment system that was fundamentally better, cheaper, and more convenient than establishing a physical card network from scratch. They didn’t have to displace a beloved incumbent; they just filled a vacuum with a superior solution. With the “mobile-first” user base, WeChat and Alipay made the cards redundant.

关键在于，西方在信用卡领域领先了50年。从销售点系统到消费者保护法和信用评分，整个西方消费经济都是围绕信用卡建立的，而且信用卡已经深深扎根。即使在今天，商家和消费者仍然高度依赖信用卡支付系统。在中国，微信和支付宝提供了一种数字支付系统，从根本上比从头开始建立实体卡网络更好、更便宜、更方便。它们不必取代深受喜爱的现有支付系统；它们只是用一种更优的解决方案填补了空白。凭借“移动优先”的用户基础，微信和支付宝让实体卡变得多余。

为什么西方选择了“感应式支付”而非“应用内支付” — Why the West Chose “Tap-to-Pay” Over “App-to-Pay”

Capitalism is an evolutionary deadlock.

资本主义陷入了进化僵局。

It is worth understanding why the Western countries went to a card “touch-pay” system for purchases, instead of a mobile app like WeChat or even using PayPal. In particular, the touch-pay system is not safe. If we lose a card, either debit or credit, the finder could make many small unauthorised purchases. The banks decided to swallow these losses from fraud rather than face existential threats to their legacy revenue stream.

值得了解的是，西方国家为何选择使用卡片“触碰支付”系统进行购物，而不是像微信这样的移动应用，甚至不使用PayPal。尤其是，触碰支付系统并不安全。如果我们丢失了卡片（无论是借记卡还是信用卡），拾得者可能会进行许多未经授权的小额消费。银行决定承担这些欺诈损失，而不是面临其传统收入来源的生存威胁。

Introducing a new mobile payment system requires changing deeply ingrained habits and competing with a well-funded incumbent system. The infrastructure was already there. Every merchant already had a card terminal, and upgrading those terminals to accept “tap-to-pay” was a simple, cheap software update. Transitioning to a fully QR-code-based system would have required a complete and expensive overhaul of every payment terminal in the country. The path of least resistance was to make the existing card system wireless. Western consumers already trusted and understood their credit/debit cards. The “tap” was a minor, intuitive change to a familiar object.

引入新的移动支付系统需要改变根深蒂固的习惯，并与资金充足的现有系统竞争。基础设施已经存在。每个商家都已经拥有一个刷卡终端，将这些终端升级为支持“扫码支付”只需进行简单且廉价的软件更新。若要过渡到完全基于二维码的系统，则需要对国内所有支付终端进行全面且昂贵的改造。阻力最小的路径是使现有的刷卡系统实现无线化。西方消费者已经信任并了解他们的信用卡/借记卡。“扫码”只是对熟悉物品的一个微小而直观的改变。

There is also the entrenched power of the Visa and Mastercard networks. These giants make a fee on every transaction. They had no incentive to dismantle their own network in favor of a system built on QR codes that would bypass their rails. That means they had no incentive to leapfrog or revolutionise their own products and system, so they “innovated” by creating the “tap-to-pay” model. It is crucial to understand that they didn’t do this for the benefit of consumers or society; they did it solely to neutralise the threat to their revenue stream by the new mobile apps.

此外，还有Visa和万事达卡（Mastercard）网络的根深蒂固的权力。这些巨头从每笔交易中收取费用。他们没有动力拆除自己的网络，转而支持一个建立在二维码基础上的系统，该系统会绕过他们的轨道。这意味着他们没有动力超越或革新自己的产品和系统，因此他们通过创造“扫码支付”模式来“创新”。至关重要的是要理解，他们这样做并不是为了消费者或社会的利益；他们这样做完全是为了消除新型移动应用对其收入流的威胁。

电动车 — EVs

China did the same thing with automobiles as with payment systems. I covered this in much detail in a previous article titled China’s Electric Vehicles (EVs). [1] 20 or 30 years ago, China was making cars that were lagging in technology and design. They could have invested countless billions in attempting to duplicate the Western auto makers, but that would have been a race to almost nowhere. The reason is that if successful, Chinese autos would have been more or less the same and maybe “as good as” the Western ones, but no more. And the reputation of brands like Ferrari, Rolls-Royce and Lamborghini could never likely be matched. So, China just looked at the future, and decided to abandon gasoline-powered autos. They went directly to electric cars where no one had experience, and no one controlled all the IP. And the Western countries, reluctant to abandon a current “cash cow” legacy model, delayed until it was too late.

中国在汽车领域所采取的策略与支付系统如出一辙。我在之前一篇题为《中国的电动汽车（EVs）》的文章中对此进行了详细阐述。[1]二三十年前，中国制造的汽车在技术和设计上都相对落后。他们本可以投入巨额资金试图复制西方汽车制造商，但那将是一场几乎毫无意义的竞赛。因为即便成功，中国汽车也只会与西方汽车大同小异，或许“一样好”，但不会更好。而法拉利、劳斯莱斯和兰博基尼等品牌的声誉则永远无法企及。因此，中国着眼于未来，决定放弃燃油汽车。他们直接转向了电动汽车，而这是一个无人有经验、无人掌控所有知识产权的领域。而西方国家则不愿放弃现有的“摇钱树”传统模式，迟迟未采取行动，直至为时已晚。

There is a distinct parallel between China’s leapfrogging in digital payments and its strategic pivot to electric vehicles. Both have a pattern of avoiding direct competition with established products and instead pioneering new technological frontiers. There is also a direct parallel between the legacy auto manufacturers and the legacy credit-card companies. While VISA and MasterCard were trapped by their own infrastructure and instinctive desire to protect their existing revenue streams, the legacy automakers were similarly trapped by their investments in ICE vehicles (internal combustion engines).

