上海的月亮: CN — LARRY ROMANOFF: 犹太人对人类的战争, 第六部分 — 2008年美国非犹太裔住房危机

翻译者：Pearl

房利美和房地美 — Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac

This is a crucial piece of the 2008 puzzle. The institutions of Fannie Mae (Federal National Mortgage Association) and Freddie Mac (Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation) were Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs). They were not original lenders but existed to provide liquidity and stability to the US mortgage market. They would buy mortgages from banks and other lenders then pool those mortgages to create Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS), and sell these MBSs to investors (like pension funds) worldwide.

这是2008年谜题的关键部分。房利美（联邦国民抵押贷款协会）和房地美（联邦住房贷款抵押公司）是政府资助企业（GSEs）。它们并非原始贷款机构，而是为了给美国抵押贷款市场提供流动性和稳定性而存在的。它们会从银行和其他贷款机构购买抵押贷款，然后将这些抵押贷款汇集起来，创造出抵押贷款支持证券（MBS），并将这些MBS出售给全球投资者（如养老基金）。

But there was a crucial difference between them and all other participants in the mortgage market in that they purchased only high-quality mortgages, and they fully guaranteed these investments. Both institutions guaranteed to pay the principal and interest on the underlying mortgages even if the homeowner defaulted. Thus, a 100% guarantee of the value of the investment. It is a matter of record that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac owned or guaranteed about half of all US mortgages, a figure that rose to over 80% after the crisis began. In reality, it was rather like buying a government bond in that no investor could ever lose money because the US government provided a backstop to these two entities, if they were unable to meet their obligations. Their “securitisation” process served two vital functions. It freed up capital for banks and other lenders, allowing them to issue new mortgages. Also, it standardised mortgage underwriting while providing a massive, steady flow of capital into the US housing system. It is important that these two institutions were privately owned, but with a US government sponsorship and a federal backstop, the eventual guarantee provided by the US government itself.

但它们与抵押贷款市场所有其他参与者之间存在一个关键区别，即它们只购买高质量的抵押贷款，并且为这些投资提供全额担保。即使房主违约，这两家机构也承诺支付相关抵押贷款的本金和利息。因此，它们对投资价值提供了100%的担保。有记录显示，房利美和房地美拥有或担保了美国约一半的抵押贷款，这一比例在危机爆发后升至80%以上。实际上，这更像是购买政府债券，因为如果这两家机构无法履行义务，美国政府会为它们提供支持，因此没有任何投资者会损失资金。它们的“证券化”过程发挥了两个至关重要的作用。它为银行和其他贷款机构释放了资本，使它们能够发放新的抵押贷款。此外，它还使抵押贷款承销标准化，同时为美国住房体系提供了大量稳定的资金流入。重要的是，这两家机构是私营企业，但有美国政府的赞助和联邦政府的支持，最终由美国政府本身提供担保。

As things unfolded, the “guarantee” inherent in their securities became a poison pill, and was the cause of their destruction. Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac had purchased – and guaranteed – trillions of dollars of securitised NINJA mortgages and, when the bubble burst, those guarantees were called. They were then contractually obligated to make investors whole, paying out the missing principal and interest from the defaulted mortgages. This turned their massive, steady stream of income into a catastrophic, unending cash outflow. They were actually hit by a double whammy. The first was being obligated to cover the losses on the defaulting mortgages they had guaranteed. The second was that they held many of those low-quality mortgage-related assets in their own investment portfolio and, when the market collapsed, the value of these assets plummeted, forcing them to write down their value and realise massive losses.

随着事态的发展，其证券所固有的“担保”成为毒药，并最终导致其破产。房利美和房地美购买了数万亿美元的证券化NINJA（负资产、利息负扣、无就业、无住房、无收入）抵押贷款，并为其提供担保。当泡沫破裂时，这些担保被要求兑现。于是，它们在合同上有义务全额赔偿投资者，支付违约抵押贷款中缺失的本金和利息。这使它们原本稳定的大量收入变成了灾难性的无休止现金流出。它们实际上遭受了双重打击。第一重是必须承担它们所担保的违约抵押贷款的损失。第二重是它们在自己的投资组合中持有许多低质量的抵押贷款相关资产，当市场崩溃时，这些资产的价值暴跌，迫使它们减记资产价值，并蒙受巨额损失。

They were not just the guarantors of the market; they were also one of its largest, most highly leveraged speculators. They bet on the US housing market with an implicit government guarantee, and they lost. In September 2008, the US government was forced to place both companies into a form of bankruptcy where they were put under federal control and propped up with around $200 billion in taxpayer funds to prevent their total collapse from annihilating the global financial system.

他们不仅是市场的担保人；他们还是市场上规模最大、杠杆率最高的投机者之一。他们利用美国政府隐性担保，押注于美国房地产市场，结果却输了。2008年9月，美国政府被迫让这两家公司进入某种形式的破产程序，由联邦政府接管，并动用约2000亿美元的纳税人资金对其进行支撑，以防止其彻底崩溃，进而摧毁全球金融体系。

Prior to the bankruptcies, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were classified as Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) but, in reality, they were publicly traded, private businesses. They had a diverse base of institutional shareholders. Capital Research Global Investors was the largest single shareholder of both companies, with other shareholders including Fidelity Investments, American Funds, and many other funds having significant stakes. These two firms were the pillars of the US housing market, owning or guaranteeing over 80% of all US mortgages after the crisis began. Their debt was held by central banks and financial institutions worldwide.

在破产之前，房利美（Fannie Mae）和房地美（Freddie Mac）被归类为政府资助企业（GSEs），但实际上，它们是公开上市的私营企业。它们拥有多元化的机构股东基础。资本研究全球投资者（Capital Research Global Investors）是这两家公司的最大单一股东，其他股东包括富达投资（Fidelity Investments）、美国基金（American Funds）以及许多其他持有大量股份的基金。这两家公司是美国住房市场的支柱，在危机爆发后，它们拥有或担保了美国所有抵押贷款的80%以上。它们的债务由全球各地的中央银行和金融机构持有。

回顾房利美和房地美 — A Look Backward at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac

A “standard narrative” was being promoted that Fannie and Freddie caused the subprime crisis by buying risky loans, but the reality was different. As the housing bubble inflated in the early 2000s, the private-label (and low-quality) MBS market (led by Wall Street firms like Goldman Sachs and Lehman Brothers) exploded. The official story for the gullible public was that the “prime” sector of the market where these two GSE firms lived, was nearly stagnating while the “subprime” portion was growing exponentially. And because of this, Fannie and Freddie’s market share shrank dramatically. We were told that to maintain relevance and profitability, they felt immense pressure to lower their own underwriting standards and buy these riskier securitised loans to package into their own MBS.

当时，一种“标准叙事”正在流传，即房利美和房地美因购买高风险贷款而引发了次贷危机，但事实并非如此。随着21世纪初房地产泡沫的膨胀，由高盛和雷曼兄弟等华尔街公司主导的私人品牌（且低质量）抵押贷款支持证券（MBS）市场迅速崛起。面向轻信的公众，官方的说法是，这两家政府支持企业（GSE）所在的“优质”市场几近停滞，而“次级”市场则呈指数级增长。正因如此，房利美和房地美的市场份额急剧萎缩。我们被告知，为了保持相关性和盈利能力，它们面临着巨大的压力，不得不降低自己的承保标准，购买这些风险更高的证券化贷款，并将其打包成自己的MBS。

There is something very wrong with the official story which says they felt “pressured” to purchase vast amounts of the toxic securities. It is not possible their purchases resulted from pressure of any kind. These institutions were owned and controlled by firms like Capital Group, who are the largest fund managers in the world, managing more than $3 trillion. Given the sophisticated ownership and management, to suggest that public pressure forced them to purchase enough garbage securities to bankrupt themselves, is an insult to intelligence. These people, of all people, had to fully understand the nature of the CDOs and the risks.

They were not children.官方说法称，这些机构感到“被迫”购买了大量有毒证券，这显然大有问题。他们的购买行为不可能是出于任何形式的压力。这些机构由资本集团等公司所有和控制，资本集团是全球最大的基金管理公司，管理着超过3万亿美元的资金。鉴于其复杂的所有权和管理结构，若说公众压力迫使他们购买了足以让自己破产的垃圾证券，那简直是对智商的侮辱。这些人，尤其是这些人，必须充分了解债务抵押债券（CDO）的性质和风险。他们不是小孩子。

The only theory that fits all the known facts is that these firms were active participants along with Goldman, Sachs, Lehman Brothers and the other investment banks in the massive fraud underlying the housing crisis. And that means their purchase and sale of the toxic securities was just another “financialisation project” where they helped firms like Goldman, Sachs privatise the profits and socialise the losses by using Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as tools. Given their social mandate, there was no valid reason for these two institutions to have knowingly purchased toxic securities when they were full guarantors. They knew they were bound by law to make investors whole, but they also knew the government backstopped them. They didn’t purchase the high-risk mortgages due to pressure, but because they were participants reading from the same script as Goldman, Sachs. These institutions weren’t naive victims but rather active participants in a coordinated worldwide scheme to loot and plunder.