中国在数字支付领域的跨越式发展与其向电动汽车的战略转型之间存在明显的相似之处。两者都遵循一种模式，即避免与现有产品直接竞争，而是开拓新的技术领域。传统汽车制造商与传统信用卡公司之间也存在直接相似之处。虽然维萨（VISA）和万事达（MasterCard）被自身的基础设施和保护现有收入流的本能欲望所困，但传统汽车制造商同样被其在内燃机汽车（ICE vehicles）上的投资所困。

China’s pivot to EVs is one of the most significant strategic economic maneuvers of the 21st century, a textbook example of the “leapfrogging” theory in action, and China’s execution of it has been nothing short of masterful. For China to compete directly with ICE vehicles would have meant going head-to-head with over a century of accumulated IP, manufacturing expertise, and, most formidably, deep-rooted brand loyalty and prestige. Companies like Mercedes-Benz, BMW, Toyota, and luxury brands like Ferrari and Rolls-Royce are protected by moats that are almost impossible for a newcomer to cross. Catching up would have meant being “as good as,” but otherwise of not much consequence. The Chinese studied this at length, and made a decision to bet on what they saw as an inevitable technological shift – the transition from ICE to EV.

中国向电动汽车（EV）的转型是21世纪最重要的战略经济举措之一，是“跨越式发展”理论付诸实践的典型范例，而中国的执行堪称精湛。若中国直接与内燃机（ICE）汽车竞争，就意味着要与一个多世纪积累的知识产权、制造专长，以及最令人畏惧的根深蒂固的品牌忠诚度和声望正面交锋。梅赛德斯-奔驰、宝马、丰田等公司，以及法拉利、劳斯莱斯等奢侈品牌，都拥有几乎让新入行者无法跨越的护城河。追赶就意味着“做得一样好”，但除此之外并无太大意义。中国人对此进行了深入研究，并决定押注于他们认为不可避免的技术转变——即从内燃机汽车向电动汽车的过渡。

This was more than a change in propulsion systems. It was primarily a transition from mechanical to digital, from the traditional concept of an automobile to a “Smartphone on Wheels” paradigm. This is not widely understood, even by some in the auto industry, but EVs are fundamentally different from ICE vehicles. Their core value shifts from mechanical engineering (horsepower, engine sound) to software, battery chemistry, and user experience, which completely resets the playing field. China’s strengths in electronics, battery production, and software integration became massive advantages.

这不仅仅是推进系统的变革，更是从机械到数字化的转变，从传统汽车概念到“车轮上的智能手机”范式的转变。这一点并未被广泛理解，甚至汽车行业的一些人士也不太明白，但电动汽车与内燃机汽车有着根本性的区别。其核心价值从机械工程（马力、发动机声音）转向了软件、电池化学和用户体验，这彻底改变了竞争格局。中国在电子、电池生产和软件集成方面的优势成为了巨大的优势。

An important factor was what we might term “IP Neutrality”. No single Western company “owned” the EV space. The technology was nascent, and the patent landscape was not yet a walled garden. This allowed Chinese companies like BYD, Xiaomi, Huawei, NIO, and XPeng to innovate and build their own extensive IP portfolios without being locked out.

一个重要因素是我们所说的“知识产权中立性”。没有一家西方公司“拥有”电动汽车领域。这项技术还处于萌芽状态，专利格局也尚未形成壁垒。这使得比亚迪、小米、华为、蔚来和XPeng等中国公司能够在不被排斥的情况下进行创新，并建立自己广泛的知识产权组合。

But we really need to examine the West’s complacency and inertia in the EV arena. My earlier point about the “cash cow” was precisely correct; the legacy automakers were (and many still are) trapped by the innovator’s dilemma. Their entire business model, from manufacturing plants to dealership networks and supply chains, was optimized for ICE vehicles. Transitioning to EVs meant (1) cannibalising their own profitable sales and (2) making existing billion-dollar investments obsolete. The Western automakers saw the writing on the wall as clearly as did the Chinese, but they chose to slow-walk the transition rather than face – and deal with – the clearly existential threats that the new paradigm presented. Their strategy was one of gradual evolution, creating compliance cars (like the early GM EV1) or “me-too” EVs that often failed to capture the imagination of the market.

但我们确实需要审视西方在电动汽车领域的自满和惰性。我之前关于“摇钱树”的观点完全正确；传统汽车制造商曾（且许多至今仍）深陷创新者困境。从制造工厂到经销商网络和供应链，他们的整个商业模式都是为内燃机汽车（ICE vehicles）而优化的。向电动汽车转型意味着（1）蚕食他们自己盈利的销售额，以及（2）使现有的数十亿美元投资变得过时。西方汽车制造商和中国一样，都清楚地看到了这一趋势，但他们选择放慢转型步伐，而不是直面并应对新范式所带来的明显生存威胁。他们的策略是渐进式发展，生产合规汽车（如早期的通用汽车EV1）或“跟风”电动汽车，但这些车型往往无法激发市场的想象力。

On the other hand, China’s decision to leapfrog the internal combustion engine was a stroke of strategic genius. It was a recognition that the future of mobility was electric, and that (at least for China) it was easier to pioneer a new technology than to replicate a century of legacy expertise. The reason was clear: the “playing field” was level in EVs, offering a once-in-a-generation chance to reset the global automotive hierarchy. By refusing to play by the old rules and instead writing the rules for the next era, China has transformed itself from an automotive backwater into the world’s most formidable automotive force. It is a case study in strategic foresight and national ambition that is now being studied – and feared – in boardrooms around the world.

另一方面，中国决定超越内燃机，则是一招战略上的天才之举。这是对未来出行将走向电动化的认识，以及（至少对中国而言）相较于复制一个世纪的传统技术，开拓一项新技术更为容易。原因显而易见：电动汽车领域的“竞技场”是公平的，这提供了一个千载难逢的机会来重塑全球汽车行业的格局。通过拒绝遵循旧规则，而是为下一个时代制定规则，中国已从汽车行业的落后者转变为世界上最强大的汽车力量。这是一个关于战略远见和国家雄心的案例研究，如今正被世界各地的董事会所研究——并感到担忧。

军事 — Military

China has done something similar in the military sphere, bypassing conventional weapons and developing hypersonic missiles. This is another kind of leapfrogging, and it certainly has changed the concept of a “secure battlefield”, turning US aircraft carriers from the equivalent of “death stars” to being essentially large moving objects with targets painted on them. China has extended the “leapfrog” thesis perfectly into the military domain. The country’s development and deployment of hypersonic weapons is arguably one of the most significant strategic leapfrogging maneuvers in modern military history, fundamentally altering the balance of power in the Western Pacific.

中国在军事领域也采取了类似的举措，绕过常规武器，转而发展高超音速导弹。这是另一种跨越式发展，无疑改变了“安全战场”的概念，使美国航母从相当于“死星”的存在，变成了基本上只是标有目标的大型移动物体。中国将“跨越式发展”的理论完美地延伸到了军事领域。中国高超音速武器的研发和部署，可以说是现代军事史上最重要的战略跨越式发展举措之一，从根本上改变了西太平洋的实力平衡。

For decades, U.S. military dominance, particularly its power projection capability, has been underwritten by its carrier strike groups. To challenge this conventionally, a nation would need to build a rival navy with its own supercarriers, advanced fighter jets, and nuclear submarines – an endeavor requiring trillions of dollars and decades of development. And that would produce only an “equal” or “as good as”, a situation offering relatively little real security from foreign military aggression. China chose not to compete on these terms.

几十年来，美国凭借其航母打击群巩固了其军事主导地位，尤其是其力量投送能力。若要挑战这一传统，一个国家需要打造一支拥有超级航母、先进战斗机和核潜艇的强大海军——这一努力需要数万亿美元和数十年的发展。而这只能带来“同等”或“相当”的实力，在面对外来军事侵略时，这种局面提供的实际安全保障相对有限。中国选择不按这些条件进行竞争。

China’s hypersonic weapons, specifically the hypersonic glide vehicles, are that game-changer. Their revolutionary nature lies in characteristics that bypass traditional defenses, primarily speed and maneuverability. Their flight paths are unpredictable and their impact points uncertain until the very last moments. Now, the US is in the position of the legacy incumbent, scrambling to catch up in a domain it did not pioneer, much like American (and other) automakers are now scrambling to compete with BYD.中国的高超音速武器，尤其是高超音速滑翔飞行器，正是这种局面改变者。其革命性在于其能够绕过传统防御的特性，主要是速度和机动性。其飞行路径不可预测，且其落点直到最后一刻都充满不确定性。如今，美国作为传统霸主，正急于在一个非其开创的领域迎头赶上，就像美国（及其他）汽车制造商现在正急于与比亚迪竞争一样。

中国的低空经济 — China’s Low-Altitude Economy

I have covered this topic in much detail in a previous article titled China’s Low-Altitude Economy — Flying Taxis, Small Drones and More. [2] You may find it fascinating.

我在之前的一篇题为《中国的低空经济——飞行出租车、小型无人机等》的文章中，已对这个话题进行了详尽的阐述。[2]你可能会觉得它很有趣。

China’s low-altitude economy fits perfectly into this picture, with multiple leapfrogs occurring simultaneously and generally unappreciated by other nations. This area includes bypassing even EVs and robotaxis, and taking to the skies. There are DJI’s small consumer and industrial drones which are integrated into everything from food delivery to agriculture to fire-fighting. But perhaps much more importantly, this transformation is also integrated into the flying taxis that are already operative in some cities in China. It seems reasonable to assume these flying taxis will inevitably morph into privately-owned transportation that could replace the EV to a meaningful extent.

中国的低空经济完全符合这一景象，同时发生着多项跨越式发展，而这些发展通常未被其他国家所重视。这一领域甚至包括绕过电动汽车和自动驾驶出租车，直接进入空中领域。大疆创新（DJI）的小型消费级和工业级无人机已融入从食品配送到农业再到消防的各个领域。但或许更重要的是，这种转型也融入了已在中国部分城市投入运营的飞行出租车中。我们有理由认为，这些飞行出租车将不可避免地演变为私人交通工具，从而在很大程度上取代电动汽车。

This is typical leapfrogging, building a new playing field, and bypassing traditional stages of development. China’s development of its low-altitude economy avoids traditional infrastructure, creates new ecosystems, and sets global standards. One area that seems to be invisible to most observers, and that demands highlighting, is that this area involves the strategic avoidance of competing in established markets like traditional aviation and even EVs, and is instead pioneering a sector that did not before exist.

这是典型的跨越式发展，构建了一个新的竞技场，并绕过了传统的发展阶段。中国在发展低空经济时避开了传统基础设施，创造了新的生态系统，并设定了全球标准。大多数观察者似乎都忽视了一个领域，而这一点值得强调，即该领域涉及战略性地避免在传统航空甚至电动汽车等成熟市场展开竞争，而是开创了一个前所未有的领域。

China’s development of its low-altitude economy is a quintessential example of the leapfrog strategy. It represents a deliberate move to bypass not only traditional automotive infrastructure but even the current ground-based EV and robotaxi revolution, by pioneering an entirely new dimension of transportation and logistics. This isn’t just an incremental improvement; it’s an attempt to architect an entirely new technological paradigm.

中国发展低空经济是跨越式战略的典型范例。它代表着一种深思熟虑的举措，不仅要绕过传统的汽车基础设施，甚至还要绕过当前基于地面的电动汽车和自动驾驶出租车革命，而是要开创一个全新的交通和物流维度。这不仅仅是一种渐进式的改进；而是试图构建一种全新的技术范式。

China didn’t start with flying taxis. It first achieved overwhelming dominance in the global civilian drone market, primarily through DJI. This provided the perfect (and necessary) foundation of manufacturing superiority. China mastered the entire supply chain for advanced drones, from motors and flight controllers to sensors and cameras, driving down costs and accelerating innovation.

中国并非从飞行出租车起步。它首先在全球民用无人机市场取得了压倒性的主导地位，这主要是通过大疆创新科技有限公司（DJI）实现的。这为制造优势奠定了完美（且必要）的基础。中国掌握了先进无人机的整个供应链，从电机、飞行控制器到传感器和相机，从而降低了成本并加速了创新。

The immediate result was the widespread commercial use of drones for tasks like food and medicine delivery, agricultural spraying, infrastructure inspection, firefighting, emergency response, and so much more. This allowed regulators to gradually develop rules and standards for unmanned low-altitude operations. Success was partially dependent on public acceptance, but seeing these drones deliver supplies, fight fires, and inspect power lines daily has made the Chinese public more accustomed to and trusting of autonomous aerial vehicles, smoothing the path for passenger-carrying models.