唯一符合所有已知事实的理论是，这些公司与高盛、雷曼兄弟以及其他投资银行一样，都是住房危机背后大规模欺诈行为的积极参与者。这意味着它们购买和出售有毒证券只是另一个“金融化项目”，它们利用房利美和房地美作为工具，帮助高盛等公司实现利润私有化，同时将损失社会化。鉴于其肩负的社会使命，这两家机构在作为完全担保人时，没有正当理由故意购买有毒证券。它们知道自己在法律上有义务全额赔偿投资者，但它们也知道政府会为其提供支持。它们购买高风险抵押贷款并非迫于压力，而是因为它们与高盛一样，都是按照同一剧本参与其中。这些机构并非天真的受害者，而是全球协同掠夺计划中的积极参与者。

It is not possible to definitively confirm or deny a coordinated script with firms like Goldman Sachs, but an assessment of all the small details of the framework and incentives, creates a compelling argument that this was a massive and deliberate fraud. The argument is that the shareholders of these firms saw such immense and immediate profits in the subprime market that they jumped in with both feet. And they were not sacrificing the companies in the process: they knew they would be unable to fulfill their obligations, but the government would bail them out and they would survive, having looted investors and the US government of hundreds of billions of dollars. And that is precisely what happened. The People’s Bank of China published an assessment of Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac that you might care to read. [1]

虽然无法确切证实或否认高盛等公司是否参与了协同造假，但通过对框架和激励措施的所有细节进行评估，可以得出一个令人信服的论点：这是一场大规模且蓄意进行的欺诈。该论点认为，这些公司的股东在次贷市场看到了如此巨大且即时的利润，以至于他们毫不犹豫地投身其中。而且，在此过程中，他们并没有牺牲公司：他们知道无法履行义务，但政府会出手纾困，他们得以幸存，同时掠夺了投资者和美国政府数千亿美元。事实也的确如此。中国人民银行发布了一份关于房利美和房地美的评估报告，您或许有兴趣阅读。 [1]

The market operated under a long-standing belief in an implicit government guarantee—that the US would not allow the GSEs to fail because of their vital role in the housing market. This created a “heads we win, tails the taxpayer loses” dynamic, encouraging risk-taking with the understanding that the downside would be borne by the public.

市场长期运作的信念是政府会提供隐性担保——即美国不会允许政府支持企业（GSEs）因其在住房市场中的关键作用而破产。这形成了一种“正面我们赢，反面纳税人输”的格局，鼓励人们冒险，因为他们知道不利后果将由公众承担。

Well before the 2008 collapse, there were clear signals that the GSEs were engaging in dangerously aggressive behavior. Warren Buffett was a major investor in Freddie Mac but sold nearly all of his holdings starting in 2000, when the scheme had barely begun. Buffett expressed a fundamental loss of confidence in their management and, crucially, detected signs that Freddie Mac’s management was “cooking the books” and providing misleading financial reports. This action from one of history’s most astute investors is a powerful piece of circumstantial evidence that the problems were known internally. Before the crisis even unfolded, Buffett said the company had “the signs and the smell of death“. [2] [3] Buffett also sensed the increasing danger from the “derivative” securities that were being so aggressively marketed (the CDSs); he said they were “financial weapons of mass destruction”.

早在2008年危机爆发之前，就有明确迹象表明，政府支持企业（GSEs）正在从事危险且激进的行为。沃伦·巴菲特曾是房地美（Freddie Mac）的主要投资者，但从2000年开始，他几乎卖掉了所有持股，当时该计划才刚刚启动。巴菲特表示，他对房地美的管理层彻底失去了信心，而且至关重要的是，他发现了房地美管理层“做假账”并提供误导性财务报告的迹象。作为历史上最精明的投资者之一，巴菲特的这一举动有力地证明了这些问题在内部是众所周知的。在危机爆发之前，巴菲特就曾表示，该公司“有死亡的迹象和味道”。[2][3]巴菲特还察觉到，被大肆推销的“衍生品”证券（信用违约掉期（Credit Default Swaps，CDS））带来的危险日益加剧；他称这些证券是“大规模杀伤性金融武器”。

Insiders were also keenly aware of the impending doom. Internal documents and subsequent investigations revealed that the GSEs were aware of the risks they were taking. There were many internal warnings: As early as 2004, a Fannie Mae risk manager warned in an internal presentation that the company was so excessively leveraged on subprime mortgages that even a 5% decline in house prices would wipe out their capital and leave them bankrupt. That warning was ignored, but it wasn’t a case of ignorance. There is much evidence of knowing complicity in what was essentially a huge criminal fraud. The executives and shareholders of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac knew precisely what they were doing, knew the inevitable end result, but were executing a plan to loot trillions from investors and the public and leave the US government holding the bag when the bubble burst.

内部人士也敏锐地意识到了即将到来的厄运。内部文件和随后的调查显示，政府支持企业（GSEs）意识到了自己所承担的风险。内部警告层出不穷：早在2004年，房利美（Fannie Mae）的一名风险经理就在一次内部报告中警告称，该公司对次级抵押贷款的杠杆率过高，即使房价下跌5%，也会使其资本金化为乌有，并导致其破产。这一警告被忽视了，但这并非出于无知。有大量证据表明，房利美和房地美（Freddie Mac）的高管和股东在本质上是一场巨大的刑事欺诈中知情共谋。他们清楚地知道自己正在做什么，也知道不可避免的最终结果，但却在执行一项计划，从投资者和公众手中掠夺数万亿美元，并在泡沫破灭时让美国政府来买单。

As the housing bubble inflated in the early 2000s, Goldman Sachs and Lehman Brothers aggressively securitised subprime loans—the very risky, high-yielding mortgages that fell outside Fannie and Freddie’s traditional “conforming” standards. The official narrative about their market share shrinking, was both irrelevant and untrue. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had never taken part in this segment of the market, and the borrowers with good credit did not disappear, so their market share could not shrink.

随着21世纪初房地产泡沫的膨胀，高盛和雷曼兄弟大举将次级贷款证券化——这些风险极高、收益颇丰的抵押贷款超出了房利美和房地美的传统“标准”范围。关于其市场份额缩水的官方说法既不相关也不真实。房利美和房地美从未涉足这一细分市场，信用良好的借款人也没有消失，因此它们的市场份额不可能缩水。

The official story says that if they lost market share, they would no longer the dominant players in the fastest-growing part of the market, and facing a threat to their dominance and profitability. But that entire line of reasoning is irrelevant, a false “official story” that does not explain WHY these two agencies would want to buy toxic mortgages. These were not normal commercial enterprises like Ford and VW fighting for “market share”, and they cannot be compared to normal corporations. Their legislated function was fundamentally social and economic, to provide a stable mortgage market, not to dominate a market or to maximise profits for the next quarter. Their only concern about the explosion of the subprime sector should have been to minimise it, not to participate in it.

官方说法是，如果它们失去了市场份额，它们将不再是市场中增长最快部分的主导者，其主导地位和盈利能力也将面临威胁。但这种推理完全不相关，是一种虚假的“官方说法”，无法解释这两家机构为何要购买有毒抵押贷款。它们并非像福特和大众这样的普通商业企业，为“市场份额”而战，也不能与普通企业相提并论。它们的法定职能从根本上来说是社会和经济性质的，即提供一个稳定的抵押贷款市场，而非主导市场或为下一季度实现利润最大化。对于次贷行业的爆炸式增长，它们唯一应该关注的是如何将其最小化，而非参与其中。

There is no rational reason they should have purchased securities they knew were high-risk, which went entirely against their stated purpose. The only logical explanation that fits all the known facts, is that the owners of these two companies were part of the plot, cooperating with Goldman and Lehman to plunder the US Treasury, knowing that they could extract enormous profits today and, when they failed, the government would assume the guarantees on all the toxic mortgages they held. Thus, the owners and shareholders could afford to be reckless. They sucked tens of billions of investor money into their pockets, paid billions in bonuses to their staff to purchase these toxic investments, then left the US government holding the bag for hundreds of billions more. Their actions perfectly mirror those of Goldman, Sachs, Citibank, Lehman Brothers, Bear Sterns, Citibank, and all the others. All players were reading from precisely the same script. When we connect all the pieces, we can’t avoid concluding this was a deliberate fraud, with all available evidence supporting that interpretation.

他们本应明知证券的高风险而选择购买，这与他们所宣称的目标完全背道而驰，这其中绝无合理的理由。唯一符合所有已知事实的合理解释是，这两家公司的所有者参与了这一阴谋，与高盛和雷曼合作掠夺美国财政部，他们明知自己今天可以获取巨额利润，而一旦失败，政府将为他们所持有的所有有毒抵押贷款提供担保。因此，这些所有者和股东可以肆无忌惮。他们将数百亿美元的投资者资金据为己有，向员工支付数十亿美元的奖金以购买这些有毒投资，然后让美国政府为他们再承担数千亿美元的损失。他们的行为与高盛、花旗银行、雷曼兄弟、贝尔斯登等所有其他公司的行为如出一辙。所有参与者都在照本宣科。当我们把所有碎片拼凑在一起时，我们不可避免地得出结论，这是一场蓄意欺诈，所有现有证据都支持这一解释。

It is important that Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac were not normal commercial companies. Their congressional charters established them for a public purpose: to provide liquidity, stability, and affordability to the US mortgage market. To suddenly begin chasing market share in the subprime sector was a direct betrayal of that mission. Their hybrid public-private structure proved fatal because that structure created a perfect environment for criminal behavior. They used their government-backed advantage not just for market stability, but for aggressive looting to please their private shareholders. This was in many ways reminiscent of the giant Savings and Loan fraud of the early 1980s.