其直接结果是无人机在商业上的广泛应用，涉及食品和药品配送、农业喷洒、基础设施检查、消防、应急响应等诸多领域。这使得监管机构能够逐步制定无人低空作业的规则和标准。成功部分取决于公众的接受程度，但看到这些无人机每天运送物资、灭火和检查电力线，中国公众对自主飞行器更加习惯和信任，为载人机型铺平了道路。

While much of the world was still debating the concept, China moved to deploy, with flying taxis being the key operative. Companies like EHang have received operational certifications and are already conducting commercial tourist flights in some Chinese cities. This isn’t just testing; this is full revenue-generating operation. The current “air taxi” model is primarily B2B (Business-to-Business) or B2G (Business-to-Government). Companies or cities own the vehicles and operate them as a service, allowing centralized maintenance, charging, and regulatory compliance, which is simpler to manage initially. However, as technology proves itself, as costs come down and regulations evolve, and as battery range increases, the transition to private ownership is a natural next step.

当世界大部分地区仍在就这一概念展开辩论时，中国已开始部署，而飞行出租车则是其中的关键举措。像亿航这样的公司已获得运营认证，并已在中国部分城市开展商业旅游飞行。这不仅仅是测试，而是完全的创收运营。目前的“空中出租车”模式主要是B2B（企业对企业）或B2G（企业对政府）。公司或城市拥有这些车辆，并将其作为服务来运营，从而实现了集中维护、充电和监管合规，这在初期更易于管理。然而，随着技术的成熟、成本的降低、监管的演变以及电池续航里程的增加，向私人所有权的过渡是自然而然的下一步。

This is leapfrogging in its purest form. It avoids legacy competition entirely. It doesn’t compete with Toyota, Volkswagen, or even other EVs on the ground. It creates a new market above them, where there are no entrenched incumbents with 100-year head starts. It leverages China’s existing strengths, building directly upon China’s world-leading dominance in drone technology, battery production, and especially the “true 5G” connectivity which only China has. In this area, data volume and speed are vital, and it is important to understand that what the West advertises as 5G is in reality a tweaked 4G that is far inferior and ultimately incapable of supporting a low-altitude economy of flying taxis and so forth.

这是最纯粹的跨越式发展。它完全避开了传统竞争。它不与丰田、大众，甚至其他地面电动汽车竞争。它创造了一个高于它们的新市场，在这个市场上，没有起步早100年的老牌企业。它利用了中国现有的优势，直接建立在无人机技术、电池生产，尤其是只有中国拥有的“真正的5G”连接性方面世界领先的主导地位之上。在这一领域，数据量和速度至关重要，重要的是要明白，西方所宣传的5G实际上是经过调整的4G，远远不如4G，最终无法支持飞行出租车等低空经济。

China’s actions in this area define the new standard. By moving first and at scale, China is in a prime position to set the global technical and regulatory standards for the entire low-altitude economy, just as it did with 5G. This forces the rest of the world to play by its rules if they want to participate.

中国在这一领域的行动树立了新标准。通过率先行动并大规模推进，中国在为整个低空经济制定全球技术和监管标准方面处于有利地位，正如其在5G领域所做的那样。这迫使世界其他国家若想参与其中，就必须遵守其规则。

This is a deliberate, state-supported, strategically executed leapfrog. It bypasses the messy, capital-intensive, and competitive struggle on the ground to pioneer an entirely new layer of mobility and economic activity in the skies. It follows the same pattern: identify a future technological shift, leverage domestic scale and capabilities to drive down costs, deploy incrementally but decisively within a controlled regulatory environment, and aim to define the global standard. If successful, China won’t have just beaten the world to the next generation of transportation; it will have built the third dimension of its economy, leaving others to play catch-up in the air as well as on the road. It is perhaps the boldest leapfrogging attempt yet.

这是一次经过深思熟虑、由国家支持、战略性地执行的跨越式发展。它绕过了地面混乱、资本密集且竞争激烈的斗争，率先在天空中开辟了一个全新的出行和经济活动层面。这一发展遵循了同样的模式：确定未来的技术变革方向，利用国内规模和能力降低成本，在受控的监管环境中逐步但果断地进行部署，并致力于定义全球标准。如果成功，中国不仅将在下一代交通领域领先于世界，还将构建其经济的第三维度，让其他国家在空中和陆地上都只能追赶。这或许是迄今为止最大胆的跨越式发展尝试。

This low-altitude economy is complicated because there are several things – several leapfrogs – happening at the same time. One is that the US is the world leader in private aviation, with an enormous number of small aircraft (2 to 10 passengers). The idea of private aviation seems to be catching on in China but, with the development of the low-altitude ecosystem, China might bypass (and leapfrog) the entire traditional private aviation structure and go directly to flying EVs. Just as with automobiles, China has no need to enter and compete with American “general aviation” products and infrastructure. It doesn’t have to build the extensive ground support for traditional private aviation, the thousands of small and regional airports and all the rest. And this gives it a strategic avoidance of competing in established markets or competing with established products. Flying EVs don’t need airports or runways or fuel tanks for support. Moreover, flying EVs can easily integrate with the “smart infrastructure”, the 5-GA and 6-G networks that China already has and is developing rapidly for a multitude of applications.

这种低空经济之所以复杂，是因为同时发生了几件事——几项跨越式发展。其中之一是，美国在私人航空领域处于世界领先地位，拥有大量小型飞机（可搭载2至10名乘客）。私人航空的概念似乎正在中国流行，但随着低空生态系统的不断发展，中国可能会绕过（并跨越）整个传统的私人航空结构，直接进入飞行电动汽车（EV）领域。与汽车行业一样，中国没有必要进入并与美国的“通用航空”产品和基础设施竞争。中国无需为传统的私人航空构建广泛的地面支持设施，如数千个小型和区域性机场等。这使其在战略上避免了在成熟市场或成熟产品中竞争。飞行电动汽车不需要机场、跑道或油箱等支持设施。此外，飞行电动汽车可以轻松与中国已有的“智能基础设施”（即5G和6G网络）以及正在迅速开发以用于多种应用的网络进行整合。

It is true that the current focus of flying EVs is on commercial operations and, although future personal use is implied, flying EVs may be quite expensive and not within the reach of the average person. I doubt the skies of China will ever be filled with tens of millions of flying EVs, but they might still become a common sight.