重要的是，房利美（Fannie Mae）和房地美（Freddie Mac）并非普通的商业公司。它们的国会特许状是为公共目的而设立的：为美国抵押贷款市场提供流动性、稳定性和可负担性。突然开始在次级抵押贷款领域追逐市场份额，是对这一使命的直接背叛。它们混合的公私结构被证明是致命的，因为这种结构为犯罪行为创造了完美的环境。它们不仅利用政府支持的优势来维护市场稳定，还利用这种优势大肆掠夺，以取悦其私人股东。这在很多方面让人想起20世纪80年代初的储蓄和贷款协会欺诈案。

When the fraud began, executives at Fannie and Freddie were paid like private Wall Street CEOs, with their compensation heavily tied to metrics like earnings per share and market share growth. In the early 2000s, CEO compensation at the GSEs reached tens of millions of dollars. To hit the targets that would generate these massive bonuses, they had dive into the pool of private subprime mortgages. The accurate and damning story is that the Jewish owners, shareholders, and management of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac hijacked these two institutions with a plan to deceive investors and to loot the US government of hundreds of billions of dollars. The record is clear that they created a perverse incentive and bonus structure to ensure this, bonuses not aligned with their public mission, but with private greed. Taking advantage of their private ownership and government backing, they knowingly abandoned their role as a stabilising force and became a primary accelerator of the crisis, secure in the belief that the American taxpayer would be forced to cover their losses. The tragedy is that the “privatise profits, socialise losses” model I have identified, is not an anomaly in modern finance. But the 2008 crisis was its most spectacular and devastating manifestation.

当欺诈行为开始时，房利美和房地美的高管们的薪酬就像华尔街的私人首席执行官一样，他们的薪酬与每股收益和市场份额增长等指标紧密挂钩。21世纪初，政府支持企业（GSE）首席执行官的薪酬达到了数千万美元。为了达到能产生这些巨额奖金的目标，他们深入到了私人次级抵押贷款的领域。准确且确凿无疑的事实是，房利美和房地美的犹太所有者、股东和管理层通过一项欺骗投资者并从美国政府掠夺数千亿美元的计划，劫持了这两家机构。记录清楚地表明，他们创造了一种不正当的激励和奖金结构来确保这一点，奖金与其公共使命无关，而是与私人贪婪有关。他们利用其私人所有权和政府支持，故意放弃了作为稳定力量的角色，成为危机的主要加速器，并坚信美国纳税人将被迫承担他们的损失。悲剧在于，我所指出的“利润私有化，损失社会化”的模式在现代金融中并非异常。但2008年的危机是其最壮观、最具破坏性的表现。

While proving criminal intent is difficult, the evidence overwhelmingly supports a conclusion of gross, calculated negligence and a breach of fiduciary duty. We have no choice but to conclude that this was a massive betrayal of trust. The leaders of these institutions foresaw the potential for massive losses but proceeded anyway, believing the profits would be theirs and the losses would be borne by the taxpayer. The fact that this was a foreseeable consequence of their actions is the very definition of the moral hazard I described – where foreseeable consequences imply intent.

尽管证明犯罪意图颇为困难，但证据确凿，足以得出结论：这起事件属于严重、蓄意的疏忽，且违反了受托责任。我们别无选择，只能得出结论：这是对信任的严重背叛。这些机构的领导者预见到可能发生巨额损失，但仍一意孤行，认为利润将归他们所有，而损失则由纳税人承担。这一事实正是他们行为可预见后果的体现，正是我所描述的道德风险——即，可预见的后果暗示着存在故意。

(2) 雷曼兄弟的离奇事件 — The Strange Case of Lehman Brothers

From left, Henry Paulson, secretary of the Treasury; Ben Bernanke, Fed chairman; and Timothy Geithner, head of the New York Fed, at a news conference in 2008, as global finances faced ruin. Meeting transcripts from the period were released Friday. CreditHyungwon Kang/Reuters. Source

2008年，全球金融面临崩溃之际，左起为美国财政部长亨利·保尔森、美联储主席本·伯南克和纽约联储主席蒂莫西·盖特纳在新闻发布会上的合影。该时期的会议记录于周五公布。图片来源：Hyungwon Kang/路透社。来源

This is a profound and troubling point that ventures into one of the most controversial aspects of the 2008 crisis. From assembling and connecting the pieces of evidence, it appears that Lehman Brothers was permitted (or, more accurately, chosen and pushed) to go bankrupt, in large part to frighten the US Congress into bailing out the other big banks. It is a bit of a question why Lehman was actively disliked in some powerful segments of the international Jewish banking fraternity.

这是一个深刻而令人不安的观点，它触及了2008年危机最具争议的方面之一。从收集和整理证据来看，雷曼兄弟似乎被允许（或者更准确地说，是被选择和推动）破产，这在很大程度上是为了吓唬美国国会，使其对其他大银行进行纾困。雷曼兄弟为何在国际犹太银行业界的某些强大群体中如此不受欢迎，这有点令人费解。

Lehman had 158 years of history, and was the fourth largest investment bank in the United States. When it filed for bankruptcy protection, it had assets of $635 billion and liabilities of $613 billion. [4] Throughout the summer of 2008, due to the deterioration of the real estate market, the crisis in the financial market became more and more serious, and Lehman’s problems became more and more obvious: Lehman held too many non-performing housing loans which it couldn’t divest. The most important thing is that the scale of these non-performing assets was extraordinary: Lehman lost as much as $7 billion in commercial housing loans alone, and its stock price plummeted by 90%. [5] [6]

雷曼兄弟拥有158年的历史，曾是美国第四大投资银行。在其申请破产保护时，其资产达6350亿美元，负债达6130亿美元。[4]2008年整个夏季，由于房地产市场的恶化，金融市场危机日益严重，雷曼兄弟的问题也愈发凸显：雷曼兄弟持有过多无法剥离的不良住房贷款。最重要的是，这些不良资产的规模异常庞大：仅在商业住房贷款一项上，雷曼兄弟就损失了高达70亿美元，其股价暴跌90%。[5] [6]

The official narrative was that Lehman Brothers was allowed to fail because the government lacked the legal authority to bail it out, and perhaps secondarily wanted to teach the market a lesson about moral hazard. The theory was that if Lehman were rescued, it would encourage financial institutions to engage in high-risk business recklessly, thereby seriously damaging market self-discipline mechanisms. In addition, multiple bailouts of financial companies were bound to cause other industries in trouble to ask the US government to rescue them. But the actual Lehman events that unfolded, suggest a far more calculated and cynical operation. I cannot conclusively verify all the specifics, but we can still analyse the plausibility of this scenario based on known facts, financial mechanics, and historical patterns.

官方说法是，雷曼兄弟之所以被允许破产，是因为政府缺乏对其进行纾困的法定权限，其次或许也是为了给市场上一课，让其认识到道德风险。这一理论认为，如果雷曼兄弟得到救助，将会鼓励金融机构不计后果地从事高风险业务，从而严重破坏市场自律机制。此外，对金融公司进行多次纾困，必然会导致陷入困境的其他行业要求美国政府出手相救。但雷曼兄弟实际发生的事件表明，这是一次经过深思熟虑、更加玩世不恭的行动。我无法确凿地核实所有细节，但我们仍然可以根据已知事实、金融机制和历史模式来分析这一情景的可信度。

Lehman was definitely an exception to the US government largess of bailout money, and this could only have been a deliberate decision. The suspicion that Lehman Brothers was “chosen” to go bankrupt is supported by the historical record, a stark contrast to the US Treasury’s actions with other similar institutions. Only months earlier, in March of 2008, the FED had facilitated JPMorgan‘s takeover of Bear Stearns by agreeing to back $30 billion of its risky assets. When Lehman found itself in an identical crisis by September, its CEO, Richard Fuld, desperately sought a similar deal. However, the US government’s stance on Lehman was not determined by the US government, but by Henry Paulson who was “totally in charge” and who made a conscious choice not to save Lehman. Paulson called investment bank executives on Wall Street and said he would not use taxpayer funds to rescue Lehman.

雷曼兄弟公司绝对是美国政府慷慨纾困资金的例外，这只能是一个蓄意决定。历史记录支持了雷曼兄弟公司“被选中”破产的怀疑，这与美国财政部对其他类似机构的做法形成了鲜明对比。就在几个月前的2008年3月，美联储同意为摩根大通收购贝尔斯登的高风险资产提供300亿美元的支持，从而促成了这笔交易。当雷曼兄弟公司在9月份陷入同样的危机时，其首席执行官理查德·富尔德（Richard Fuld）迫切地寻求类似的交易。然而，美国政府对雷曼兄弟公司的立场并非由美国政府决定，而是由“全权负责”的亨利·保尔森（Henry Paulson）决定，他有意选择不拯救雷曼兄弟公司。保尔森致电华尔街的投资银行高管，表示他不会动用纳税人的资金来拯救雷曼兄弟公司。

After that, the Treasury Department and the FED made it clear that the federal government would not provide any financial support for investors to acquire Lehman. Paulson’s main stated reasons were that the US had no authority to prevent a Lehman failure, and that a bailout would create a “moral hazard” – rewarding risky behavior and setting a dangerous precedent for future crises. But this public rationale deserved only ridicule at best. If the US had no authority to bail out Lehman, and if Lehman didn’t deserve a bailout due to moral hazard, then what was Goldman, Sachs? And what “right” did the FED or the Treasury have, to bail out AIG, Bear Sterns and the others? The suspicion that Lehman Brothers was “chosen” to go bankrupt is supported by the historical record.