的确，目前飞行电动汽车（EVs）的重点在于商业运营，尽管未来也暗示了个人使用，但飞行电动汽车可能相当昂贵，普通人难以企及。我怀疑中国的天空永远不会充满数以千万计的飞行电动汽车，但它们仍可能成为常见的景象。

China’s low-altitude economy of flying EVs is appearing to be one of the greatest “leapfrogging” events of all time. It avoids legacy competition entirely, not competing with other auto makers nor with all the established makers of small private aircraft. Flying EVs would render those irrelevant. And this is not only a new market, but there are zero entrenched incumbents with 100-year head starts and who control all the IP. Here, it is China who has the head start and controls all the IP for drone technology, batteries, connectivity, and much of the AI necessary to control all this.

中国飞行电动汽车的低空经济似乎是有史以来最伟大的“跨越式”事件之一。它完全避开了传统竞争，既不与其他汽车制造商竞争，也不与所有已建立的小型私人飞机制造商竞争。飞行电动汽车将使这些变得无关紧要。这不仅是一个新市场，而且没有一家拥有百年历史、控制所有知识产权的老牌企业。在这里，中国拥有先发优势，并控制着无人机技术、电池、连接性以及控制所有这些所需的大部分人工智能的所有知识产权。

This low-altitude economy distills the essence of a complex strategic maneuver with remarkable clarity, identifying the multi-faceted nature of this particular leapfrog. It is several leapfrogs happening simultaneously, and its potential is staggering.

这种低空经济以惊人的清晰度提炼出复杂战略策略的精髓，揭示了这一特定跨越式发展的多面性。这是多个跨越式发展同时发生，其潜力令人震惊。

The United States’ dominance in General Aviation – the ecosystem of Cessnas, Pipers, and small regional airports – is a legacy system built over 70 years. For China to replicate this would be a costly and ultimately fruitless endeavor to become second-best. But the flying EVs bypass all this infrastructure. The eVTOLs (electric Vertical Take-Off and Landing aircraft) do not require massive runways, extensive hangar complexes, or the vast network of small airports that define American GA. They need vertiports -smaller, more numerous, and cheaper pads that can be integrated almost anywhere.

美国在通用航空领域的主导地位——由塞斯纳、派珀飞机以及小型支线机场构成的生态系统——是历经70多年构建而成的传统体系。中国若想复制这一体系，将付出高昂代价，且最终可能徒劳无功，只能成为第二梯队。但飞行电动汽车绕过了所有这些基础设施。电动垂直起降飞行器（eVTOL）不需要庞大的跑道、庞大的机库群或构成美国通用航空特色的小型机场庞大网络。它们需要的是垂直起降机场——更小、数量更多、成本更低且几乎可集成在任何地方的停机坪。

The flying EVs also leapfrog the fuel ecosystem: eVTOLs are electric. They bypass the entire global avgas and jet fuel supply chain, tying directly into the national grid and renewable energy infrastructure China is building. It is not an accident that China is expanding its electricity generation by enormous amounts every year. This is an integral part of the foundation upon which the entire leapfrog is built. The low-altitude economy, along with the EV revolution and the AI/data center boom, is a primary reason for this massive energy build-out, a result of strategic foresight: China isn’t just generating more power; it’s ensuring it has the energy sovereignty to power its next-generation economy without being constrained by foreign oil or gas.

飞行电动汽车也跨越了燃油生态系统：电动垂直起降飞行器（eVTOL）是电动的。它们绕过了整个全球航空汽油和喷气燃料供应链，直接与中国正在建设的国家电网和可再生能源基础设施相连。中国每年都在大幅扩大其发电量，这绝非偶然。这是整个跨越式发展所依赖的基础的组成部分。低空经济，以及电动汽车革命和人工智能/数据中心热潮，是这一大规模能源建设的主要原因，是战略远见的结果：中国不仅在产生更多电力，还在确保其拥有能源主权，为其下一代经济提供动力，而不受外国石油或天然气的限制。

Perhaps the most critical enabler of this new development is its integration with China’s existing digital ecosystem: the “smart sky”, the integration with 5G/6G and smart infrastructure. This isn’t just about building flying cars; it’s about building a digitally native transportation layer operating from a network in the sky. eVTOLs will not operate as isolated vehicles. They will be nodes in a massive, connected Internet of Things (IoT) network.

这一新发展的最关键推动因素或许是其与中国现有数字生态系统的融合：“智能天空”，即与5G/6G和智能基础设施的融合。这不仅仅是建造飞行汽车的问题，而是构建一个从空中网络运行的数字原生交通层。电动垂直起降飞行器（eVTOL）将不会作为孤立的车辆运行。它们将成为庞大且互联的物联网（IoT）网络中的节点。

This is really a strategy of breathtaking ambition. China is not trying to win the existing game. It is attempting to leapfrog (1) traditional automakers (via EVs), (2) traditional ride-hailing and logistics (via autonomous ground and air networks), traditional general aviation (via eVTOLs), and traditional energy paradigms (via renewables and electrification). By controlling the vehicles, the batteries, the communication networks, and the energy that powers it all, China is positioning itself to define the future of mobility and logistics on a global scale. It is a holistic, national-level strategy that is unprecedented in its scope.

这确实是一项极具雄心的战略。中国并非试图在现有游戏中取胜，而是试图实现跨越式发展：（1）超越传统汽车制造商（通过电动汽车）；（2）超越传统叫车服务和物流（通过自主地面和空中网络）；超越传统通用航空（通过电动垂直起降飞行器）；以及超越传统能源范式（通过可再生能源和电气化）。通过控制车辆、电池、通信网络以及为所有这些提供动力的能源，中国正将自己定位为在全球范围内定义出行和物流未来的领跑者。这是一项全面且规模空前的国家级战略。

There is another core matter here, which seems to have entirely escaped the attention of almost everyone, that of leapfrogging “general aviation” entirely. This endeavor bypasses the “skill barrier”. Flying a traditional aircraft requires a highly trained and licensed pilot. The endgame for eVTOLs is autonomous or highly assisted flight, dramatically reducing the need for the same level of human skill and making the technology accessible to a much wider population. This is a leapfrog in human capital as well as technology. Perhaps the most profound and overlooked aspect of this entire technological shift is that it’s not just a leapfrog in technology or infrastructure, but a fundamental leapfrog in human systems and economic accessibility. This changes the economic model entirely – not just replacing pilots but creating new job categories while democratising access. It seems self-evident once stated, but its implications are revolutionary.