在那之后，财政部和美联储明确表示，联邦政府不会为投资者收购雷曼提供任何财政支持。保尔森的主要理由是，美国没有权力阻止雷曼破产，而纾困将产生“道德风险”——奖励高风险行为，并为未来的危机树立危险的先例。但这种公开理由充其量只能让人嗤之以鼻。如果美国没有权力纾困雷曼，如果雷曼不值得纾困（因为道德风险）,那么高盛又算什么？美联储或财政部有什么“权利”纾困美国国际集团、贝尔斯登和其他公司？历史记录支持了雷曼兄弟“被选中”破产的怀疑。

The then-President of the NYC FED, Timothy Geithner, (a junior to Paulson) arranged a private sale to Barclays bank in the UK, but the deal collapsed when UK regulators suddenly refused to approve it. Paulson apparently traveled to “Europe” (i.e. the UK) and informed various parties that the US would not use “taxpayer funds” to bail out Lehman Brothers. But the official narrative was nonsense; Paulson’s statements were a warning to others that any attempt to bail out Lehman would not be appreciated. The UK government were not objecting to this bailout, and indeed had bailed out other banks. But, after Paulson’s intervention, the UK government abruptly backed away.

时任纽约联储主席的蒂莫西·盖特纳（资历不及保尔森）安排将该行私下出售给英国巴克莱银行，但因英国监管机构突然拒绝批准，交易告吹。保尔森显然曾前往“欧洲”（即英国），并告知各方美国不会动用“纳税人资金”来纾困雷曼兄弟。但官方说法纯属无稽之谈；保尔森的声明是在警告其他人，任何纾困雷曼的企图都不会受到欢迎。英国政府并不反对这次纾困，事实上，英国政府也曾纾困过其他银行。但在保尔森介入后，英国政府突然退缩了。

Without a government backstop to absorb Lehman’s worst assets, no other buyer was willing to take on the risk. It was Henry Paulson who definitively killed the rescue of Lehman Brothers. Geithner published a book revealing the inside story of Lehman’s collapse. [7] In that text he wrote, “This was one of the few estrangements between me and Henry during the crisis. There was even some estrangement between me and [then-Fed Chairman] Ben [Bernanke].” Ultimately, Paulson declared that the FED “did not have the right” to save Lehman.

由于没有政府担保来吸收雷曼兄弟最糟糕的资产，没有其他买家愿意承担风险。正是亨利·保尔森（Henry Paulson）彻底扼杀了雷曼兄弟的救援计划。盖特纳（Geithner）出版了一本书，揭露了雷曼兄弟倒闭的内幕。[7]他在书中写道：“这是我在危机期间与亨利之间为数不多的几次疏远之一。甚至我和（时任美联储主席）本（伯南克）之间也有一些疏远。”最终，保尔森宣布美联储“没有权利”拯救雷曼兄弟。

Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley had the strength to acquire Lehman, but both had suffered heavy losses in the subprime mortgage crisis, and were taking care of themselves. Private equity funds such as J.C. Flowers, KKR (Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co), Carlyle Group and Blackstone Group also had the strength to buy, but those institutions were not interested in acquiring Lehman as a whole, but hoped to acquire some of Lehman’s high-quality assets at a low price after the bank was liquidated.

高盛和摩根士丹利有实力收购雷曼，但两者在次贷危机中均蒙受了巨额损失，自身难保。J.C. Flowers、KKR（科尔伯格-克拉维斯-罗伯茨公司）、凯雷集团和黑石集团等私募股权基金也有实力收购雷曼，但这些机构对整体收购雷曼不感兴趣，而是希望在雷曼破产清算后，以低价收购其部分优质资产。

WASHINGTON – FEBRUARY 11: Executives from the financial institutions who received TARP funds, (L-R) Goldman Sachs Chairman and CEO Lloyd Blankfein, JPMorgan Chase & Co CEO and Chairman Jamie Dimon, The Bank of New York Mellon CEO Robert P. Kelly, Bank of America CEO Ken Lewis (obsucred), and State Street Corporation CEO and Chairman Ronald Logue testify before the House Financial Services Committee February 11, 2009 in Washington, DC. The hearing focused on how financial institutions have spent funds received from the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). (Photo by Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images). Source

华盛顿——2月11日：2009年2月11日，在华盛顿特区，接受问题资产救助计划（TARP）资金的金融机构高管（从左至右）——高盛董事长兼首席执行官劳尔德·贝兰克梵、摩根大通公司首席执行官兼董事长杰米·戴蒙、纽约梅隆银行首席执行官罗伯特·P·凯利、美国银行首席执行官肯·刘易斯（被遮住）以及道富银行首席执行官兼董事长罗纳德·洛格在众议院金融服务委员会前作证。听证会主要关注金融机构如何使用从问题资产救助计划（TARP）获得的资金。（照片由Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images提供）。来源

The bankruptcy raised many questions and offered much to confound observers. One is whether Lehman was pushed into bankruptcy as a planned “Sacrificial Lamb”. This is the most strategic layer since it tries to explain why Lehman was singled out for destruction while AIG, Bear Stearns, Citigroup, and Bank of America were saved. The most plausible answer is what we term the “Controlled Demolition” theory. Many analysts have argued that the system needed a catastrophic event to shock Congress and the public into accepting unprecedented bailouts (the TARP program) for the bankers. Letting Lehman fail provided the necessary “heart attack” to justify the “open-heart surgery” on the rest of the banking system. In this view, Lehman’s failure was a tactical sacrifice to save the whole – and socialising some of the largest collective losses in history.

此次破产引发了许多问题，也让观察者们大惑不解。其中一个问题是，雷曼是否被当作计划中的“牺牲品”而被迫破产。这是最具战略性的层面，因为它试图解释为什么雷曼会被选中进行毁灭，而美国国际集团（AIG）、贝尔斯登、花旗集团和美国银行却得到了救助。最合理的答案是所谓的“控制性拆除”理论。许多分析人士认为，金融体系需要一场灾难性事件来震惊国会和公众，让他们接受对银行家前所未有的纾困（问题资产救助计划）。让雷曼破产为其他银行体系提供了必要的“心脏病发作”，从而为对其余部分进行“心脏直视手术”提供了理由。根据这种观点，雷曼的破产是为了拯救整体而做出的战术牺牲，也是将历史上一些最大的集体损失社会化的表现。

The chaotic aftermath of Lehman’s bankruptcy truly did terrify global markets and the US Congress, and was what spurred Congress to approve the $700 billion TARP program, and also to become much more aggressive in bailing out other firms, like the insurance giant AIG. It is of course possible that Lehman was simply the weakest link with the least political clout or the most disagreeable management in the eyes of the Treasury and the FED. The notion that its collapse was “planned” implies a level of coordination that is hard to prove. However, the outcome was the same: its failure served as a justification for a massive, no-strings-attached rescue of its competitors.

雷曼兄弟破产后的混乱局面确实令全球市场和美国国会感到恐惧，这也促使国会批准了7000亿美元的问题资产救助计划（TARP），并在救助其他公司（如保险巨头美国国际集团（AIG））时变得更为激进。当然，雷曼兄弟可能只是财政部和美联储眼中政治影响力最小或管理层最令人不快的最薄弱环节。认为其倒闭是“有预谋的”这一观点意味着存在某种难以证实的协调。然而，结果是一样的：其破产成为对其竞争对手进行大规模、无附加条件救助的理由。

When Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the US, its global operations were frozen and began a long, complex process of liquidation. However, its European operations, based in London, were placed into administration (the UK equivalent of bankruptcy) under different rules. The administrators for Lehman Brothers International (Europe) have so far (to the end of 2025) spent over a decade unwinding its positions and returning assets to creditors. What remains today is not “Lehman Brothers” the active investment bank, but a shell of its former self, managed by teams of lawyers and administrators who are still settling claims.

当雷曼兄弟控股股份有限公司在美国根据《破产法》第11章申请破产时，其全球业务被冻结，并开始了漫长而复杂的清算过程。然而，其位于伦敦的欧洲业务却根据不同的规则被置于破产管理（英国相当于破产）之下。雷曼兄弟国际（欧洲）的管理人迄今（截至2025年底）已花费了十多年的时间来解除其头寸并将资产返还给债权人。如今，剩下的已不再是活跃的投资银行“雷曼兄弟”，而是一个由仍在处理索赔的律师和管理团队管理的空壳。

There is something else here, that was strange. I encountered credible information that “someone” was selling bonds in Lehman Brothers right until the day of the bankruptcy, and were selling them not at a discount but at a high price, claiming that Lehman was in good health. My sources in Hong Kong claimed that at least several billions of US$ of Lehman bonds were sold to investors in Hong Kong right up until the day of the bankruptcy. This raises some interesting questions. If billions of dollars of Lehman bonds were sold, the money would normally have gone into Lehman’s treasury and the firm could not have gone bankrupt. But the money from those bond sales clearly did not go into Lehman Brothers treasury, which means it went into the pockets of the private owners of the company. There is justification for a belief that insiders knowingly sold Lehman bonds at inflated prices right up to the bankruptcy, diverting funds to private pockets rather than the company treasury. I saw documents that claimed, with some good (circumstantial) evidence that, although Lehman was planned and permitted to go bankrupt as a kind of sacrificial lamb, the owners would not necessarily be losers.

这里还有一件奇怪的事。我得到可靠消息称，直到破产当天，“某人”还在雷曼兄弟公司出售债券，而且不是以折扣价，而是以高价出售，声称雷曼兄弟公司状况良好。我在香港的消息来源声称，直到破产当天，至少有数十亿美元的雷曼兄弟公司债券被卖给了香港的投资者。这引发了一些有趣的问题。如果数十亿美元的雷曼兄弟公司债券被售出，这些钱通常会进入雷曼兄弟公司的金库，公司就不会破产。但是，这些债券销售所得显然没有进入雷曼兄弟公司的金库，而是落入了公司私人所有者的口袋。有理由相信，内部人士在知情的情况下，直到破产前都以高价出售雷曼兄弟公司的债券，将资金转移到私人腰包，而不是公司金库。我看到了一些文件，其中有一些很好的（间接）证据表明，尽管雷曼兄弟公司被计划并允许作为牺牲品而破产，但所有者并不一定是输家。

I haven’t enough evidence to jump to conclusions, but it appears possible, if not likely, that the Lehman bankruptcy holds yet another financial fraud, and where the bankruptcy was a kind of “controlled demolition” of Lehman, done for greater purposes. Certainly, the historical context gives plausibility to this thesis. In financial crises, there are almost always suspicious trading patterns before collapses. The bond sales in Hong Kong align with known issues of offshore financial opacity, and we can draw comfort from documented patterns from other financial scandals. If we think of the bond sales, the sacrificial lamb theory, and the strange afterlife of Lehman Brothers in London, we can easily tie this back to the broader theme of deliberate wealth transfer.

我没有足够的证据来妄下结论，但雷曼破产案似乎有可能（如果不是极有可能的话）牵涉到另一桩金融欺诈，而此次破产就像是雷曼为更大目的而进行的一种“控制性拆除”。当然，这一论点在历史背景下显得合情合理。在金融危机中，崩溃前几乎总是存在可疑的交易模式。香港的债券销售与已知的离岸金融不透明问题相吻合，而我们从其他金融丑闻中记录的模式中可以找到一些安慰。如果我们考虑到债券销售、牺牲品理论以及雷曼兄弟在伦敦的奇怪“来世”，就很容易将其与蓄意财富转移这一更广泛的主题联系起来。

First, the plausibility is high that “someone” really was selling Lehman bonds until the end. This would be entirely consistent with the “Greater Fool” theory and the incentive structures we’ve examined. When the insiders knew a bankruptcy was imminent, their primary goal would be to raise and extract as much cash as possible through any means before the doors shut. Selling bonds, especially in distant markets like Hong Kong where information asymmetry was high, is a classic tactic the Jews have used repeatedly.

首先，“有人”真的在雷曼兄弟破产前一直出售其债券的可能性很高。这与我们所探讨的“博傻”理论以及激励结构完全一致。当内部人士得知破产即将发生时，他们的首要目标就是在大门关闭之前，通过任何手段筹集并提取尽可能多的现金。出售债券，尤其是在信息不对称程度较高的香港等遥远市场，是犹太人反复使用的经典策略。

The most damning part of this is that selling a distressed asset at a deep discount is one thing; fraudulently marketing it as a safe investment at par value is another, and would obviously constitute securities fraud. To support this thesis, there were numerous civil cases after the fact alleging that Lehman and others misled investors about the health of their assets right up to the collapse.

最令人发指的是，以大幅折扣出售不良资产是一回事；以欺诈手段将其作为安全投资按面值推销则是另一回事，这显然构成了证券欺诈。为了支持这一论点，事后有许多民事案件指控雷曼兄弟等公司在资产状况良好时误导投资者，直至其破产。

The critical distinction is perhaps the destination of the funds obtained from the sales. If Lehman Brothers the corporation issued new bonds, the cash would go to the corporate treasury to fund its operations, even if those operations were doomed. However, if major shareholders or partners (the “private owners”) were selling their personal holdings of existing Lehman bonds to unsuspecting buyers, then the cash would go directly into their pockets, not the company’s. This would be a direct transfer of wealth from the new buyers to the insiders liquidating their positions. Proving this on a large scale is difficult, but it is a known phenomenon in dying companies. As one easy example, insiders often use their superior knowledge to dump their stock before bad news becomes public, and Lehman would be essentially the same thing – but with lies attached.

关键的区别或许在于销售所得资金流向何处。如果雷曼兄弟公司发行新债券，那么所得现金将进入公司金库，用于其运营，即便这些运营注定会失败。然而，如果主要股东或合伙人（即“私人所有者”）将其个人持有的现有雷曼债券出售给毫无戒心的买家，那么所得现金将直接进入他们的口袋，而非公司账户。这将是一种财富的直接转移，即从新买家转移至正在平仓的内幕人士。虽然很难大规模证明这一点，但这是濒临倒闭公司中一个众所周知的现象。举个简单的例子，内幕人士往往利用其优势知识，在坏消息公布前抛售股票，而雷曼的情况基本相同——只不过还掺杂着谎言。

The scenario outlined above, fits a recognisable pattern of financial predation. There is always insider knowledge prior to such a collapse, where the apex players at the doomed institution know the true state of its balance sheet. When we examine these cases, it seems almost inevitable that the insiders used this knowledge to offload toxic assets onto less-informed investors in offshore and distant markets at inflated prices. And the cash from these final sales extracted from the system went directly into the pockets of insiders selling their personal stakes. The institution is then allowed to fail.

上述情形符合一种可识别的金融掠夺模式。在此类崩溃之前，总是存在内部消息，即濒临倒闭的机构的高层人员了解其资产负债表的真实状况。当我们审视这些案例时，似乎不可避免的是，内部人员利用这些信息，以虚高的价格将有毒资产转嫁给离岸和遥远市场中信息较少的投资者。而从系统中提取的这些最终销售的现金，则直接流入出售个人股份的内部人员的口袋。随后，该机构被允许破产。

(3)美国国际集团（AIG）– American Insurance Group (AIG)

AIG was the largest insurance company in the world, operating in more than 130 countries. The company’s CEO for nearly 40 years, was Maurice Greenberg, who was part of the Jewish financial elite and well-known to all the players. Greenberg built AIG and, under his leadership, AIG’s market value soared from $3 billion to $1.7 trillion. The man was known for his obsessive control, relentless drive, and sophisticated understanding of risk and financial innovation. Greenberg was also a financial criminal. His reign as CEO ended abruptly in 2005 when a New York investigation uncovered accounting irregularities, forcing his resignation and a $1.6 billion regulatory settlement. AIG did indeed engage in fraudulent accounting. In 2000, AIG engaged in a complex transaction with Warren Bufffet’s General Re that regulators concluded was not true insurance, but a $500 million deal designed to artificially bolster AIG’s financial appearance. [8]

美国国际集团（AIG）曾是全球最大的保险公司，业务遍布130多个国家。该公司近40年的首席执行官是莫里斯·格林伯格（Maurice Greenberg），他是犹太金融精英中的一员，在业内众所周知。格林伯格一手缔造了AIG，在他的领导下，AIG的市值从30亿美元飙升至1.7万亿美元。他以执着的控制、不懈的追求以及对风险和金融创新的深刻理解而闻名。然而，格林伯格也是一名金融罪犯。2005年，纽约的一项调查揭露了AIG的会计违规行为，迫使其辞职并支付16亿美元的监管和解金，格林伯格作为首席执行官的统治就此戛然而止。AIG确实存在会计欺诈行为。2000年，AIG与沃伦·巴菲特（Warren Buffett）旗下的通用再保险（General Re）进行了一项复杂的交易，监管机构认定该交易并非真正的保险交易，而是一笔旨在人为提升AIG财务状况的5亿美元交易。 [8]

This would suggest that Greenberg was a perfect partner in the massive 2008 mortgage fraud, and he was certainly no stranger to either risk or profit. However it happened, Greenberg and AIG became so deeply involved in the US housing CDO fraud that it bankrupted the company and needed a bailout by the FED and US Treasury.

这表明格林伯格是2008年大规模抵押贷款欺诈案中的完美合作伙伴，他对风险和利润都了如指掌。无论如何，格林伯格和美国国际集团（AIG）都深深卷入了美国住房债务抵押债券（CDO）欺诈案中，导致公司破产，需要美联储和美国财政部出手救助。

To recap, the heart of the 2008 crisis was the process of securitising mortgages into complex financial products. Because the bankers conspired to loot the entire known world, this process interconnected the entire global financial system to the US housing market. First, banks issued trillions of dollars of subprime mortgages to totally unqualified borrowers. Then, the investment banks (like Goldman and Lehman) bought these mortgages and bundled them into bonds called Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS).

概括而言，2008年危机的核心在于将抵押贷款证券化为复杂金融产品的过程。由于银行家合谋掠夺整个已知世界，这一过程将整个全球金融体系与美国房地产市场紧密相连。首先，银行向完全不合格的借款人发放了数万亿美元的次级抵押贷款。然后，投资银行（如高盛和雷曼）购买这些抵押贷款，并将其打包成名为“抵押贷款支持证券”（MBS）的债券。

Maurice Greenberg, former CEO of American International Group, in better days in 2005. Greenberg believes the 2008 government bailouts left him and other AIG shareholders poorer. Photograph: STEPHEN CHERNIN/AP.