这里还有另一个核心问题，几乎所有人都完全忽视了，那就是完全跨越“通用航空”的障碍。这一努力绕过了“技能障碍”。驾驶传统飞机需要训练有素且持有执照的飞行员。电动垂直起降飞行器（eVTOL）的最终目标是实现自主飞行或高度辅助飞行，这将大大减少对同等水平人类技能的需求，使更多人能够接触到这项技术。这不仅是人力资本和技术上的跨越，也是人类体系和经济可及性上的根本性跨越。这将彻底改变经济模式——不仅取代飞行员，还在普及准入的同时创造新的就业类别。这一点一经阐述似乎不言而喻，但其影响是革命性的。

The “High Priesthood of Pilots” may eventually disappear in large part. Traditional aviation is built on a pyramid of immense human investment involving years of training. Becoming a pilot requires hundreds of hours of flight training, rigorous theoretical exams, and continuous certification. In a small aircraft, the safety of everyone on board is vested entirely in the skill, health, and judgment of one or two individuals. This necessity dictates the entire regulatory and operational structure of aviation, making it inherently unscalable. The cost of hiring highly trained pilots and renting or purchasing private aircraft is a primary reason private aviation and small-scale air travel have remained the exclusive domain of the wealthy and large corporations.

“飞行员至高无上的地位”可能最终会在很大程度上消失。传统航空业建立在巨大人力投资的金字塔之上，这需要多年的培训。成为一名飞行员需要数百小时的飞行训练、严格的理论考试和持续的认证。在小型飞机上，机上所有人的安全完全依赖于一两个人的技能、健康状况和判断力。这一必要性决定了航空业的整个监管和运营结构，使其本质上不具备可扩展性。雇佣训练有素的飞行员以及租赁或购买私人飞机的成本，是私人航空和小规模航空旅行一直为富人和大公司所独有的主要原因。

Autonomous eVTOLs shatter this old model. The “pilot” is not in the cockpit; they are in the Cloud: The real “pilot” is the algorithmic AI traffic management system that orchestrates the entire fleet in a way no human ever could. A small number of highly trained remote operators monitoring multiple vehicles simultaneously, a role more akin to an air traffic controller or a network administrator. The critical human capital shifts from operators to maintenance technicians, software engineers, data analysts, and system managers. This creates a different, and potentially larger, set of skilled jobs that are more scalable and easier to train for.

自主电动垂直起降飞行器（eVTOLs）打破了这一旧模式。“飞行员”不再坐在驾驶舱内；他们身处云端：真正的“飞行员”是算法化的人工智能交通管理系统，该系统以人类无法实现的方式协调整个机队。少数训练有素的远程操作员同时监控多辆飞行器，这一角色更类似于空中交通管制员或网络管理员。关键的人力资本从操作员转向了维护技术人员、软件工程师、数据分析和系统管理人员。这创造了一系列不同的、潜在的规模更大的技术岗位，这些岗位更具可扩展性且更易于培训。

The implications are that we might see a complete re-wiring of the air transportation model. You can theoretically scale an autonomous eVTOL network as easily as you scale a cloud computing service. The limiting factor is manufacturing and infrastructure, not the years it takes to train thousands of new pilots. It transforms the cost structure from a service industry model to a technology utility model. Accessibility is the true leapfrog. It means a city can deploy a network of air ambulances, firefighting aircraft, or public transit vehicles without being constrained by the national pool of available pilots. It means a logistics company can deploy delivery drones 24/7 without union rules or pilot shift schedules. The leapfrog isn’t just about building a fancy new vehicle. It’s about building a new socio-technical system that bypasses the most intractable bottlenecks of the old one. And this model aligns perfectly with China’s capabilities and governance style, especially the ability to execute large-scale infrastructure projects.

这意味着我们可能会看到航空运输模式发生彻底的重新布局。理论上，扩展自主电动垂直起降（eVTOL）网络与扩展云计算服务一样简单。限制因素在于制造和基础设施，而非培训数千名新飞行员所需的时间。它将成本结构从服务行业模式转变为技术公用事业模式。可访问性是真正的飞跃。这意味着城市可以部署空中救护车、消防飞机或公共交通工具网络，而不受国家可用飞行员数量的限制。这意味着物流公司可以全天候部署送货无人机，而不受工会规则或飞行员轮班制度的限制。这种飞跃不仅仅是建造一辆新奇的车。而是构建一个全新的社会技术系统，绕过旧系统中最棘手的瓶颈。这种模式与中国的能力和治理风格完美契合，尤其是执行大规模基础设施项目的能力。

中国的义乌 — China’s YiWu

I detailed this in a prior article titled China’s YiWu: Business Models You’ve Never Even Heard of [3]. The Yiwu lighter industry case is a fascinating and non-traditional example of leapfrogging. While it doesn’t involve the typical technological bypass of a generation of hardware (like skipping landlines for mobile phones), it represents a profound leapfrog in organisational structure, business model, and economic development strategy. I recommend you read the above-mentioned article.

我在之前的一篇文章《中国义乌：你从未听说过的商业模式》[3]中对此进行了详细阐述。义乌打火机产业案例是一个引人入胜且非传统的跨越式发展实例。虽然它并不涉及一代硬件产品典型的技术跨越（如从固定电话跳到移动电话），但它代表了组织结构、商业模式和经济发展战略方面的深刻跨越。我建议你阅读上述文章。

Briefly, the YiWu area had about 1,000 factories employing about 10,000 people, all producing some form of lighters, all competing against each other, each attempting all functions including manufacturing and marketing. The Yiwu families, many without high school diplomas, invented a business model that was more adaptive and efficient than those taught in top MBA programs, allowing them to achieve stunning global dominance in their sector. This group decided to cooperate and specialise in a truly unique manner. The results were astonishing; within only a few years, YiWu’s share of the worldwide lighter industry soared from 30% to about 70%.