美国国际集团前首席执行官莫里斯·格林伯格，摄于2005年经济状况较好的时期。格林伯格认为，2008年的政府纾困使他和其他美国国际集团的股东们变得更穷。照片：STEPHEN CHERNIN/美联社。

They then took these MBSs and split them into new, even more complex products called Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDOs). These contained tiers, or “tranches,” with different levels of risk and return. The complexity of these (repeatedly sliced and diced securities) was not well known; the prospectus was more than 200 pages and there were probably few who could, or would, read that document. These MBSs and CDOs were sold to investors worldwide (pension funds, foreign banks, etc.).

他们随后将这些抵押贷款支持证券（MBS）拆分成新的、更为复杂的产品，即债务抵押债券（CDO）。这些产品包含不同风险和回报等级的层级或“部分”。这些（经过多次分割和组合的证券）的复杂性并不为人所知；招股说明书长达200多页，可能很少有人能够或愿意阅读这份文件。这些抵押贷款支持证券和债务抵押债券被出售给全球投资者（养老基金、外国银行等）。

To make these risky products seem safe, two additional frauds were perpetrated. The rating agencies like S&P and Moody’s falsely gave the subprime rubbish packages a rating of AAA. The second fraud was that AIG sold insurance on securities through instruments called Credit Default Swaps (CDSs).

为了让这些高风险产品看起来安全，还实施了两项欺诈行为。标准普尔和穆迪等评级机构错误地将次级垃圾证券组合评为AAA级。第二项欺诈行为是，美国国际集团（AIG）通过名为信用违约掉期（CDS）的工具出售证券保险。

AIG wasn’t a buyer of the toxic securities, but a seller of a kind of insurance on them.

AIG并非有毒证券的买家，而是出售一种针对这些证券的保险。

Through a small, 377-person unit in London called AIG Financial Products (AIGFP), the company sold CDS contracts to major banks and investors worldwide. In simple terms, AIG promised investors that if their complex bundles of mortgages (MBSs and CDOs) were to default, AIG would cover the losses. The company appeared to believe that the only risk was in a severe and nationwide crash in US housing prices, a condition considered to be a “once in a million” event for which the possibility was essentially zero.

通过伦敦一个名为AIG金融产品公司（AIGFP）的377人小部门，该公司向全球各大银行和投资者出售信用违约掉期（CDS）合约。简单来说，AIG向投资者承诺，如果他们持有的复杂抵押贷款组合（MBS和CDO）违约，AIG将承担损失。该公司似乎认为，唯一的风险是美国房价出现全国性的严重崩盘，这种情况被认为“百年一遇”,可能性几乎为零。

WASHINGTON – MARCH 18: Code Pink protesters hold signs as Chairman and CEO of the American International Group Edward Liddy prepares to testify before the House Financial Services Committee March 18, 2009 in Washington, DC. Hired after AIG accepted billions of dollars in aid from the federal government, Liddy faced intense scrutiny from members of Congress over $165 million in bonuses paid to employees of the insurance giant. (Photo by Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images). Source

华盛顿——3月18日：2009年3月18日，美国国际集团（AIG）董事长兼首席执行官爱德华·利迪（Edward Liddy）准备在众议院金融服务委员会作证时，粉色代码（Code Pink）抗议者举着标语牌。利迪在AIG接受联邦政府数十亿美元援助后受雇于该公司，他因向这家保险巨头员工发放1.65亿美元奖金而受到国会议员的密切关注。（照片由Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images提供）。来源

For AIG, this seemed like “free money.” They collected billions in lucrative insurance premiums, believing that they would never have to pay out. AGIFP stated openly that there was essentially zero risk that they would ever have to pay “even $1.00”. For the banks, buying this insurance from a top-rated firm like AIG made their risky assets appear safe, allowing them to meet regulatory requirements. This “insurance” from AIG, added to the fraudulent AAA ratings from the rating agencies, is what convinced investors to participate.

对于美国国际集团（AIG）而言，这似乎是“不花本钱的买卖”。他们收取了数十亿美元的丰厚保费，并认为他们永远不必赔付。美国国际集团保险产品（AGIFP）公开表示，他们几乎没有任何风险需要赔付“哪怕1美元”。对于银行而言，从像美国国际集团这样顶级评级的公司购买这种保险，会使他们的风险资产看起来很安全，从而使他们能够满足监管要求。美国国际集团的这种“保险”，再加上评级机构虚假的AAA评级，是说服投资者参与其中的原因。

AIGFP’s models were built on the assumption that a crisis affecting all regions and housing market segments was virtually impossible. They grew this business to an enormous scale, at one point providing CDS protection on over $600 billion in bonds, creating a huge, undiversified risk that eventually threatened the entire company. When the “once in a million” housing market collapse occurred and the securities AIG had insured plummeted in value, three things happened simultaneously: (1) The risk of default skyrocketed, meaning AIG’s potential insurance liabilities became enormous. (2) AIG’s own credit rating was downgraded. (3) These two events triggered clauses in the CDS contracts that forced AIG to immediately post billions of dollars in cash collateral. Despite being a massive company, AIG was not a bank and did not have tens of billions in liquid cash on hand. It was this liquidity crisis—the inability to meet its immediate collateral calls—that pushed it to the brink of bankruptcy within days.

AIG金融产品（AIGFP）的模型建立在这样一个假设之上：一场影响所有地区和住房市场细分领域的危机几乎不可能发生。这些模型将该业务发展到了庞大的规模，一度为超过6000亿美元的债券提供了信用违约掉期（Credit Default Swap，CDS）保护，从而产生了巨大的、未分散的风险，最终威胁到了整个公司。当“百年一遇”的住房市场崩溃发生，AIG承保的证券价值暴跌时，三件事情同时发生：（1）违约风险飙升，这意味着AIG的潜在保险负债变得巨大。（2）AIG自身的信用评级被下调。（3）这两件事触发了CDS合同中的条款，迫使AIG立即提供数十亿美元的现金抵押。尽管AIG是一家大型公司，但它不是银行，手头上也没有数百亿美元的流动现金。正是这场流动性危机——无法满足即时的抵押要求——在几天内将其推到了破产的边缘。

纾困 — The Bailout

The US government decided that AIG was “too interconnected to fail”. Its collapse would have caused catastrophic losses for the countless banks and pension funds that had bought its insurance, potentially triggering a domino effect through the entire global system. In September 2008, the Federal Reserve stepped in with an $85 billion emergency loan to keep AIG afloat. Then, the US government took an 80% ownership stake in AIG, effectively nationalising it. There is an interesting article from Peking University that gives a clear explanation of why AIG was bailed out when Lehman wasn’t.[9]

美国政府认定美国国际集团（AIG）“关联性太强，不能倒闭”。该集团的倒闭将给无数购买其保险的银行和养老基金带来灾难性损失，并可能在整个全球体系中引发多米诺骨牌效应。2008年9月，美联储介入，提供850亿美元紧急贷款以维持AIG的运营。随后，美国政府收购了AIG 80%的股权，实际上将其国有化。北京大学有一篇有趣的文章，明确解释了为什么AIG得到了纾困，而雷曼兄弟却没有。[9]

There were many investigations and much public anger about AIG’s collapse and the subsequent bailout. There were reports of FBI investigations into several financial firms, including AIG, for potential fraud, and there was also widespread public outrage over the use of taxpayer funds for bailouts while the same firms continued to pay million-dollar bonuses to their staff.

针对美国国际集团（AIG）的破产及其后的纾困行动，展开了大量调查，公众对此也十分愤怒。有报道称，美国联邦调查局（FBI）正在调查包括AIG在内的多家金融公司，以查明是否存在欺诈行为。同时，公众对以下情况也普遍感到愤怒：这些公司一边继续向员工发放数百万美元的奖金，一边却使用纳税人的资金进行纾困。

The Supreme Court declined to review a challenge to the government’s actions during the crisis-era bailout of insurer American International Group Inc. Source

最高法院拒绝审查对政府在危机时期对保险公司美国国际集团股份有限公司（American International Group Inc.）实施救助的质疑。来源

There were enormous controversies about the bailout of AIG, primarily because that money did not go to AIG. Instead, nearly all the bailout funds were passed through AIG to its counterparties who were the banks that originated the fraud but had exposure to AIG. Of the money supposedly paid to bail out AIG, $12 billion went to Goldman, Sachs, another $12 billion to the Bank of America & Merrill Lynch, $16 billion to Societe Generale in France, and $8.5 billion to Deutsche Bank, among many others. Another $12 billion went to various US states and municipalities. None of it remained with AIG.

关于美国国际集团（AIG）的纾困存在巨大争议，主要是因为这笔钱并没有流向AIG。相反，几乎所有的纾困资金都是通过AIG流向其交易对手的，而这些交易对手正是发起欺诈行为但对AIG有敞口的银行。在据称用于纾困AIG的资金中，120亿美元流向了高盛，另有120亿美元流向了美国银行美林，160亿美元流向了法国兴业银行，85亿美元流向了德意志银行，此外还有其他许多银行。另有120亿美元流向了美国各州和市政当局。这些资金没有一分留在AIG手中。

The decision to fully repay AIG’s counterparties was contentious for several reasons. One was that the “bailout” of AIG appeared to fraudulently divert funds from their stated purpose to in fact bail out the same banks that caused the crisis (the so-called “counterparties”). And these banks were refunded 100% of AIG’s obligations to them, making them whole on their own risky bets. This was all done with questionable justification. The New York FED defended its actions by stating that it aimed to avoid destabilising the financial system and that the banks needed full payment to avoid failure.