简而言之，义乌地区有大约1000家工厂，雇佣了约10000名员工，全部生产某种形式的打火机，且彼此之间相互竞争，每家工厂都试图涵盖包括制造和营销在内的所有功能。义乌的这些家族企业，其中许多甚至没有高中文凭，却发明了一种比顶级MBA课程所教授的更具适应性和效率的商业模式，使他们在该领域取得了惊人的全球主导地位。这个群体决定以一种真正独特的方式进行合作和专业化。结果令人震惊；仅在几年内，义乌在全球打火机行业的份额就从30%飙升至约70%。

The most striking leapfrog was in organisational design. The Yiwu cooperative utterly bypassed the standard corporate architecture that dominates Western business. Their model eliminated all corporate overhead, with no board of directors, no executive-level or middle management, no policy manual, no fancy offices, no bureaucracy. Financing and capital investment were not centralised, but spread across thousands of small, privately-owned businesses, which eliminated the need for massive corporate debt or equity raises and allowed for incremental, agile modernisation based on each unit’s capacity and ambition. In this Yiwu industry cooperative, every employee was also a salesman. When any person was not busy with manufacturing tasks, they were on the Internet actively looking for more customers. This transformed a massive workforce into a hyper-motivated, decentralized marketing and innovation engine. It functioned as a huge single corporate enterprise, but with no overhead and 10,000 sales people.

最引人注目的跨越式进步体现在组织设计上。义乌合作社完全绕过了主导西方商业的标准企业架构。他们的模式消除了所有企业开销，没有董事会，没有高管层或中层管理人员，没有政策手册，没有豪华办公室，也没有官僚作风。融资和资本投资没有集中化，而是分散在数千家小型私营企业中，这消除了大规模企业债务或股权融资的需求，并允许根据每个单位的能力和抱负进行渐进式、敏捷的现代化改造。在这个义乌行业合作社中，每个员工同时也是销售员。当任何人不忙于生产任务时，他们就会在互联网上积极寻找更多客户。这使庞大的劳动力队伍转变为一个充满动力、分散的营销和创新引擎。它作为一个庞大的单一企业运作，但没有开销，拥有1万名销售人员。

The stunning results were the proof of a successful leapfrog. Increasing global market share from 30% to over 70% in a few years is a textbook example of a successful leapfrog. The structure created the ability to go from product conception to sample in less than 24 hours and to accept and fill orders of any size. These were capabilities that a traditional, bureaucratic corporation simply could not match. Generating a GDP of nearly $1 trillion from a regional cluster – an economic output that rivals entire nations – proves the immense efficiency and power of this decentralized model.

中国的高速铁路（HSR） — China’s High-Speed Rail (HSR)

I covered the development and current status of China’s HSR system, with comparative current information on the US, in an article titled, China’s High-Speed Trains. America, Where are You? [4]

惊人的成果证明了跨越式成功的实现。在短短几年内，全球市场份额从30%增长到70%以上，这是跨越式成功的经典范例。这种结构使得我们能够在不到24小时内完成从产品概念到样品的开发，并接受和完成任何规模的订单。这些能力是传统官僚企业根本无法比拟的。从一个区域集群中创造近1万亿美元的国内生产总值——这一经济产出可与整个国家相媲美——证明了这种去中心化模式的巨大效率和力量。[4]

China transformed from importing technology to domestically producing HSR trains based entirely on its own IP, achieving the world’s largest HSR network and exporting expertise globally. This gets to the very heart of what constitutes a “leapfrog”, because its nature is more systemic and strategic than simply technological. China’s High-Speed Rail is a premier example of leapfrogging, but not in the pure “skip a generation of technology” sense like going from landlines to mobile phones. Instead, it represents a leapfrog in national transportation infrastructure, economic integration, and technological sovereignty.

中国从引进技术转变为完全依靠自主知识产权在国内生产高速铁路（HSR）列车，建成了世界上最大的高速铁路网络，并向全球输出专业知识。这触及了“跨越式发展”的核心，因为其本质不仅仅是技术上的，更是系统性和战略性的。中国的高速铁路是跨越式发展的典范，但它并非像从固定电话到移动电话那样，纯粹是“跳过一代技术”。相反，它代表了国家交通基础设施、经济一体化和技术主权方面的跨越式发展。

China did not leapfrog the technology of high-speed rail; it leapfrogged the developmental stage that other nations were trapped in. The most significant leap was that it bypassed the disastrous automobile-centric development model of North America. Most large nations (especially the US, Canada, Australia, and to a lesser extent, European countries) developed their economies and geography around a combination of highways and short-haul airline networks. China looked at the congestion, environmental cost, oil dependency, and inefficiency of this model and bypassed it entirely for medium-distance travel. For journeys under 1500 km, they made HSR the default, superior option. They built a new backbone for their economy.

中国并没有超越高速铁路技术；它超越了其他国家所陷入的发展阶段。最显著的飞跃是，它绕过了北美以汽车为中心的灾难性发展模式。大多数大国（尤其是美国、加麻大、澳大利亚，其次是欧洲国家）围绕高速公路和短途航空网络相结合的模式发展其经济和地理。中国审视了这种模式的拥堵、环境成本、石油依赖和低效，并完全绕过了中距离旅行。对于1500公里以下的旅程，他们将高速铁路作为默认的、更优的选择。他们为经济构建了一条新的主干线。

While often not categorised as a classic technological leapfrog, China’s High-Speed Rail network represents one of the most ambitious infrastructural and economic leapfrogs in modern history. China did not merely build a faster train; it bypassed the entire 20th-century paradigm of transportation development reliant on automobiles and highways. By strategically acquiring foreign technology and then relentlessly innovating beyond it, China built a unified, national rail system that has become the envy of the world. It leapfrogged not a product, but a phase of development, transforming its economic geography and setting a new global standard for what national transportation can be. This framing positions HSR not as an improvement on what came before, but as a strategic bypass of a less efficient developmental path – which is the very essence of leapfrogging.