全额偿还美国国际集团（AIG）交易对手的决定颇具争议，原因有以下几点。首先，对AIG的“纾困”似乎是以欺诈手段将资金从其既定用途挪用于实际上纾困那些引发危机的银行（即所谓的“交易对手”）。而这些银行却得到了AIG对其债务的100%偿还，使它们在自身的高风险押注中得以全身而退。这一切都是在缺乏充分理由的情况下进行的。纽约联邦储备银行为其行为辩解，称其旨在避免破坏金融体系的稳定，且银行需要全额偿付以避免破产。

Another contention was the intense lack of transparency. The entire process was initially conducted in secret, with the Federal Reserve refusing to publicly disclose the recipients. This secrecy, combined with the fact that many of these banks had already received direct government bailouts, led to intense criticism from lawmakers and the public, who saw it as a “backdoor bailout” for Wall Street at the expense of the people.

另一个争议点在于极度缺乏透明度。整个过程最初都是秘密进行的，美联储拒绝公开披露受助者名单。这种保密行为，再加上许多银行已经接受了政府的直接纾困，引发了议员和公众的强烈批评，他们认为这是以牺牲人民利益为代价，为华尔街提供的“后门纾困”。

Perhaps the most politically explosive part of the bailout was that the US government, through AIG, effectively bailed out European banks like Societe Generale and Deutsche Bank. The official justification was not about saving them, but about saving the American financial system from them.

此次纾困最具政治爆炸性的部分或许在于，美国政府通过美国国际集团（AIG）实际上纾困了法国兴业银行和德意志银行等欧洲银行。官方给出的理由并非是为了拯救这些银行，而是为了保护美国金融体系免受其影响。

Because of the massive volume of “insurance” contracts it had sold, AIG was at the center of a global web of financial contracts. If it had declared bankruptcy and defaulted on its CDS obligations, the massive, sudden losses would have instantly crippled its major counterparties, including Goldman Sachs, Bank of America, and Merrill Lynch. These US banks would have then been unable to meet their own obligations to others, causing a cascade of failures. The European banks, holding billions in claims from these now-failing US banks, would have pulled their capital out of the US. system, freezing credit completely. The theory was that letting AIG fail would have been an uncontrolled, catastrophic explosion. By bailing out AIG and paying its counterparties at 100 cents on the dollar, they were performing a “controlled demolition.” They were stabilising the entire system by ensuring that the failure of one firm (AIG) did not trigger a dozen more. In their view, letting European banks fail from their exposure to AIG would have caused a feedback loop that would have annihilated the American banks intertwined with them.

由于AIG出售了大量“保险”合同，它成为了全球金融合同网络的中心。如果AIG宣布破产并拖欠信用违约掉期（CDS）债务，其突然遭受的巨额损失将立即拖垮其主要交易对手，包括高盛、美国银行和美林。这些美国银行将无法履行对其他银行的义务，从而引发一系列破产。持有这些如今已破产的美国银行数十亿美元债权的欧洲银行，将把资金撤出美国金融体系，导致信贷完全冻结。理论上，让AIG破产将是一场无法控制的灾难性爆炸。通过纾困AIG并以全额支付其交易对手，他们执行了一次“控制性爆破”。他们通过确保一家公司（AIG）的破产不会引发十几家公司的破产，从而稳定了整个体系。在他们看来，如果让欧洲银行因对AIG的风险敞口而破产，将引发一个反馈循环，摧毁与之交织在一起的美国银行。

官方说法 — The Official Story

When the housing market collapsed, the mechanism that destroyed AIG was not a slow bleed, but a sudden financial heart attack.

当房地产市场崩溃时，摧毁美国国际集团（AIG）的机制并非是缓慢的失血，而是突如其来的金融心脏病发作。

There are many problems with the official story of AIG. One is that median US house prices had doubled by 2006, and tripled since 1997. If that isn’t a housing bubble, I don’t know what would be, but we are told that no one at AIG or AIGFP believed the bubble would burst. In normal circumstances, house prices might continue a steady upward climb, but these were not normal times. Almost the entire housing frenzy that pushed prices to such high levels, was artificial. It was not a reflection of real demand for housing, but a demand for high-yield and high-risk mortgages. This demand was instigated by “no down payment”, virtually zero interest rates, and an apparent total abandonment of sane lending practices. Most of the mortgages were “subprime” and most borrowers substandard. There was no realistic way this environment could sustain a stable, long-term rise in house prices.

美国国际集团（AIG）的官方说法存在诸多问题。其中之一是，到2006年，美国房价中位数已翻了一番，自1997年以来更是翻了三倍。如果这还不算房地产泡沫，我不知道什么算，但我们被告知，AIG或AIG金融产品（AIGFP）的任何人都不认为泡沫会破裂。在正常情况下，房价可能会持续稳步攀升，但当时并非正常时期。几乎将房价推至如此高位的整个房地产狂热都是人为制造的。它并非对住房真实需求的反映，而是对高收益、高风险抵押贷款的需求。这种需求是由“零首付”、近乎零的利率以及明显完全放弃理智的贷款做法所引发的。大多数抵押贷款都是“次级抵押贷款”，大多数借款人也都不合格。在这种环境下，房价不可能实现稳定、长期的上涨。

Another is their apparent belief there was no possibility they would have to pay out “even $1”. Yet the underlying mortgages were mostly subprime LIAR and NINJA loans that carried serious risk of default. Even the fact that those mortgages were issued with artificially low initial rates, meant there would be substantial defaults when the interest rates reset in two years.

另一个问题是，他们显然认为，他们不可能需要支付“哪怕1美元”。然而，这些抵押贷款大多为次级“说谎者”和“无收入无证明”贷款，存在严重的违约风险。即使这些抵押贷款的初始利率被人为压低，也意味着两年后利率重置时，将会有大量违约发生。

Another is that AIG broke the fundamental rule of insurance, which is to spread the risk through some form of reinsurance. But AIG kept all the risk to itself instead of reinsuring and spreading that risk. Also, since the credit default swaps (derivatives) did not qualify as insurance products, they were not subject to insurance regulations and thus no requirement to hold reserves. And AGIFP kept no reserves. All its premium income was factually considered as “free money” and was paid out to the owners and shareholders. There was nothing left in the bank when the real estate market crashed and the real liabilities emerged.

另一个问题是，美国国际集团（AIG）违反了保险的基本规则，即通过某种形式的再保险来分散风险。但AIG却将所有风险留给了自己，而没有进行再保险以分散风险。此外，由于信用违约掉期（衍生品）不符合保险产品的资格，因此不受保险法规的约束，也无需持有准备金。而美国国际集团金融产品公司（AGIFP）则没有准备金。其所有的保费收入实际上都被视为“免费资金”，并被支付给了所有者和股东。当房地产市场崩溃、实际负债浮出水面时，银行里已经没有剩余资金了。

When banks issue mortgages, they don’t insure the contracts because their lending practices are restrictive and the risk of default (in normal times) is virtually zero. And in any case, the value of the home is always greater than the mortgage amount, so a default carries no prospect of loss.

银行发放抵押贷款时，不会为这些合同投保，因为它们的贷款行为具有限制性，且（在正常情况下）违约风险几乎为零。而且无论如何，房屋的价值总是大于抵押贷款的金额，因此违约不会带来损失。

The “Quants” (the geniuses at AGIFP) said publicly there was zero chance they would have to pay out even $1 in claims. We must take them at their word. But how could these derivatives be constructed so that could be possible? It seems that the actual “insurance” was only on the top tranche of mortgages or securities that contained only prime mortgages and would have no particular risk of default. Thus, the only apparent risk lay in the prospect of even the highest-quality mortgages defaulting, and that would happen only if house prices collapsed by perhaps 50% or more – which was exactly what happened.

“定量分析师”（即AGIFP的天才们）公开表示，他们连1美元的索赔都不可能支付。我们必须相信他们的话。但是，这些衍生品是如何构建的，以至于他们可能需要支付哪怕1美元的索赔呢？看起来，真正的“保险”只存在于最高级别的抵押贷款或仅包含优质抵押贷款的证券上，而这些证券并没有特别的违约风险。因此，唯一明显的风险在于，即便是最高质量的抵押贷款也可能违约，而这种情况只有在房价暴跌50%或更多时才会发生——这正是当时所发生的情况。

There was a kind of “Too-Safe-to-Fail” arrogance. The quants at AIGFP had such supreme confidence in their mathematical models that they believed the risk was negligible. Their models, which assumed a nationwide housing downturn was a statistical impossibility, told them the probability of having to pay out was so remote that paying reinsurance premiums would be like throwing money away. Also, they seemed to view themselves as “The Ultimate Reinsurer”. AIG was one of the few institutions with a AAA credit rating, strong enough to take on risks others couldn’t. In their view, they were the end of the line. Who could they possibly reinsure with? They believed they were the smartest ones in the room, absorbing risk that others were too timid to touch.

有一种“稳赚不赔”的傲慢心态。AIG金融产品公司（AIGFP）的定量分析师们对自己的数学模型有着极高的信心，认为风险可以忽略不计。他们的模型假设全国性的房地产市场低迷在统计学上是不可能发生的，因此他们认为赔付的可能性极小，支付再保险费无异于把钱扔掉。此外，他们似乎自视为“终极再保险公司”。美国国际集团（AIG）是少数几家拥有AAA信用评级的机构之一，其信用评级之高足以承担其他机构无法承担的风险。在他们看来，他们是链条的末端。他们还能向谁投保再保险呢？他们认为自己是房间里最聪明的人，承担着其他人因胆怯而不敢承担的风险。

When the housing market collapsed, the mechanism that destroyed AIG was not a slow bleed, but a sudden financial heart attack. The prime result came from collateral calls. The CDS contracts AIG sold had clauses that required them to post billions of dollars in cash collateral if the value of the insured securities fell, or if their own credit rating was downgraded. In 2008, both of these things happened at once. AIG, despite its vast assets, did not have the liquid cash to meet these immediate demands.

当房地产市场崩盘时，摧毁美国国际集团（AIG）的机制并非是缓慢的失血，而是一场突如其来的金融心脏病发作。主要结果来自抵押品赎回权。AIG出售的信用违约掉期（CDS）合约中包含条款，要求如果被保险证券的价值下跌，或者其自身的信用评级被下调，他们必须提供数十亿美元的现金抵押品。2008年，这两件事同时发生。尽管AIG拥有庞大的资产，但它没有流动现金来满足这些迫切的需求。

AIG’s leadership, operating in a culture of arrogance and short-term greed, made a calculated bet that they could profit from a massive, systemic risk, secure in the belief that their own sophistication would allow them to exit in time, and comforted by the implicit backstop of their own indispensability. This was not a failure of intelligence or risk assessment. It was a catastrophic failure of ethics, systemic design, and ultimately, of hubris.

美国国际集团（AIG）的领导层在傲慢和短期贪婪的文化中运营，他们精心策划，押注于能从巨大的系统性风险中获利，并坚信凭借自身的精明能及时抽身，同时因自身不可或缺的地位而心安理得。这并非情报或风险评估的失误。这是道德、系统设计乃至傲慢的灾难性失败。

冲洗并重复 — Rinse and Repeat

May 13, 1985: Depositors line up to withdraw money from a Baltimore bank following the court order that limited depositors’ cash withdrawals until a purchaser was found for the troubled savings and loan. (Photo: Bettmann/Bettmann/Getty Images) Source

1985年5月13日：在法院下令限制储户提取现金，直至为陷入困境的储蓄和贷款机构找到买家后，巴尔的摩一家银行的储户排队取款。（照片来源：Bettmann/Bettmann/Getty Images）源

If we compare the Savings & Loan US mortgage fraud of the 1980s to the mortgage fraud of 2008, they are essentially the same animal, differing only in the method of looting the US Treasury and taxpayer. Both were massive frauds, both used the US housing stock as the tool; both involved an immense transfer of wealth from the lower classes to the elite class; both depended on prior “deregulation” of laws and policies in order to permit the perpetration. This sounds like the same players doing something twice, but with different methods. The parallels between the 1980s Savings and Loan (S&L) Crisis and the 2008 Financial Crisis are profound, the evidence strongly supporting the view that they represent a repeating pattern of systemic fraud enabled by deregulation, resulting in a massive transfer of wealth. And again, entirely Jewish in origin.

如果我们把20世纪80年代的美国储蓄贷款协会（Savings & Loan）抵押贷款欺诈与2008年的抵押贷款欺诈进行比较，会发现它们本质上是同一类行为，只是掠夺美国财政部和纳税人的方式不同。两者都是大规模的欺诈行为，都利用了美国的住房存量作为工具；都涉及从下层阶级向精英阶层的大规模财富转移；都依赖于法律和政策事先的“放松管制”，以便实施欺诈。这听起来像是同一批人在用不同的方法做同样的事。20世纪80年代的储蓄贷款协会（S&L）危机与2008年的金融危机之间存在深刻的相似之处，证据有力地支持了这样一种观点：它们代表了由放松管制所促成的系统性欺诈的重复模式，导致了大规模的财富转移。而且，其根源完全在于犹太人。

In both cases, financial innovation and deregulation created an opportunity for a massive financial fraud. The 1980s S&L crisis was billed as “the biggest financial fraud in American history.” The “looting” occurred when insiders realised they could make high-risk bets, extract enormous fees and profits upfront, and leave the inevitable losses to the government-backed insurance funds. Privatise the profits and socialise the losses.

在这两起事件中，金融创新和放松监管为大规模金融欺诈创造了机会。20世纪80年代的储贷危机被称为“美国历史上最大的金融欺诈”。当内部人士意识到他们可以进行高风险押注、提前提取巨额费用和利润，并将不可避免的损失留给政府支持的保险基金时，就发生了“掠夺”。利润私有化，损失社会化。

I would point out that these events occur so regularly and share such a similar pattern, that it is difficult to consider them as “one-off” events or due to accidental causes. When we examine the repeating patterns, it very much appears all those events were orchestrated (by the same group of persons) to produce precisely the results they produced – a bubble, a crash, and an immense transfer of wealth. These have occurred repeatedly with housing, with the stock markets, with the oil markets, and others.

我想指出的是，这些事件如此频繁地发生，且模式如此相似，以至于很难将它们视为“一次性”事件或偶然原因所致。当我们审视这些重复出现的模式时，很明显，所有这些事件都是（由同一群人）精心策划的，以产生它们所产生的效果——泡沫、崩盘和巨额财富转移。这些事件在房地产、股市、油市等领域反复发生。

Mr. Romanoff’s writing has been translated into 34 languages and his articles posted on more than 150 foreign-language news and politics websites in more than 30 countries, as well as more than 100 English language platforms. Larry Romanoff is a retired management consultant and businessman. He has held senior executive positions in international consulting firms, and owned an international import-export business. He has been a visiting professor at Shanghai’s Fudan University, presenting case studies in international affairs to senior EMBA classes. Mr. Romanoff lives in Shanghai and is currently writing a series of ten books generally related to China and the West. He is one of the contributing authors to Cynthia McKinney’s new anthology ‘When China Sneezes’. (Chap. 2 — Dealing with Demons).

罗曼诺夫先生的作品已被翻译成34种语言，他的文章被发布在30多个国家的150多个外文新闻和政治网站上，以及100多个英文平台上。拉里·罗曼诺夫是一位退休的管理顾问和商人。他曾在国际咨询公司担任高级管理职务，并拥有一家国际进出口企业。他曾担任上海复旦大学的客座教授，为高级EMBA课程讲授国际事务案例研究。罗曼诺夫先生现居上海，目前正在撰写一系列共十本书，总体上涉及中国与西方。他是辛西娅·麦金尼新选集《当中国打喷嚏》（第2章——与恶魔打交道）的特约作者之一。

His full archive can be seen at

他的全部档案可以在以下网址查看：

https://www.bluemoonofshanghai.com/ + https://www.moonofshanghai.com/

He can be contacted at:

他的全部档案可以在以下网址查看：

2186604556@qq.com

NOTES: Perpetrator-Victims

注释：加害者–受害者

[1] Background knowledge questions and answers about the “two rooms” in the United States

[1] 关于美国“两室”的背景知识问答

http://hangzhou.pbc.gov.cn/hangzhou/125333/125625/2179388/index.html

[2] Buffett: Before the crisis, the company had signs of “death” and smelled that it was about to withdraw……

[2] 巴菲特：危机前，公司有“死亡”的迹象，并嗅到即将撤退的气息……

https://news.futunn.com/post/32803575?level=1&data_ticket=1762525606515068

[3] Buffett’s biggest enlightenment from investing in Freddie Mac: Before the crisis, the company had signs of “death”

[3] 巴菲特从投资房地美（Freddie Mac）中得到的最大启示：在危机爆发前，该公司就已显露出“死亡”的迹象

https://news.futunn.com/post/32803575?level=2&data_ticket=1762685770146918

[4] Geithner published a book revealing the inside story of Lehman’s collapse

[4] 盖特纳出版了一本书，揭露了雷曼破产的内幕

https://www.xinhuanet.com//world/2014-05/13/c_126492367.htm

[5] Let Lehman Brothers go bankrupt

[5] 让雷曼兄弟破产

http://big5.news.cn/gate/big5/jjckb.xinhuanet.com/dspd/2011-06/24/content_317297.htm

[6] Lehman Brothers once again tested the wisdom of U.S. financial regulation

[6] 雷曼兄弟再次考验了美国金融监管的智慧

http://www.cnfinance.cn/magzi/2008-10/01-1031.html

[7] Geithner published a book revealing the inside story of Lehman’s collapse

[7] 盖特纳出版了一本书，揭露了雷曼兄弟破产的内幕

https://www.xinhuanet.com//world/2014-05/13/c_126492367.htm

[8] America’s most greedy CEO

[8] 美国最贪婪的首席执行官

http://info.epjob88.com/html/2006-4-13/2006413212559.htm

[9] Xie Shiqing: Save the American insurance giant AIG

[9] 谢世清：拯救美国保险巨头AIG

https://econ.pku.edu.cn/ccissr/bdbxpl/309017.htm

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