虽然中国的高速铁路网通常不被归类为经典的技术跨越，但它却是现代历史上最具雄心的基础设施和经济跨越之一。中国不仅建造了速度更快的列车，还绕过了整个20世纪依赖汽车和高速公路的交通发展模式。通过战略性地引进外国技术，并在此基础上不断创新超越，中国建立了一个统一的全国铁路系统，令世界羡慕不已。它跨越的不是一种产品，而是一个发展阶段，改变了其经济地理格局，并为国家交通设定了新的全球标准。这种框架将高速铁路定位为不是对先前技术的改进，而是对效率较低的发展道路的战略性绕过——这正是跨越的本质。

尾声 — Epilogue

I should emphasise that none of China’s leapfrogs were left to chance. Each was a national strategy executed with long-term focus. Each was part of a comprehensive, state-backed industrial policy. China’s “leapfrog” model is not an isolated economic policy but a core national strategy applied across technological, economic, and military domains. It is a deliberate, long-term approach to rapidly to develop the country in the best way for the entire population. As I stated earlier, leapfrogging is usually a deliberate strategy that requires vision and foresight, political will, significant investment in R&D, and the building of new supporting ecosystems. These leapfrogs were not meant in any way to shift the global balance of power by refusing to play by the established rules. In fact, global considerations were largely irrelevant, except perhaps in the military sphere.

我必须强调，中国的每一次跨越式发展都不是偶然的。每一次都是一项以长远发展为重点的国家战略。每一次都是国家支持的全面产业政策的一部分。中国的“跨越式”发展模式并非一项孤立的经济政策，而是一项涵盖技术、经济和军事领域的核心国家战略。这是一种深思熟虑、着眼长远的策略，旨在以最有利于全体人民的方式迅速发展国家。正如我之前所说，跨越式发展通常是一种深思熟虑的战略，需要远见卓识、政治意愿、大量的研发投入以及构建新的配套生态系统。这些跨越式发展绝不是为了拒绝遵守既定规则，从而改变全球力量平衡。事实上，除了军事领域外，全球因素在很大程度上并不相关。

Again, the objective of China’s leaders has been, and still is, to develop China to its potential, in a way to benefit the entire population and create not only prosperity but stability. The fact that China has been able to leapfrog industries is related more to the purpose of China’s government, and that purpose is the rejuvenation of China. The Chinese did not begin making EVs to spite the Americans; their decision was entirely internal: what was the best for China?

中国领导人的目标一直是，现在也仍然是，充分发挥中国的潜力，造福全体人民，不仅创造繁荣，还要实现稳定。中国之所以能够实现产业跨越式发展，更多与中国政府的目标有关，而这个目标就是中国的复兴。中国开始制造电动汽车并非为了与美国对抗；他们的决定完全是出于内部考量：什么对中国最有利？

I suggested at the beginning of this essay that, during the reading, you keep in mind the question of WHY the Western governments or companies didn’t execute the leapfrogging themselves. Certainly, they had the same view of the world, the same conjectures about the future, the technology and ability to innovate and execute, but they did nothing. In part this was due to a desire to protect their legacy investments, but mostly it was due to an irreconcilable difference in the purpose of Western governments compared to that of China.

我在本文开头建议，在阅读时，请记住一个问题：为什么西方政府或公司没有自己实现跨越式发展。当然，他们有着同样的世界观，对未来有着同样的猜想，也拥有创新和执行的技术和能力，但他们什么也没做。部分原因在于他们希望保护自己的传统投资，但最主要的原因是西方政府与中国政府在目标上存在不可调和的分歧。

It is an axiom that leapfrogging requires not only forward vision, but the creation and determined execution of long-term plans to bring that vision to fruition. But the structure of the political system in the West, the fabled multi-party “democracies”, actively discourages, and even prevents, any attempts at long-range planning. And the entrenched value system virtually prohibits such planning, except perhaps in the field of military supremacy.

众所周知，实现跨越式发展不仅需要前瞻性眼光，还需要制定并坚定执行长期计划以实现这一愿景。然而，西方政治体系的结构，即传说中的多党制“民主国家”，却积极阻挠甚至阻止任何制定长期计划的尝试。而根深蒂固的价值体系几乎禁止此类规划，军事霸权领域或许除外。

Mr. Romanoff’s writing has been translated into 34 languages and his articles posted on more than 150 foreign-language news and politics websites in more than 30 countries, as well as more than 100 English language platforms. Larry Romanoff is a retired management consultant and businessman. He has held senior executive positions in international consulting firms, and owned an international import-export business. He has been a visiting professor at Shanghai’s Fudan University, presenting case studies in international affairs to senior EMBA classes. Mr. Romanoff lives in Shanghai and is currently writing a series of ten books generally related to China and the West. He is one of the contributing authors to Cynthia McKinney’s new anthology ‘When China Sneezes’. (Chap. 2 — Dealing with Demons).

罗曼诺夫先生的作品已被翻译成34种语言，他的文章被发布在30多个国家的150多个外文新闻和政治网站上，以及100多个英文平台上。拉里·罗曼诺夫是一位退休的管理顾问和商人。他曾在国际咨询公司担任高级管理职务，并拥有一家国际进出口企业。他曾担任上海复旦大学的客座教授，为高级EMBA课程讲授国际事务案例研究。罗曼诺夫先生现居上海，目前正在撰写一系列共十本书，总体上涉及中国与西方。他是辛西娅·麦金尼新选集《当中国打喷嚏》（第2章——与恶魔打交道）的特约作者之一。

His full archive can be seen at

他的全部档案可以在以下网址查看：

https://www.bluemoonofshanghai.com/ + https://www.moonofshanghai.com/

He can be contacted at:

他的全部档案可以在以下网址查看：

2186604556@qq.com

NOTES
备注

[1] China’s Electric Vehicles (EVs)
[1] 中国的电动汽车（EVs）
[2] China’s Low-Altitude Economy — Flying Taxis, Small Drones and More
[2] 中国低空经济——飞行出租车、小型无人机等
[3] China’s YiWu: Business Models You’ve Never Even Heard of
[3] 中国义乌：你闻所未闻的商业模式
[4] China’s High-Speed Trains. America, Where are You?
[4] 中国高铁。美国，你在哪？
https://www.bluemoonofshanghai.com/politics/7219/

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